Extending UN Role in Nepal

The following is the Transcript of Question and Answer session with Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Nepal in Kathmandu, 6 November 2007. At the end is Martin's press statement.

Sam Taylor, AFP: Mr Martin, it’s a bit difficult, I am still digesting your statement. When you talk about expanding of the mandate, first you talk about support to the implementation to the peace process. Can you explain in concrete terms what you mean about that support, what would that, could that be?

Ian Martin: There are a number of peace processes where there is implementation machinery defined which the United Nations participates in or supports. Indeed here in Nepal we were asked to be members of a broader advisory committee around the Peace Ministry. But many of the elements of agreements that have been reached, for example, the establishment of a high level monitoring committee, which we have always regarded as of great importance and were indeed asked in principle to assist; the establishment of a credible commission to investigate disappearances, which again has been repeatedly agreed but yet to be implemented in practice: these are among the kind of measures where I believe we could be of greater assistance to the parties in the follow-through on agreements that have been reached, sometimes more than once.

Sam Taylor, AFP: But how Mr. Martin – what form will that assistance take? Experts, UN people going in to assist or set up these things? What concrete things?

Ian Martin: Well, it could mean a continuing relationship with whatever body, the Peace Ministry or other implementation machinery that’s agreed, as well as indeed bringing in international experience where it is helpful to defining how to implement particular commitments.

Kumar Lamichhane Nepal 1 TV: Your statement mentions that “The expectation among Nepalese are high as to what UNMIN can do”. Are you indicating that Nepalese people are expecting much more of a role and mandate to be given to UNMIN, and are you indicating this thing in case the Terai rebel group which has also asked UNMIN to play role while negotiating with the Government?

Ian Martin: That reference wasn’t intended to be a reference to the Terai situation. It was rather a general reference to the fact that Nepalis see here what looks like a rather large United Nations presence and one that has increasingly reached the regions and, through our District Electoral Advisers and Arms Monitors, the districts of Nepal. They are very concerned about a peace process that they see faltering perhaps, in a number of respects. And they assume that it should be the role of the United Nations to help keep that process on track.

And we find ourselves having to explain to them, through you, that our role has essentially been asked to focus on arms monitoring, extremely important to sustaining the peace process but nonetheless only one aspect of it; electoral support, but it’s not the technical preparations for the election that has meant this further postponement; assistance in monitoring, but there what we have been able to do is being limited by the absence of an effective national monitoring of peace process commitments, such as was always intended. And, naturally, I think, many ordinary Nepalis who don’t understand the limitations of the mandate that was given to UNMIN expect that we should in some way be able to support the process more broadly.

Now I have stressed again that this will always remain a Nepalese process and any assistance the United Nations offers can only be at the request of the Government and the parties to the process. But we do think, without in any way envisaging a larger mission, that perhaps there are ways in which we could be more active in support to the process if that is desired.

Devendra Bhattarai, Kantipur: You have mentioned one thing here, “this would not mean a bigger UNMIN presence, we are already reducing our electoral staff”. But according to some of the sources most of the district electoral officers are being reinstated despite the fact that everybody is talking about downsizing UNMIN. Can I get the numbers of those electoral officers?

Ian Martin: We can give you the numbers afterwards. I can’t give them to you off the top of my head. But it is indeed true that, not wanting to cut back people’s quite limited contracts, many of which expire in December, we have temporarily re-deployed some of the staff who were here as District Electoral Advisers. So, the downsizing is in process. But it is not their re-deployment as District Electoral Advisers, that would be something to consider whatever the appropriate period was ahead of a new election date.

Sirish Pradhan, Press Trust of India: As you know the election has been postponed twice and it seems that the political parties are not serious in holding election in near future. How can you pressurize them to come to the electoral process? And there are reports that as the peace process becomes longer, the Maoist combatants in the camps are reducing. If it goes longer, there won’t be any Maoists in camp. How can you resolve this issue?

Ian Martin: First, I don’t think it’s the matter of the United Nations pressurizing the parties in relation to the election. I think it is the matter of the parties themselves, as I have suggested, frankly analysing what have been the reasons why the postponement took place, not just in terms of the new demands that produced the deadlock in the Parliament but also underlying reasons for the growing mistrust between the parties, and then to decide how those can be addressed in a way that allows the electoral process to go forward and addresses issues like public security which are critical for a successful electoral process.

So far as the cantonments are concerned, I don’t think you should exaggerate departures from the cantonments. It is true that our verification has shown that some of those who were there at the time of first registration are no longer in the cantonments, but the majority are. And I think it is extremely important that discharge from the cantonments is a managed process, with consideration of the future of those who leave the cantonments. That’s what we are working on so far as those who have been excluded by our process of verification. And then of course, as I have highlighted, there’s a longer-term question of the future of those who are verified and will remain in cantonments.

But what I have been stressing, and why it is so important to discuss the future of the security sector, is that cantonment was supposed to be a relatively short-term process while an early election was held. It has now gone on for 11 months. Similarly, the Nepal Army has been basically restricted to barracks for those 11 months. That is not a viable long term situation. And therefore there needs to be discussion, which so far has hardly begun, about the long term. And that’s a very central issue for UNMIN, because as I have said we don’t know how long the arms monitoring role at cantonments and barracks will need to continue unless we know that there is a plan for the long term solutions.

Sudeshna Sarkar, Indo Asian News Service: Mr Martin, would you care to name the armed group and leaders met by UN humanitarian officers, and are these UN humanitarian officials from UNMIN or from other UN offices?

Ian Martin: The statement was intended to make it very clear that they were not UNMIN personnel. We don’t have humanitarian personnel as such. But precisely because this was not an UNMIN responsibility I am not going to say anything more about the nature of the meeting. I have made it clear its general nature.

Sashi Pokharel, Ujayalo Radio: You have said that the UN has been suggested to be more active including in security sector as well. Does it mean you will give support to security forces? Supporting security forces?

Ian Martin: It is not so much a question of supporting security forces, as assisting a discussion as to what is the long-term future in the security sector. Now, if one goes back to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it didn’t settle the future of the Maoist combatants or indeed all issues relating to the future of the Nepal Army. It said, on one hand, that there should be a special committee established by the Interim Government to consider the future of the Maoist combatants. That special committee was eventually established in May, it held a single meeting in July, and now with the Maoists out of the Interim Government, it is not continuing to work. So, essentially no progress has been made on that issue.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement also talked about the Interim Government drawing up an action plan for the Nepal Army for its democratisation, for considering its appropriate size, for considering its future inclusive character. And again, I am not aware that that discussion has been taken forward. Of course, these are difficult issues on which there are very different perspectives, but it’s not an issue that can be avoided because the future of those in the cantonments must be addressed.

Jane Rankin Reid, Tehelka: I am just wondering about the actual time frame for the extended mandate. I understand it is suppose to be mid-December. How much longer will UNMIN be looking for?

Ian Martin: The present mandate actually expires on 22 January. It is an initial 12 month mandate, voted by the Security Council on 23 January 2007. The question of the duration of any extension is a matter first for the Government, in the request it makes, and then for the Security Council. It’s not for UNMIN itself to determine. So, in that respect we will wait the request from the Government, which as I have said, the Prime Minister indicated is the subject of active consultation amongst the political parties at the moment.

Jane Rankin Reid, Tehelka: Assuming that Government requests your mandate, and it does not look like they are not going to, what is a ballpark timeframe?

Ian Martin: A Security Council mandate can be very different in different circumstances. Twelve months, which was our initial mandate, is normally the maximum that is decided. There was some suggestion when the initial mandate of UNMIN was discussed that six months would have been more appropriate initially and then a review, and that’s not uncommon in terms of United Nations operations, especially where the situation on the ground is uncertain and the Security Council wants to review it. But I would stress these are in a sense technical issues. The decision as to how long the mandate is extended doesn’t preclude further extension if that is requested.

Manesh Shrestha, CNN: You mention “where it has been suggested more UN involvement”: where does this suggestion come from? And, second, “there is no exit strategy for the UN without security sector reform”. What does that mean, exactly? Without security sector reform the UN will not be able to get out of Nepal?

Ian Martin: So far as the question of where suggestions come from, there have been a wide range of suggestions: from Nepalis, from people in political parties, people in civil society, as well as from those in the international community who wish the process well, who have made a significant investment, both by paying through the United Nations for UNMIN but also in many other ways, providing support to the election and so on. And naturally the international community wants to see that the investment in international support is actually effective and successful in furthering the process.

So far as the question of exit strategy is concerned, if you take the two core roles of UNMIN, so far as the electoral support is concerned, the exit strategy is clear: the holding of a successful election means there is no longer a continuing need for electoral support. Even now the amount that has already been accomplished, that will still be of value when a new date is set for the election, means that we wouldn’t necessarily expect to be asked for the same degree of support in future as we initially provided to the Election Commission. It’s much more complicated when you come to the arms monitoring role. Because that is linked to the arms monitoring agreement and to the fundamental commitment that began from the 12-Point Understanding that the Nepal Army would remain in barracks and the Maoist army would be in cantonments until the Constituent Assembly election had taken place. And even then there may be some further need for discussion and implementation of decisions about the future. So that’s why I link the question of discussions about the future of the security sector to UNMIN’s exit strategy.

There could be a decision that UNMIN was no longer to play the arms monitoring role, but then one would have to ask the question what does that mean in terms of respect for the commitments in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the arms monitoring agreement that have been implemented and are expected to continue until the Constituent Assembly election has taken place.

Mahesh, Kantipur Radio: You have mentioned in the statement there is a need for an “agreement on a road-map which will ensure that there is not yet another failure to hold the election on whatever new date is agreed.” Can you suggest what type of roadmap it could be?

Ian Martin: Again, I regard that as something that should be a subject of reflection amongst Nepalese actors, in which we will be delighted to contribute to. It is not for UNMIN to set out exclusively an UNMIN roadmap. But it clearly requires a sufficient degree of consensus around the electoral system, not only amongst the political parties but an understanding from the marginalised groups that they are to be adequately represented in the Constituent Assembly, and therefore that nobody has a motivation to continue to seek to disrupt the process. It requires, as I have already suggested, addressing the issues of public security which are particularly serious in parts of the Terai as we all know, but not only in the Terai. We don’t know exactly what would have happened if the political parties had gone forward to a 22 November election and had begun campaigning actively at the local level. But certainly up until the time the election was postponed, a climate had not yet been created in many parts of the country where all political parties could campaign freely, without any fear of intervention, of violence or threats of violence from others. And that’s fundamental, of course, to having a successful election.

But then beyond that, as I have suggested, the Constituent Assembly election is a key part of the peace process and there needs to be an understanding on all sides that that peace process is on track, and that’s where I come back to the suggestion and the very welcome reflection of that suggestion, on the part of the Prime Minister and others in the political parties, that a review of implementation of the Agreements is an important matter.

Ram Humagain, Gorkhapatra: I don’t see anything information about the second round of verification in the statement. Has it become sidelined due to other issues? What is the latest progress on the verification process?

Ian Martin: I primarily wanted to focus on the mandate issues that we have been discussing. But indeed I am happy to tell you that verification is proceeding with cooperation at Nawalparasi, the penultimate cantonment site where we are undertaking verification. And that once that is completed, we move on to the seventh and last site. Cooperation regarding the verification process itself is proceeding smoothly.

The big issue that remains, however, is arranging the discharge of those who have been excluded by verification and that, as many of you have heard me say before, requires the Government to take decisions on the payments that are to be made to those who are discharged. Because although three months of payments was released on the eve of Dasain, as it were, that was not regarded as the final fulfilment of commitments to make payments. Again, not a negotiation that UNMIN is involved in directly, but one that has to be successfully resolved by the Government and with the Maoists for us to be able to proceed with the discharge arrangements.

Ishwar Khanal, The Himalayan Times: You have said that UNMIN has met and will continue to meet the wide range of representatives from the traditionally marginalised groups. Does this mean that your discussions are purely confined to humanitarian issues or, like, political issues as well?

Ian Martin: These are discussions to inform how UNMIN carries out all of its work. Obviously a lot of the concerns that marginalized groups have expressed to us relate to their position within the electoral system and eventually in the Constituent Assembly. Humanitarian issues are dealt with by the UN humanitarian system, the Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Kahane and others. Human rights issues are of course primarily within the mandate of OHCHR, which similarly has an active engagement with representatives of these groups. But we regularly discuss, sometimes at our initiative, sometimes at theirs, with representatives of women’s groups about the inclusion of women in the peace process and the electoral system, and then of course with Madhesi, Janajati, Dalit and other groups. And I think that it is extremely important that UNMIN and the United Nations system as a whole should be open to and aware of their concerns, even if some of them are not matters that are for UNMIN to address directly.

Surendra Phuyal, BBC: We’ve been hearing and reading reports that UNMIN is giving too much concession to the Maoists, which was evident while doing the revision of those disqualified during the verification process. We also hear, at the same time, from the Maoists that UNMIN is conspiring against them. What is the reality? How do you see these reports?

Ian Martin: The reality from my perspective is that UNMIN is trying as hard as it can to be objective in a situation where there are accusations and counter-accusations, and naturally nobody is going to be fully satisfied that we are reflecting exclusively their point of view.

Let me deal specifically with the question about verification and whether there are concessions within verification. Because this, I think, mainly stems from the disagreements we had with the Maoists after verification at the first cantonment site in Ilam, when we did agree to review a small number of cases. We reviewed a small number of cases chosen by General Wilhelmsen, the Chief Arms Monitor, because he was not satisfied that the reports from the teams could be fully relied on. They were reviewed according to exactly the same criteria. Some of the decisions were maintained, some were reversed, and we then built in a process whereby cases could be taken up to a higher level. We are carrying out a very difficult process, because we are trying to confirm through interview issues of age and recruitment dates that can’t be confirmed with absolute certainty by any documentation. But I assure you and everyone again that we have not compromised in any way the criteria that were set out in the arms monitoring agreement.

Now you will continue to find that sometimes things we say will coincide with the perspective of the Nepali Congress, sometimes with the perspective of the UML, sometimes with the perspective of the Maoists. And our criticisms will sometimes be directed in one direction and sometimes in the other, and I would ask you to look overall in the manner in which we are trying to fulfil the role of an objective third party. Because frankly it is only with objectivity and trust from all parties that support to a peace process can be effective. It can’t be effective by the third party becoming purely a critic of one party or another.

Biswomani Pokharel, Samay: Mr Martin, I think you are aware of the fact that Prime Minister Koirala, the Maoists and China and India are not willing to give you the extended role. In this context, why are you coming with all these agendas demanding the extension. Are you trying to put pressure on the government and all these parties?

Ian Martin: I’m not really aware of anyone’s position unless it is communicated to me. I read a lot of things in the media, some of which I think may be correct, some of which I’m not sure are correct. But until I’ve had official discussions with those involved I don’t know formally what the position is.

I am responding to the view that the United Nations ought to be able to play a more fully effective and supportive role in this peace process without in any way compromising national sovereignty and the fact that it is a Nepalese process. At the end of the day, what UNMIN will do will be determined by the requests of the Government and the parties, and the willingness, of course of the Security Council to mandate us according to their request.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: In your statement it says “the need for reviewing the CPA” and you have blamed both the parties for violating the CPA. Can you please tell me who is more violating the CPA? Do you see any defect in the CPA itself?

Ian Martin: I don’t think it is helpful to try to ask the question who is violating the CPA most. Because certainly failures to implement the CPA are very different in their nature and some of them frankly are a matter of shared responsibility, especially when implementation was the responsibility of an Interim Government that included the Maoists, both sides to the peace agreement. So I think what’s needed is for everybody to look at what the limitations have been in the implementation of the peace agreements. And it would be more helpful is if each side focused on their own limitations rather than on accusations against the other. The further part of your question?

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: Do you see any defects in the CPA?

Ian Martin: Many of the issues that concern us are questions of implementation, but some are issues where the CPA itself did not fully map out the future. For example, if we return to the question of the future of the Maoist combatants, as I already said the CPA described a process in general terms but it certainly did not settle the issue. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was not a final resolution of all the issues of the peace process. It was a very major achievement in taking the peace process forward but there is still a need to take forward further aspects of the peace process. And the CPA was also negotiated at a time when issues of inclusion were not as prominent as they have become. So again, although there are general commitments to questions of inclusion, those too I think need further consideration in the current situation.

Gopal Sharma, Reuters: Some Indian channels have quoted you as saying “significant numbers in the Maoist soldiers in the camps are children”. What is the latest numbers? Can you give us some figures?

Ian Martin: There is nothing new, I have said in these press conferences that we have confirmed through our verification that there are a significant number of minors, that’s not new. And that continues to be something that we are determining through our verification, what exactly the numbers are. As you know, I am not in the habit of giving you those numbers, but I have always been clear that we have found significant numbers who are under 18 on the qualifying date. And we are concerned to move ahead to their discharge, which under the agreement ought to have been immediate but which has been delayed by the failure to reach an agreement on the issue of payments in particular.

Ghanashyam Ojha, The Kathmandu Post: As regional forces have an influence on the peace process, do you think Nepal has to discuss with India to extend the tenure of UNMIN?

Ian Martin: That’s a matter for the Government of Nepal to decide,

Ghanashyam Ojha, The Kathmandu Post: What to you feel?

Ian Martin: It’s not a question of what I feel. What the Security Council expects is a request from an independent sovereign government. What views the Government takes into account in making its requests, are a matter for the Government.

Kumar Lamichhane, Nepal 1 TV: Fully effective role of UNMIN. Does that mean in your role, you are looking for expansion of the mandate that was earlier given to you? My second question is, are you in favour of merging Maoists combatants in the Nepal Army prior to the election?

Ian Martin: Well again, let me do the last question first: it’s not for me to be for or against the merger of Maoist combatants before or after the election. That is a matter that has to be decided by the parties. It is for me to insist that is a crucial issue - the future of the Maoists combatants is a crucial issue for the reasons that I have already said. Because there is no other way in which our arms monitoring responsibilities are going to transition to longer term solutions. What those longer term solutions are not for the UN to prescribe. They are indeed to be negotiated. Of course there is international experience that can be made available to those considering the issues that may be helpful, but not in the spirit of saying what should be done in Nepal should be done the same way as has been done in any other particular country.
As so often, when you ask two questions, I forget the other one.

Kumar Lamichhane, Nepal 1 TV: The fully effective role of UNMIN?

Ian Martin: Does it mean a formal expansion of the mandate? The three examples that I gave, of where we think we could be more helpful, I don’t think would necessarily require a formal expansion of the mandate of UNMIN. We are a United Nations political mission; I am the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who has what in United Nations terms is normally called a “Good Offices” role, an ability to offer assistance where that is requested. Those are areas in which I think we could very well assist largely within our existing mandate and resources if there is a clear wish for us to do so.

Sirish Pradhan, Press Trust of India: Last question. When you say extended mandate does it mean peacekeeping forces as the political situation becomes more fragile due to the postponement of the election.

Ian Martin: Nobody, nobody, nobody is talking about peacekeeping forces coming to Nepal. And I should point out to you some ambiguity in the words we are using. When I use the word “extended”, I am talking about extended in time. Others have been using the word “expanded” in relation to the scope of the mandate. But please be clear, I have just been in New York, there is no discussion in New York of peacekeeping in relation to Nepal. This is a special political mission and what is under discussion is the future term and role of this political mission.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: When you were in New York, the newspaper reported that someone telephoned you and asked some money, threatened you. Is it true?

Ian Martin: It’s true that there were telephone threats made here to this office, not received by me personally. And that an arrest was carried out as a result of that. A lot of the details in the report were not correct, including the report that someone had spoken directly to me. But it is correct that there were threats made.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: What is happening to the case? Is that case in the police?

Ian Martin: The police – it is now in the hands of the police. Yes. It is obviously not for UNMIN, it is a matter for the police.

Sudeshna Sarkar, Indo Asian News Service: Just wondering Mr. Martin, when this mandate is extended, from Special Representative, are you going to become and Extra-Special Representative?

Ian Martin: I think, I can, without any doubt deny that. Let me just wrap up by emphasizing, if I may, a few of the points that I wanted to make. The first, I wanted to emphasize my main message from New York that there is still very strong commitment on the part of United Nations, both the Secretary-General and the Security Council, to supporting Nepal’s peace process. So, that’s true at the highest level.

Secondly, the challenges to the process really must not be under estimated. There is a need for a frank assessment of why the two dates for the Constituent Assembly election have come and gone, and what now is a realistic roadmap. Thirdly, we have had a lot of discussion about in areas in which UNMIN is ready and could be of assistance to the process, but again I emphasize that that is not in any way to take away from the fact that this is a Nepali process, and that it is for the Nepalis to decide what role it wants the United Nations and the international community as a whole to play in support of it. Thank you very much indeed.

########

PRESS STATEMENT of Ian Martin (6 November 2007)
My main purpose in inviting you to this press briefing is to answer any questions you may have about the future of UNMIN’s mandate, about which there have been many media reports and comments during my trip to New York. But first I want to refer to the negotiations of recent weeks which culminated in the votes in the Interim Legislature-Parliament on Sunday. The future of the monarchy is obviously not a matter on which the United Nations has taken or should take a position; nor is the electoral system, except for the desirability of respecting international good practice which is compatible with different electoral systems. These are matters for Nepalis to decide. Although these two issues have not been fully resolved, there have been positive aspects of recent discussions among the parties: the seriousness of the efforts to reach compromise within the Seven-Party Alliance; the repeatedly-expressed commitments to sustaining the Alliance and the peace process; and the respectful spirit in which the final parliamentary proceedings were conducted, despite continuing substantive disagreements.
I am dismayed however to have returned to an increased number of reports of unresolved abductions and killings, whether attributed to armed Madhesi groups, Maoist cadres, or local disputes. Nepal has lived for too long with violence and intimidation, and I appeal again at this season for a commitment to tolerance and non-violence, but also for an end to impunity. It is the responsibility of all to support efforts to bring murderers to justice, as the CPN(M) has committed to do in the tragic case of Birendra Sah, and as I have repeatedly said should be the case with the killers of Maoist cadres in the Terai. The rule of law across all of Nepal is fundamental to a conducive atmosphere for free and fair elections as well as to broader public confidence in the peace process as a whole.
When I briefed the Security Council in New York, I said that the crisis facing the peace process was not just the consequence of new demands regarding the issues of monarchy and the electoral system, but that it also stemmed from growing distrust amongst the parties to the peace agreement, with accusations in both directions that commitments had not been implemented. I believe that the parties need to take stock of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and other agreements reached, and their implementation. This should include the implementation of commitments made to Janajati, Madhesi and other groups. I was encouraged to be told in my meeting with the Prime Minister just before leaving Kathmandu that he intended that there should indeed be a review of the implementation of agreements, and to find on my return a wide appreciation of this need.
I also said to the Security Council that the parties need to collectively reaffirm to the public their commitment to a successful Constituent Assembly election, in order to reassure the people of Nepal that the process remains on track. The Constituent Assembly election is an integral element of the peace process: a credible election cannot take place unless the peace process is on a solid footing, and a credible election is critical to the success of the peace process. This requires not just the setting of a date, but agreement on a road-map which will ensure that there is not yet another failure to hold the election on whatever new date is agreed. Despite the best efforts of the Election Commission, with which UNMIN has worked closely, two dates set for the election have come and gone. It is now time for a frank analysis by Nepali politicians and civil society of why this has been the case, and what are the requirements for a successful electoral process to go forward.
I also informed the Security Council that the Prime Minister had told me of his intention to consult other parties with a view to requesting an extension of the mandate of UNMIN. The mood of the Security Council appeared to be unanimously sympathetic to such a request. As well as extending the time period of the mandate of UNMIN, there has also been discussion regarding the scope of our support to the peace process.
Let me first put to rest the suggestion that UNMIN has already exceeded its mandate. This is not the case. I want in particular to put on record that UNMIN has not met or sought to meet with the leadership of armed Madhesi groups. This misunderstanding appears to have arisen because there was one meeting in India between United Nations humanitarian officials and the leadership of one armed group. Their purpose was to try to ensure that emergency food relief and other assistance could be delivered in the wake of flooding in the Terai earlier this year without attacks by armed groups against humanitarian workers. These UN officials involved were not under the authority of UNMIN, and their discussion was confined to humanitarian, not political issues. Of course UNMIN has met and will continue to meet with a wide range of representatives of traditionally marginalized groups.
I was frank with the Security Council, as was the Secretary-General in his report, that expectations among Nepalis are high as to what UNMIN can do. Our focused mandate is not well understood. To expect UNMIN to safeguard or advance the peace process in ways that it has not been mandated or requested to assist is not realistic. I have always emphasized that this is a Nepalese process, whose success depends on Nepalis: the international community can only assist in the manner in which its support is requested. There are a number of areas where it has been suggested that more active United Nations support to the peace process would be of value, if desired by the government and the parties. I mention three. First, support to the implementation of the peace process and agreements reached, which as I have already said Nepali political leaders and civil society are increasingly acknowledging needs to be addressed. Second, assisting a discussion on the future of the country’s security sector, including a managed transition from the current temporary Maoist army cantonments and restriction to barracks of the Nepal Army to long-term solutions: without this, there is no exit strategy from UNMIN’s arms monitoring. And third, greater advisory support to promoting public security – the greatest concern of so many Nepalis and a critical requirement for a credible Constituent Assembly election. These would not mean a bigger UNMIN presence: we are already reducing our electoral staff, although we will be ready to increase our district presence again if requested ahead of a firm election date. But it could mean providing the broader support to the success of the peace process that many Nepalis expect of the United Nations. is for Nepalis to decide what is asked of the United Nations: you have the assurance of the Secretary-General and, I believe, the openness of the Security Council to extend the assistance requested.