Transitional Maoist Diplomacy

Having come to the conclusion that they are unlikely to succeed to attain power solely through the "barrel of the gun" given the geo-strategic, economic and political realities of contemporary Nepal and the world, they now want to have relations with the regional and global powers whose policies and power-play they have all along termed objectionable to their radical ideology or interests.

Dr. Som P Pudasaini

The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda" and supported by his second in command Dr. Baburam Bhattarai and their foreign policy czar C.P. Gajural, has been attempting to streamline its foreign policy and diplomatic relations with two key objectives of largely contradictory nature. Understandably, they are in a difficult transition by both the design and default given their internal party dynamics and external ground realities.
First, as a "revolutionary" insurgent outfit that followed a bloody trail with a high pitched outcry of nationalism and radical transformation they want to continue to appear standing firmly against the so called "expansionist" and "neo-colonialist" regional and global bullies as has been done by many insurgents across the continents in the last five decades to sustain general public's attention.

Secondly, having come to the conclusion that they are unlikely to succeed to attain power solely through the "barrel of the gun" given the geo-strategic, economic and political realities of contemporary Nepal and the world, they now want to have relations with the regional and global powers whose policies and power-play they have all along termed objectionable to their radical ideology or interests.

The compulsion resulting from the second objective probably explains why comrade Prachanda played to the gallery during his visit to New Delhi several months ago with his lavishly India-friendly pronouncements and was showered with frenzied media coverage and a wide approval from a broad range of intellectuals and businessmen. The CPN-M and Indian relations appears to be cooling in recent months given the Indian realities of having to deal with their own fast expanding Maoist threat, its democratic polity, politico-economic interests and narrow margin of cozying up with the Nepalese Maoists under its present state of troubled transition.

As an alternative as well as a covert threat to the Maoists to toe the earlier line, India seems to be manipulating Madhav Nepal and UML's aspirations and ego and advised the latter to cozy up with the NC as was obvious from the red carpet treatment afforded to Madhav Nepal and his two colleagues in New Delhi recently. This is nothing unusual in international politics and diplomacy. But the wisdom of our leaders, particularly the Eight Party Alliance (EPA) ones, will lie on the choices they make in the sustained national interests that will benefit them as well as the nation in both the short and long runs.

In the aftermath of the Indian diplomatic pilgrimage, the Maoists are continuing their charm offensive towards the powers that matter. It was evident in Prachanda's and Dr. Bhattarai's exceptional courting of visiting former US President Jimmy Carter during and after their meeting to help the Maoists establish communication with the US government "at any level" and lobby to drop the "terrorist tag". Carter's statements indicated that the Maoists will have to wait to be treated as a normal political outfit by the sole global superpower and will depend much on further behavioral change on the part of the Maoists; including its reigning on the YCL.
A person of a former president's status coming from a country with an institutionalized democracy like the US would probably not publicly recognize relevance of communication between the Maoists and the US even at a personal capacity without some perceived receptivity on the part of his government. However, he was honest in expressing his limitations by saying he had no authority to pressurize and would pass his report to the US President. George Bush being a conservative hardliner may take any advice on being soft on those perceived to be less than fully reformed "terrorists" with a pinch of salt as his policies elsewhere indicate.

The Maoists may be wise not to misunderstand the American or the global diplomatic code of conduct and may have been poor in their judgment if Carter was advised not to trust Ambassador James Moriarty but to talk to others for shaping US opinion about the Maoists as first reported and then denied in the local media. It is important to remember that the first person Carter met in Kathmandu was Moriarty. Carter's conditional recognition of the need to open communication with the Maoists that did not figure the word "terrorist" is probably not more than marginally superior to the expressed desire of the Ambassador to shake hand with Prachanda the day the Maoists behavior fully met the norms of a mainstream democratic party. Let us remember other countries neither appoint nor treat Ambassadors as trash as Nepali politicians seem to do most of the time.

Maoists' policy of "equidistance between India and China" is also flawed on two grounds. First, it attempts to court India eagerly at times and wants to move closer to China when that does not work. Secondly, mutual interest between nations, including economic and strategic, constitute the core basis for diplomatic relations in the contemporary world not any concept of a distance. For China, support for "one China doctrine" and some trade with a stable Nepal not inclined to irritate it too much by excessively pro-India or pro-West cacophony may be important. Nepal and India has a lot more areas of mutual benefits and conflicts to sort out.

It needs the West and Japan to enhance development and reclaim its past image of stability, tranquility and panoramic beauty. It hardly presents as a viable option to attempt to play one against the other or unduly please one or two at the cost of the others in the open and globalizing world. Nepali politicians and diplomats, including the Maoists, will have to read the international pulse better and play it effectively in the national interest without being bogged down by jargons. Since the major focus of contemporary world is on economic diplomacy, conflict resolution and anti-terrorism, and democratization, the Maoists' fuzzy economic policy is a big bottleneck. However, its move towards mainstreaming and peace building represents a good opening for improved international relations.

In short, the Maoists’ foreign policy at the moment appears to be in both a confused and pragmatic transition dictated by their past "revolutionary" rhetoric and a new desire to brace the contemporary domestic, regional and global politico-economic and strategic realities. They may have to better shape up their foreign affairs, economic agenda and eliminate their "violent" and non-law-abiding image sooner. The Maoists may benefit by enhancing their contacts and communications with independent and experienced Nepali experts who understand as well as command the respect of international community, including the UN and donors, to further rationalize its foreign policy and firm up its shift to a peaceful competitive politics to build better bridges with the rest of the world. Clearly, they deserve support from all the concerned to cement their commitment to pragmatic diplomacy, sound economy and inclusive democracy.

Source: Nepalnews.com, June 2007