Nepal needs a close look

Ashok K Mehta

In the case of Nepal, historically India's foreign policy has been driven by its security concerns, but the policy planning has been patchy. Cognisance is still taken of a British foreign policy document as old as 1919, which noted: "Nepal is in a position to exercise powerful influence over India's internal stability and if it were to become disaffected, the anarchy would spill over...."
The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (TPF), together with the accompanying letter which is derived from the 1923 security treaty Nepal signed with Britain, has provisions impacting on mutual security concerns: "Neither country will tolerate threat to the other... devise effective countermeasures..."

In 1959, Jawaharlal Nehru equated aggression on Nepal or Bhutan with aggression on India. This resulted in a furore in Nepal for being bracketed with Bhutan. While BP Koirala welcomed Nehru's security commitment, he asserted Nepal's independence. Nepal takes pride in its independence, being the only country other than Bhutan and Thailand in the region not to be colonised, but it paid a different price for it.

India has been associated directly with all the major changes in Nepal starting with the overthrow of the Ranas in 1950, advent of multi-party democracy in 1959, restoration of democracy in 1990 and the virtual end of monarchy in 2006. Two companies of Indian Infantry were poised to land in Kathmandu in 1950 in case there was "anarchy", but the force was not needed. In 1959, during Nepal's first multi-party election, Indian Army Gorkha signallers were deployed for communications.

The military-to-military connection between the two Armies is also historic. In 1952, King Tribhuvan requested for an Indian military mission to train the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). In 1960, 21 border checkposts were established in the north with Indian security personnel. In 1965, King Mahendra requested India for reorganising and re-equipping the Army. In 1970, on Nepal's request both the checkposts and training teams were withdrawn but the military cooperation continued unabated without any physical presence of Indian Army trainers. The special military relationship was symbolised by the Army Chiefs of the two countries being made honorary Generals of each other's Armies.

The bulk of Army training is handled by India under the special aided programme of the MoD and maximum training vacancies on training courses go to Nepal and Sri Lanka. In 1990, after the restoration of democracy, yet another request was made to modernise the Nepal Army and that programme is still going on. At the height of Maoist insurgency, when the Army was under pressure and ill-prepared to meet the Maoist challenge, Indian Army's counter-insurgency experts trained and guided the Nepal Army to defeat the Maoists. Massive contingents of equipment were rushed to ensure military posts were defensible.

In 2003, for the first time after 1970, a Bilateral Security Consultative Group was established for channelling equipment and expertise to Nepal Army. The military assistance was provided on specific request from the Government of Nepal in the spirit of past agreements and understandings. In 2004, when the Maoists besieged the Kathmandu Valley for a week, the Directors General Military Operations consulted each other on possible help that India could provide. National Security Adviser JN Dixit held a special meeting with the Indian Army and Air Force Chiefs to evolve contingency plans in case of any adverse situation.

Contingency planning is at the core of national security; it includes humanitarian and military assistance requested by friendly countries. India is guided by treaty obligations and security commitments in the neighbourhood. It dispatched the IPKF to Sri Lanka following a request made by President JR Jayewardene after the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. Similarly, the Government of Maldives asked for -- and received -- military assistance to defeat a serious mercenary threat.

India has either planned or dispatched military succour to Seychelles, Mauritius and Fiji. It has repeatedly stated that it is committed to the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka", which is diplomatese for deterring the LTTE from a military takeover of the north-east or declaring the Eelam. The ISLA of 1987, like the 1950 TPF, is still in place, though both are dated.

Like the Southern Command in Pune is responsible for contingency planning and tasks in the island countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, Lucknow's Central Command has for long been involved in planning possible missions in the north, including Nepal. Military training institutions and think tanks are forever wargaming scenarios in the region so that, unlike their political masters, they are not caught napping. Exercise Tribhuvan was a study carried out in the late 1970s to assess the possibilities of a Communist takeover of Nepal. Shades of what is being currently played out by the Maoists and their associates in Kathmandu and the countryside were reflected in the exercise.

Over the years, India's security concerns were focussed on the activities of the ISI in Nepal, culminating in the hijack of IC-814 in Kandahar. The raid on the ISI stronghold by Nepal Police in Kathmandu's Hotel Karnali in 1994 revealed the scale of Pakistan's anti-India activities, but Kathmandu chose to deny most of it till the Kandahar episode. Nepal's sensitivity about its sovereignty and territorial integrity is manifest in the ladder-point security check of Indian Airlines flights at Tribhuvan Airport. Indian security staff frisk passengers on an elevated platform, avoiding use of Nepalese soil.

In the early 1990s, the first GP Koirala Government requested New Delhi for help to search for survivors of two major air crashes in the Valley. Nepali media ran banner headlines: "IAF helicopters invade Nepali airspace..." The Madhuri Dixit and Hrithik Roshan non-incidents created an avoidable anti-Indian stir in Nepal. Many Nepali friends say India is hypersensitive to anti-India sentiments which are dutifully shed by Nepalis before crossing the open border with India. They ask: "How can India become a regional -- leave alone an Asian -- power, if it loses sleep over such incidents?"

Leaders of the Seven-Party Alliance are privately, and some even publicly, saying that Maoists are afraid of facing an election; and, their hardliners could be preparing for a power grab. The Maoists have consistently accused royalists of conspiring against the "people's revolution" and the Army of planning a coup. These may not happen but are all part of future scenarios which warrant contingency plans.

The Maoists have the capability and the hardliners the intent to skirt the electoral process and seize power. India does not have to be apologetic about voicing its security concerns and priorities in Nepal and taking necessary action in shaping the environment. Moreover, being prepared for the unexpected, the political class would then no longer be equated with "headless chickens". National interest might prevail over political survival.

Source: The Pioneer, October 31, 2007