No Strategy to Fight Maoists
Ashok K Mehta
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is an able and learned man, singly responsible for the economic emancipation and rise of India. But lately he has made some impromptu statements on security which make one wonder whether he is well advised. That Indian Muslims are not immunised against engaging in acts of international Islamist terrorism was exposed last week. Mr Singh's latest defence and loss of sleep over that community's involvement was politically incorrect. It is clear that he and his Home Minister Shivraj Patil take internal security rather lightly; otherwise we ought to have seen some 'terrorist catches' in three years of major terror attacks causing at least 300 deaths.
Not long ago, he told China's President Hu Jintao that the people of India regarded China as their greatest neighbour even after Beijing has repeatedly pressed its claim on Arunachal Pradesh. Last year, at a Chief Ministers' conference, he described the Naxalite/Maoist threat as the single biggest challenge to internal security. Surprisingly, there is no visible action to deal with the Maoist challenge which, according to the former Home Secretary, is not a national problem. That is the reason the Maoist threat has not been met with coordinated and effective State and Central response.
The 1967 Naxalite movement was confined to West Bengal and crushed there in 1970 but its ideology of protracted armed struggle to capture power survived. It spread to Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. Its area of influence has increased from 55 districts in nine States in 2003 to 156 districts in 13 States in 2004, had to 182 districts in 16 States today. The Asian Centre for Human Rights, in its latest Naxal Conflict Monitor, has reported that violence levels are down 45 per cent during the first half of 2007 compared to the same period last year, yet it says the conflict is intensifying due to increase in casualties among security forces. It identifies Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand with the highest levels of violence and attributes the continuing armed struggle to failure of governance and abysmal implementation of schemes and projects.
While Maoist influence is certainly spreading with their claims that by 2010-15, 30 to 35 per cent of India will be under their control, violence levels have temporarily dipped. The threat postulated (actually exaggerated) five years ago by intelligence agencies of a Compact Revolutionary Zone or Red Corridor from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh is a pipe dream, especially after the Maoists in Nepal have upset the ideological applecart by joining the political mainstream. Why did intelligence agencies exaggerate the Red threat?
The contours of change in Maoist grand strategy emerged after its month-long Ninth Unity Congress earlier this year attended by representatives from 16 States. An 'Action Plan' was dramatically unleashed last month through a pincer of a two-day economic blockade and lightening attacks against police stations and infrastructure. The Maoists announced that these were in protest against the Government's economic policies, in particular against the imposition of Special Economic Zones. Both these strategies are leaves out of the Nepali Maoists' 'Peoples War Book' of paralysing the state. That is precisely what the Maoists were able to do to parts of Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa and Chhattisgarh.
In 2006, an economic blockade of smaller intensity had seriously affected commercial activity. This year though, the strategy was bolder - destruction of infrastructure, prevention of movement of strategic minerals like bauxite, iron ore, steel, and partial to total disruption of commercial activity. The economic cost of the Maoist blockade is estimated to be around Rs 1,000 crore. In May, the Bastar blackout cost Chhattisgarh Rs 2000 crore. Targetting infrastructure was a favoured Nepali Maoist tactic that destroyed nearly Rs 500 crore of roads, bridges and telecommunication facilities in a country with so little of it.
The other element of copycat disruption is the Maoists' capability of planning and mounting attacks by up to 2,000 combatants and overwhelming police posts. The Jehanabad jailbreak in Bihar in 2005 and the elimination of Rani Bodli police post in Chhattisgarh in 2007 are powerful reflections of military strength and motivation among the Maoists. The Nepal Maoists are reported to have set up joint training and logistic bases in Champaran, Madhubani and Sitamarhi. All Left-wing extremists including the Maoists in India are known to have links with ISI, DG Inter-Forces Intelligence (Bangladesh) and LTTE, though Nepali Maoists have said they have no connections with them. The irony in the Maoist class struggle is that majority of their victims belong to the very class whose case they espouse.
Citigroup, an international financial services company which monitors Maoist activities, has estimated that without an effective deterrent to contain and roll back their surge, Maoists could not only hamper economic growth but also restrict FDI inflow. At stake could be power projects and steel plants worth Rs 2,640 billion in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Despite the apparent contradictions in strategy and goals and lack of flexibility compared to their ideological kin in Nepal, the Naxals are a united revolutionary force with mass appeal in rural areas which they hope to extend to urban regions too.
The Maoists' success is the direct outcome of the State and Central Government failures. Whenever the Government has been serious and recognised the problem, it has been able to contain or crush separatist movements from Punjab to the North-East. The inhibition in acting against Maoists does not stem from the fact that law and order is a State subject or that 16 States are involved or that there is a nexus between Maoists, the police and political leaders; it is lack of political will and a national strategy.
On paper there is no shortage of ideas and plans. Nor is there any dearth of funds and structures to address the grievances of people in the tribal areas. Elaborate and high-powered Central and State level task forces have been created, so impressive that the Maoist menace should have disappeared yesterday. Unfortunately, the grand 14-point National Action Plan is just notional. The first line of defence, the State police, has not been empowered to face up to the challenge. There is neither a counter-Maoist operational grid nor a Central intelligence network in the Maoist-affected States. Arming the locals to fight the enemy is not novel and has been experimented from Jammu & Kashmir to Nagaland. In Jharkhand, Orissa and notably the Salwa Judum's self-defence campaign, reportedly a spontaneous movement in Chhattisgarh, have shown erratic success.
Ask anyone following the rise and spread of Maoists in India, the reasons for their growing sophistication in psywar and firepower and increasing sway over tribal and rural folk, you will get this answer - there is no political will, no strategy and failure of implementation. Only yesterday, the Maoists lured security forces in Dantewada, Bastar into a deadly trap. Let us not forget, the Prime Minister has identified the Maoists as India's most serious internal security challenge. Unless we want the Army sucked into Maoist-affected States also, it is high time to make the 14-Point Action Plan work. Meanwhile, a fresh and independent assessment of the scale of Maoist challenge is required to refine strategy.
Source: The Pioneer, July 11, 2007
