Diplomacy : What Does The Latest Trend Indicate?

Madhavji Shrestha

It is high time Nepal's politically authoritative players were aware of the recent developments in the diplomatic arena. Very glaringly, the initial years of the 21st century are witnessing the dismantling of the strongly fortified walls of traditional diplomacy. It is evident that the growing supremacy of the common people combined with the enhancement of knowledge on international affairs even among the masses have led to shifting trends in the conduct of diplomacy, which was formerly considered an exclusive business of government-authorised diplomatic officials. Public diplomacyThe fundamental right to information enjoyed by the people in general has also led to the development of this new trend. As a consequence, the much pronounced public diplomacy and track-two diplomacy (people-to-people diplomacy) are fast gaining ground. The first relates to the people's inherent right to remain informed about the government's actions concerning external affairs, and the second is, becoming helpful in making international relations people-initiated to solve problems. Numerous developments can be advanced to support this trend.

Alongside this development, newer concepts and practices are making headway in the realm of diplomacy and its related fields. The old mindset and attitude are giving in to new thinking and approach. Straightforwardness and openness, instead of working behind the screen and remaining aloof in diplomatic business, have now come to stay in recent years. "Soft Power" and "Soft Ear" are now figuring prominently in diplomatic activities around the world. Dr. Joseph S. Nye Jr., a reputed expert on international affairs at Harvard University, is a leading figure who has been propagating the concept of soft power. He says soft power, as opposed to hard power, is "not the power to coerce, bully, browbeat and bribe, but the power to attract, to persuade, to influence through wisdom, example and attentiveness." In the present day world, excessive reliance on the hard power of economic strength and military might for any breathtaking achievement on the diplomatic front is neither recommended nor appreciated by the civilised society. Of course, hard power can still make the day under some unavoidable circumstances, but the solution arrived at through the use of this power will not be ever lasting, nor appear acceptable to all the concerned and affected people. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has, in his recently published write-up, put his trust on the wisdom of the soft ear which he has described as "discernment ? seeing a person or situation in the round, the bad with the good, and being able to establish rapport and an effective working relationship despite disagreement, however sharp". He believes in "engagement, dialogue before confrontation." This shows the uprightness of understanding and rapprochement in diplomatic activity. Interestingly, his belief to act accordingly to solve the problems facing the UN at the moment is beyond any doubt and debate.

The development of the softer tendency and behaviour in recent days largely owes itself to the increased awareness of humanitarian consideration. Certainly, this trend would reign supreme and stand above the narrow nationalistic feelings and ethnic divisiveness that still unfortunately torture humans in various underdeveloped regions of this planet. Social consciousness has to grow on a global scale to eliminate anything that frets the human society. Today, human concern is omnipresent in every aspect of global activity. Diplomacy and its relevant concerns are not outside its circumference. In reality, diplomacy is a "human intensive" activity. It is conducted largely through personal communications and individual actions, evaluations and decisions as well as concomitant activity in the course of carrying on diplomatic duties and functions.The requirement of diplomacy for spontaneous human involvement is usually presented as one of the key conditions for the diplomatic success of wider implication and greater dimension. Still the core need of diplomacy is closer human interactions as well as human touch. This, in turn, necessitates more human communications and greater human contacts that greatly depend on skills and abilities learnt and acquired by diplomats in question. The need to measure and examine these qualities should never be sidelined under any circumstance. Importantly, the overriding need to understand intentionality is of utmost significance, whether it be in modern diplomacy or post modern diplomacy. The human component in diplomatic dealings and concerns would never diminish even if one were to rely on the recent tools of information technology. The correct intentionality can be properly judged only if there is sufficient human touch and interaction. No other possibility appears before us than human contact and connectivity.Most recently, diplomacy on the one side is being conducted openly and, so to say, in a transparent way, and is becoming more public oriented. On the other, it requires a human approach to gain success of any consideration despite the predominance being taken away by the rapid development of information technology designed and specifically meant for it. Every nation desiring to send abroad appropriate ambassadors and envoys takes into serious consideration these highly needed qualities.

Virtual diplomacyWhile considered the emerging global environment, the Nepalese government needs to be highly selective in assigning ambassadors and envoys keeping in view the qualities and capabilities required of them in the recently developed context of diplomatic behaviour and practices if any perceptible success is to be expected from them. If not, it would be far better to conduct diplomacy for carrying out any sort of bilateral and international relations and related affairs through the use of e-diplomacy and/or virtual diplomacy through cyberspace. The Foreign Ministry, as the principal agent of the government responsible for conducting Nepali diplomacy, needs to make a definite choice between human intensive diplomacy and an electronics driven one. For the former, the country needs people enriched with well-rounded diplomatic skills and knowledge, whereas for the latter ,diploproject equipped with diploportals should be on hand to see it materialise. Could the authorities at the helm take it as their circumstance-led decision? This must remain very high on the agenda.

Source: The Rising Nepal, July 26, 2007

Fear psychosis

You reap what you have sown. The Maoists sowed fear during the insurgency, and therefore they are suffering from fear psychosis. For more than a decade, they connived, sabotaged, killed and exploited innocent people in the name of "people's war". The situation has taken a full circle with the Maoists in the government since last year. Time has changed so much that people are prepared to accept the Maoists as a responsible political force. The political parties have provided ample space to them in the parliament and the cabinet, so as to assimilate them into mainstream politics. But the Maoists themselves have been struggling, so far unsuccessfully, to come out of their wartime mindset. They see conspiracy in everything. If they fail to gain confidence, they will start distrusting their own party cadres and well-
wishers.

Last September, the Maoists went on a rampage believing that Nepal Army was bringing three trucks of loaded arms from India. It turned out to be a huge embarrassment for the Maoist leadership when they learnt that the trucks being brought were for the purpose of UN peace keeping mission and were totally empty. Then, they were overreacting to the situation. However, the overreaction has taken the form of fear psychosis. The Maoists have gone to the extent of holding a press conference and are threatening to quit the government just because Nepal Army deployed soldiers for their personal security. The Maoists have claimed that Nepal Army was hatching a conspiracy against them by sending troops trained at the infamous Bhairabnath
battalion.

The concern of the Maoist ministers cannot be completely ignored. They have all the rights to be apprehensive about their own security. However, they have jumped into a conclusion too early. Without cross-checking whether the troops were from Bhairabnath battalion or not, and whether the soldiers deployed for their security were trustworthy or not, the Maoist ministers sought immediate meeting with the prime minister. And when the prime minister refused to entertain them, they held the press conference threatening to quit the government. Meanwhile, Nepal Army issuing a press statement has made it clear that the soldiers deployed for security of Maoist ministers were from Singhanath battalion at Tokha. It is high time the Maoists stopped jumping into early conclusions and kept good faith in the intention of the political parties and the people. They must understand that it was for the sake of restoring peace in the country that the people and the parties brought them into mainstream politics. If the eight parties fail to build trust within the coalition, the country will fail miserably, which will ultimately provide an opportunity for the regressive force to raise its head.

Source: The Kathmandu Post, July 25, 2007

No Strategy to Fight Maoists

Ashok K Mehta

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is an able and learned man, singly responsible for the economic emancipation and rise of India. But lately he has made some impromptu statements on security which make one wonder whether he is well advised. That Indian Muslims are not immunised against engaging in acts of international Islamist terrorism was exposed last week. Mr Singh's latest defence and loss of sleep over that community's involvement was politically incorrect. It is clear that he and his Home Minister Shivraj Patil take internal security rather lightly; otherwise we ought to have seen some 'terrorist catches' in three years of major terror attacks causing at least 300 deaths.

Not long ago, he told China's President Hu Jintao that the people of India regarded China as their greatest neighbour even after Beijing has repeatedly pressed its claim on Arunachal Pradesh. Last year, at a Chief Ministers' conference, he described the Naxalite/Maoist threat as the single biggest challenge to internal security. Surprisingly, there is no visible action to deal with the Maoist challenge which, according to the former Home Secretary, is not a national problem. That is the reason the Maoist threat has not been met with coordinated and effective State and Central response.

The 1967 Naxalite movement was confined to West Bengal and crushed there in 1970 but its ideology of protracted armed struggle to capture power survived. It spread to Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. Its area of influence has increased from 55 districts in nine States in 2003 to 156 districts in 13 States in 2004, had to 182 districts in 16 States today. The Asian Centre for Human Rights, in its latest Naxal Conflict Monitor, has reported that violence levels are down 45 per cent during the first half of 2007 compared to the same period last year, yet it says the conflict is intensifying due to increase in casualties among security forces. It identifies Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand with the highest levels of violence and attributes the continuing armed struggle to failure of governance and abysmal implementation of schemes and projects.

While Maoist influence is certainly spreading with their claims that by 2010-15, 30 to 35 per cent of India will be under their control, violence levels have temporarily dipped. The threat postulated (actually exaggerated) five years ago by intelligence agencies of a Compact Revolutionary Zone or Red Corridor from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh is a pipe dream, especially after the Maoists in Nepal have upset the ideological applecart by joining the political mainstream. Why did intelligence agencies exaggerate the Red threat?

The contours of change in Maoist grand strategy emerged after its month-long Ninth Unity Congress earlier this year attended by representatives from 16 States. An 'Action Plan' was dramatically unleashed last month through a pincer of a two-day economic blockade and lightening attacks against police stations and infrastructure. The Maoists announced that these were in protest against the Government's economic policies, in particular against the imposition of Special Economic Zones. Both these strategies are leaves out of the Nepali Maoists' 'Peoples War Book' of paralysing the state. That is precisely what the Maoists were able to do to parts of Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa and Chhattisgarh.

In 2006, an economic blockade of smaller intensity had seriously affected commercial activity. This year though, the strategy was bolder - destruction of infrastructure, prevention of movement of strategic minerals like bauxite, iron ore, steel, and partial to total disruption of commercial activity. The economic cost of the Maoist blockade is estimated to be around Rs 1,000 crore. In May, the Bastar blackout cost Chhattisgarh Rs 2000 crore. Targetting infrastructure was a favoured Nepali Maoist tactic that destroyed nearly Rs 500 crore of roads, bridges and telecommunication facilities in a country with so little of it.

The other element of copycat disruption is the Maoists' capability of planning and mounting attacks by up to 2,000 combatants and overwhelming police posts. The Jehanabad jailbreak in Bihar in 2005 and the elimination of Rani Bodli police post in Chhattisgarh in 2007 are powerful reflections of military strength and motivation among the Maoists. The Nepal Maoists are reported to have set up joint training and logistic bases in Champaran, Madhubani and Sitamarhi. All Left-wing extremists including the Maoists in India are known to have links with ISI, DG Inter-Forces Intelligence (Bangladesh) and LTTE, though Nepali Maoists have said they have no connections with them. The irony in the Maoist class struggle is that majority of their victims belong to the very class whose case they espouse.

Citigroup, an international financial services company which monitors Maoist activities, has estimated that without an effective deterrent to contain and roll back their surge, Maoists could not only hamper economic growth but also restrict FDI inflow. At stake could be power projects and steel plants worth Rs 2,640 billion in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Despite the apparent contradictions in strategy and goals and lack of flexibility compared to their ideological kin in Nepal, the Naxals are a united revolutionary force with mass appeal in rural areas which they hope to extend to urban regions too.

The Maoists' success is the direct outcome of the State and Central Government failures. Whenever the Government has been serious and recognised the problem, it has been able to contain or crush separatist movements from Punjab to the North-East. The inhibition in acting against Maoists does not stem from the fact that law and order is a State subject or that 16 States are involved or that there is a nexus between Maoists, the police and political leaders; it is lack of political will and a national strategy.

On paper there is no shortage of ideas and plans. Nor is there any dearth of funds and structures to address the grievances of people in the tribal areas. Elaborate and high-powered Central and State level task forces have been created, so impressive that the Maoist menace should have disappeared yesterday. Unfortunately, the grand 14-point National Action Plan is just notional. The first line of defence, the State police, has not been empowered to face up to the challenge. There is neither a counter-Maoist operational grid nor a Central intelligence network in the Maoist-affected States. Arming the locals to fight the enemy is not novel and has been experimented from Jammu & Kashmir to Nagaland. In Jharkhand, Orissa and notably the Salwa Judum's self-defence campaign, reportedly a spontaneous movement in Chhattisgarh, have shown erratic success.

Ask anyone following the rise and spread of Maoists in India, the reasons for their growing sophistication in psywar and firepower and increasing sway over tribal and rural folk, you will get this answer - there is no political will, no strategy and failure of implementation. Only yesterday, the Maoists lured security forces in Dantewada, Bastar into a deadly trap. Let us not forget, the Prime Minister has identified the Maoists as India's most serious internal security challenge. Unless we want the Army sucked into Maoist-affected States also, it is high time to make the 14-Point Action Plan work. Meanwhile, a fresh and independent assessment of the scale of Maoist challenge is required to refine strategy.

Source: The Pioneer, July 11, 2007

No strategy to fight Maoists

Ashok K Mehta


Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is an able and learned man, singly responsible for the economic emancipation and rise of India. But lately he has made some impromptu statements on security which make one wonder whether he is well advised. That Indian Muslims are not immunised against engaging in acts of international Islamist terrorism was exposed last week. Mr Singh's latest defence and loss of sleep over that community's involvement was politically incorrect. It is clear that he and his Home Minister Shivraj Patil take internal security rather lightly; otherwise we ought to have seen some 'terrorist catches' in three years of major terror attacks causing at least 300 deaths.

Not long ago, he told China's President Hu Jintao that the people of India regarded China as their greatest neighbour even after Beijing has repeatedly pressed its claim on Arunachal Pradesh. Last year, at a Chief Ministers' conference, he described the Naxalite/Maoist threat as the single biggest challenge to internal security. Surprisingly, there is no visible action to deal with the Maoist challenge which, according to the former Home Secretary, is not a national problem. That is the reason the Maoist threat has not been met with coordinated and effective State and Central response.

The 1967 Naxalite movement was confined to West Bengal and crushed there in 1970 but its ideology of protracted armed struggle to capture power survived. It spread to Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. Its area of influence has increased from 55 districts in nine States in 2003 to 156 districts in 13 States in 2004, had to 182 districts in 16 States today. The Asian Centre for Human Rights, in its latest Naxal Conflict Monitor, has reported that violence levels are down 45 per cent during the first half of 2007 compared to the same period last year, yet it says the conflict is intensifying due to increase in casualties among security forces. It identifies Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand with the highest levels of violence and attributes the continuing armed struggle to failure of governance and abysmal implementation of schemes and projects.

While Maoist influence is certainly spreading with their claims that by 2010-15, 30 to 35 per cent of India will be under their control, violence levels have temporarily dipped. The threat postulated (actually exaggerated) five years ago by intelligence agencies of a Compact Revolutionary Zone or Red Corridor from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh is a pipe dream, especially after the Maoists in Nepal have upset the ideological applecart by joining the political mainstream. Why did intelligence agencies exaggerate the Red threat?


The contours of change in Maoist grand strategy emerged after its month-long Ninth Unity Congress earlier this year attended by representatives from 16 States. An 'Action Plan' was dramatically unleashed last month through a pincer of a two-day economic blockade and lightening attacks against police stations and infrastructure. The Maoists announced that these were in protest against the Government's economic policies, in particular against the imposition of Special Economic Zones. Both these strategies are leaves out of the Nepali Maoists' 'Peoples War Book' of paralysing the state. That is precisely what the Maoists were able to do to parts of Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa and Chhattisgarh.

In 2006, an economic blockade of smaller intensity had seriously affected commercial activity. This year though, the strategy was bolder - destruction of infrastructure, prevention of movement of strategic minerals like bauxite, iron ore, steel, and partial to total disruption of commercial activity. The economic cost of the Maoist blockade is estimated to be around Rs 1,000 crore. In May, the Bastar blackout cost Chhattisgarh Rs 2000 crore. Targetting infrastructure was a favoured Nepali Maoist tactic that destroyed nearly Rs 500 crore of roads, bridges and telecommunication facilities in a country with so little of it.

The other element of copycat disruption is the Maoists' capability of planning and mounting attacks by up to 2,000 combatants and overwhelming police posts. The Jehanabad jailbreak in Bihar in 2005 and the elimination of Rani Bodli police post in Chhattisgarh in 2007 are powerful reflections of military strength and motivation among the Maoists. The Nepal Maoists are reported to have set up joint training and logistic bases in Champaran, Madhubani and Sitamarhi. All Left-wing extremists including the Maoists in India are known to have links with ISI, DG Inter-Forces Intelligence (Bangladesh) and LTTE, though Nepali Maoists have said they have no connections with them. The irony in the Maoist class struggle is that majority of their victims belong to the very class whose case they espouse.

Citigroup, an international financial services company which monitors Maoist activities, has estimated that without an effective deterrent to contain and roll back their surge, Maoists could not only hamper economic growth but also restrict FDI inflow. At stake could be power projects and steel plants worth Rs 2,640 billion in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Despite the apparent contradictions in strategy and goals and lack of flexibility compared to their ideological kin in Nepal, the Naxals are a united revolutionary force with mass appeal in rural areas which they hope to extend to urban regions too.

The Maoists' success is the direct outcome of the State and Central Government failures. Whenever the Government has been serious and recognised the problem, it has been able to contain or crush separatist movements from Punjab to the North-East. The inhibition in acting against Maoists does not stem from the fact that law and order is a State subject or that 16 States are involved or that there is a nexus between Maoists, the police and political leaders; it is lack of political will and a national strategy.

On paper there is no shortage of ideas and plans. Nor is there any dearth of funds and structures to address the grievances of people in the tribal areas. Elaborate and high-powered Central and State level task forces have been created, so impressive that the Maoist menace should have disappeared yesterday. Unfortunately, the grand 14-point National Action Plan is just notional. The first line of defence, the State police, has not been empowered to face up to the challenge. There is neither a counter-Maoist operational grid nor a Central intelligence network in the Maoist-affected States. Arming the locals to fight the enemy is not novel and has been experimented from Jammu & Kashmir to Nagaland. In Jharkhand, Orissa and notably the Salwa Judum's self-defence campaign, reportedly a spontaneous movement in Chhattisgarh, have shown erratic success.
Ask anyone following the rise and spread of Maoists in India, the reasons for their growing sophistication in psywar and firepower and increasing sway over tribal and rural folk, you will get this answer - there is no political will, no strategy and failure of implementation. Only yesterday, the Maoists lured security forces in Dantewada, Bastar into a deadly trap. Let us not forget, the Prime Minister has identified the Maoists as India's most serious internal security challenge. Unless we want the Army sucked into Maoist-affected States also, it is high time to make the 14-Point Action Plan work. Meanwhile, a fresh and independent assessment of the scale of Maoist challenge is required to refine strategy.

Source: The Pioneer, July 11, 2007

Nepal's Troubled Tarai Region

Unrest in the Tarai plains has exposed the weaknesses of Nepal’s peace process, could derail elections for a constituent assembly in November and, if not properly addressed, could start a new form of conflict. Madhesis – plainspeople who are some one third of the country’s population – have protested, sometimes violently, against the discrimination that has in effect excluded them from public life. Weeks of demonstrations and clashes between political rivals recently left several dozen dead. The government has offered to address issues such as increased electoral representation, affirmative action for marginalised groups and federalism but has dragged its feet over implementing dialogue. Tension had been building for several years but was largely ignored by the political elites and international observers, and the scale of the protest shocked even its own leaders. The problems will only be resolved by strengthening the national political process and making it both inclusive and responsive – starting with free and fair elections to a constituent assembly later this year.

The Tarai plains stretch the length of the southern border and are home to half the total population, including many non-Madhesis (both indigenous ethnic groups and recent migrants from the hills). With comparatively good infrastructure, agriculture, industrial development and access to India across the open border, the Tarai is crucial to the economy. It is also an area of great political importance, both as a traditional base for the mainstream parties and as the only road link between otherwise inaccessible hill and mountain districts.
The leaders of the Madhesi movement face difficult choices: they have mobilised public support but have also angered powerful constituencies. They now need to decide between a strategy of accommodation or continued confrontation. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) has emerged as a powerful umbrella group but lacks an organisational base and clear agenda. It is entering the electoral fray but if it is to challenge the established parties, it must first deal with rival Madhesi politicians competing for the same votes. There has also been a proliferation of Madhesi armed groups; some have expanded significantly in numbers, and their strategy and attitudes will affect the political process.


The mood among Tarai residents is increasingly confrontational, with collapse of trust between most Madhesis and the government. Most believe that further violence is likely. Unresolved grievances and the hangover from the Maoist insurgency, especially the lack of reconciliation and the greater tolerance for violence, make a volatile mix. The unrest has given a glimmer of hope to diehard royalists and Hindu fundamentalists, including some from across the border, who see it as a chance to disrupt the peace process.
The mainstream parties have changed their rhetoric but are as reluctant as ever to take action that would make for a more inclusive system. Strikes in the Tarai squeezed Kathmandu but not enough to force immediate concessions. Mainstream parties, particularly the Nepali Congress, rely on their Tarai electoral base but are unsure how to deal with the new state of flux. Unable to compete with Madhesi groups in radicalism, they have also been ineffective at communicating the positive steps they have taken, such as reforming citizenship laws. Competition within the governing coalition is hindering any bold moves. For the Maoists, the Tarai violence was a wake-up call: much of it was directed against their cadres, whose appearance of dominance was shattered. Nevertheless, they remain well organised, politically coherent and determined to reassert themselves.

Engaging in serious negotiations will be a delicate process, with no party wanting to lose face. But the key issues are clear and still offer room for a reasonable compromise:



fair representation: the critical issue is ensuring the electoral system gives Madhesis a serious stake in the constituent assembly;
federalism and autonomy: the government’s commitment to federalism has yet to translate into action; without pre-empting the constituent assembly, steps are needed to demonstrate more serious intent, such as formation of a technical research commission that could develop a knowledge base for future discussions;
rebuilding trust: confidence in national and local government will only come if there is decent governance, public security based on local community consent and improved delivery of services;
redress for heavy-handed suppression of protests: demands for compensation, honouring of dead protestors and follow-through on a commission of enquiry need to be met; and
steps towards affirmative action: some immediate moves to increase Madhesi representation in parties and state bodies could pave the way for longer-term measures to remove inequalities.

Fixing the Tarai means first fixing some issues in Kathmandu and then dealing not only with Madhesis but all excluded groups. Cross-party unity in listening to grievances and pushing for their resolution through a legitimate, elected constituent assembly is the only way to a lasting solution. This requires a change in outlook and a delicate political balancing act: the Kathmandu government must do some things immediately in order to earn Madhesi trust but deciding any major issues before the elections to the constituent assembly could compromise the constitutional process. Despite the instability, elections are still possible and essential. But reshaping state identity and institutions to make all Nepali citizens feel part of the nation is a long-term task that will present challenges in the constituent assembly and beyond.

RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Nepal:

1. Address the reasonable demands for political participation of all excluded groups (not just those whose protests have forced attention) by:
(a) undertaking to discuss and resolve grievances not only with protest leaders but also with concerned parliamentarians, local community representatives and civil society representatives;
(b) starting back-channel communications to draw armed factions into peaceful dialogue, while emphasising that they must sign up to the political process; and
(c) using all available leverage to control armed groups and other organisations founded in reaction to the Madhesi movement, draw them into negotiations and prevent the communalisation of Tarai issues.

2. Show willingness to make concessions on the basis of equal rights for all citizens by:
(a) revising the electoral system to ensure fair representation of Madhesis and all other marginalised groups, including a fresh delineation of constituency boundaries if the mixed electoral system is retained;
(b) improving communication, ensuring the government’s approach is clearly explained and that there are means to invite and pay attention to citizens’ concerns;
(c) sending senior party leaders to the Tarai – as eight parties together not individually – to explain what the government has done and is doing to improve representation and make the constituent assembly a meaningful, inclusive exercise;
(d) implementing some immediate affirmative action measures to boost Madhesi presence in the civil service;
(e) initiating discussion on options for federalism, their implications and how to implement them; and
(f) honouring Madhesis killed in protests, compensating their families and those injured, supporting the commission of enquiry into the state’s handling of the movement and guaranteeing its recommendations will not be ignored.

3. Demonstrate firm commitment to constituent assembly elections by:
(a) agreeing promptly on an acceptable electoral system, preferably by ensuring the Electoral Constituency Delimitation Commission delivers a revised proposal within its extended deadline that addresses Madhesi fears of gerrymandering;
(b) announcing a realistic election timetable;
(c) developing election security plans with support of all political constituencies and communities; and
(d) insisting that other issues should not be addressed by further interim constitutional amendments but instead be left to the constituent assembly as the sole legitimate forum for resolving them.

4. Restore law and order and rebuild trust in local administration and security forces by:
(a) improving community relations through meetings between chief district officers (CDOs) and Madhesi political actors and intellectuals; holding meetings to listen and respond to the public’s concerns; and ensuring that local government offices are well staffed, performing basic duties and more accessible;
(b) balancing deployment of armed police with a greater emphasis on civil and community policing;
(c) starting discussion on using affirmative action to redress ethnic and regional imbalances in the security forces through recruitment, training and promotion; and
(d) considering the transfer of district administrators and police chiefs responsible for excessive security action and the appointment of more Madhesi officials in sensitive districts.

To Madhesi Political Leaders and Opinion-makers:

5. Continue pressing for fair electoral representation and inclusion within the framework of the constituent assembly by:
(a) rejecting violence, devising forms of protest that do not adversely affect the economic and social life of people in the Tarai and bringing armed groups into the political process;
(b) taking part in the elections to the constituent assembly;
(c) showing flexibility on the new electoral system if the government commits itself to fair representation; and
(d) cooperating in the commission of enquiry and seeking to redress grievances by judicial means.

6. Avoid replicating exclusive models at the regional level and work to reduce communal tensions by:
(a) making space for women’s voices in the movement and on negotiating delegations;
(b) ensuring representation of Muslims, Tarai janajati communities and all Hindu castes including Dalits; and
(c) not insisting on a unitary Madhesi identity if it is unacceptable to some communities.

To the National Political Parties:

7. Consult excluded groups within and beyond parties and start to explore detailed policies of concern to them such as federalism and affirmative action.
8. Wherever possible build eight-party consensus and also involve parties not represented in government, including the legislature’s official opposition.
9. Implement Comprehensive Peace Agreement commitments on representation of marginalised communities within parties, explore ways to make party leaderships more representative and pay greater attention to the concerns of Madhesi and other activists within parties.

To the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN):

10. Extend technical support to inter-party discussions on development of revised electoral models.

To the International Community:

11. Continue to support the peace process, stressing respect for the principles enshrined in peace agreements and urging full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the interim constitution.
12. Maintain momentum for elections with both positive political pressure and practical assistance, welcome the announcement of a realistic election timetable and maintain strong public support for the process.
13. Support resolving the demands of Madhesis and other groups within the framework of the peace agreement and following its principles.
14. Donors offering development and peace process assistance should consider additional help for building Madhesi civil society capacity and supporting serious, independent academic research into issues affecting all marginalised communities.

Source: International Crisis Group, Brussels, July 9, 2007