Expanding UNSC: Integral Part Of UN Reform

Hira Bahadur Thapa

For years, the issue of reform ing the United Nations has been on the agenda before the General Assembly. Not surprisingly, the same item is being debated though with greater momentum at the current 62nd session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Following the submission of the report of the Security Council to the UNGA in recent weeks in New York, the international community's attention has again been drawn to the item of expanding the council. NegotiationsExpanding the UN Security Council has occupied a major part of the debates in the UN headquarters since 1994. The UN membership decided back in 1993 to establish an Open Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on an Increase on the Council's Membership. That group has been working on this matter since January 1994. Despite 14 years of on-going negotiations among the UN members, no tangible results have been achieved on the subject.It has been the practice with the world body to consume plenty of time to come to a conclusion on an issue to which is attached great importance. Reform of the United Nations is something that concerns each and every member of the international organisation. There are 192 sovereign member states in the United Nations at the moment. Therefore, reaching a consensus on a subject like this is really a formidable job requiring perseverance and flexibility from the stakeholders. Reform itself is an issue that involves a comprehensive approach. It cannot be limited to certain areas because reform is intended to bring about changes in the working of the organisation. A reformed institution or an organisation should have its capacity enhanced so as to be able to deliver better results. With this reality very much under consideration, the entire membership of the United Nations has been engaged in fruitful negotiations for more than a decade to arrive at an acceptable formula. No doubt about the fact that the world body has gained some success in putting the reform plans in place. We have seen changes in the structure of the body in streamlining the functioning of the institution. Various departments have been amalgamated sometimes while new ones have been created to cope with the present realities. The UN has been frequently accused of employing a bloated bureaucracy. The member states have time and again stressed on the professional integrity and competence of its officials and staff members. In line with the directives given by its members, the UN has strived to reform to achieve higher efficiency in managing its manpower. It has simultaneously made sincere efforts to improve its image in terms of financial dealings. The example of bringing those financial culprits to book who were found guilty in cases related to the Oil for Food Programme in Iraq illustrates the UN's endeavours to curb corruption.No issue has become more contentious than the one concerning the expansion of the UN Security Council. It is clearly evidenced by the stretched negotiations among the members of the organisation. The question of reforming the Security Council is not confined to increasing its size. It includes the subject of improving the working methods also where, perhaps, the member states have lesser grievances to be addressed. In terms of conducting an open debate on issues of multilateral concern, like the recruitment of child soldiers, the Council has made some improvement. Its emphasis on greater transparency has been recognised as a positive step towards improving its working methods. It is equally important to note that the working methods of the Security Council are always inseparable from its composition. One without the other carries no significance.Looking at the long drawn out negotiations for almost a decade and a half, one can lose patience and observe that expansion of the size of the Council is a never materialising dream. This is certainly a negative picture of the efforts put in by the UN membership. It is because it took 18 years from 1945, the time of the UN's inception, till 1963 to increase the non-permanent membership of the Security Council. Initially there were 11 members - both permanent and non-permanent - and they rose to 15, following the UN Charter Amendment. Therefore, everyone should be aware of the complexity involved in the subject. It is not going to be an easy affair as there are many aspirants not only for non-permanent seats but also for permanent ones.It is in the category of permanent members where the members find it hard to crack the hard nut. Obviously, permanent membership is always sought after as it provides exclusive veto power. By using such a veto, they are in a position to block any resolution that they find objectionable to them. There is a dilemma as to whether they should limit the size of the reshaped Council or compromise on its effectiveness. All agree that the enlarged Council needs to be small to be quick and efficient and large enough to be effective and desirable. Some of the aspiring members have stated during the recent debate on the issue of Security Council reform that the Council's effectiveness will be compromised if changes are not made in its size. They have a point as the Security Council's present composition still represents the Cold War realities. It is high time that the members narrowed their differences and worked towards creating a constructive atmosphere to raise the bar of mutual trust.Here, it would be interesting to note down the recommendations contained in a new report prepared by the facilitators for Security Council reform who were tasked by the 61st GA President. That report seeks to focus on five major points for building on the progress achieved so far on the subject. These are, namely, categories of membership, the question of veto, question of regional representation, size of the enlarged council and the working methods of the council and the relationship between it and the General Assembly. Political structureVisible progress can be made only when the members are prepared to agree on these points and, thus, pave the way for intergovernmental negotiations. Since the expansion of the council in both categories is essential to get rid of the political structure that rested on the balance of power of the 1940s, Nepal has been favouring a position that fully takes this reality into account.

Source: The Rising Nepal, November 27, 2007

Extending UN Role in Nepal

The following is the Transcript of Question and Answer session with Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Nepal in Kathmandu, 6 November 2007. At the end is Martin's press statement.

Sam Taylor, AFP: Mr Martin, it’s a bit difficult, I am still digesting your statement. When you talk about expanding of the mandate, first you talk about support to the implementation to the peace process. Can you explain in concrete terms what you mean about that support, what would that, could that be?

Ian Martin: There are a number of peace processes where there is implementation machinery defined which the United Nations participates in or supports. Indeed here in Nepal we were asked to be members of a broader advisory committee around the Peace Ministry. But many of the elements of agreements that have been reached, for example, the establishment of a high level monitoring committee, which we have always regarded as of great importance and were indeed asked in principle to assist; the establishment of a credible commission to investigate disappearances, which again has been repeatedly agreed but yet to be implemented in practice: these are among the kind of measures where I believe we could be of greater assistance to the parties in the follow-through on agreements that have been reached, sometimes more than once.

Sam Taylor, AFP: But how Mr. Martin – what form will that assistance take? Experts, UN people going in to assist or set up these things? What concrete things?

Ian Martin: Well, it could mean a continuing relationship with whatever body, the Peace Ministry or other implementation machinery that’s agreed, as well as indeed bringing in international experience where it is helpful to defining how to implement particular commitments.

Kumar Lamichhane Nepal 1 TV: Your statement mentions that “The expectation among Nepalese are high as to what UNMIN can do”. Are you indicating that Nepalese people are expecting much more of a role and mandate to be given to UNMIN, and are you indicating this thing in case the Terai rebel group which has also asked UNMIN to play role while negotiating with the Government?

Ian Martin: That reference wasn’t intended to be a reference to the Terai situation. It was rather a general reference to the fact that Nepalis see here what looks like a rather large United Nations presence and one that has increasingly reached the regions and, through our District Electoral Advisers and Arms Monitors, the districts of Nepal. They are very concerned about a peace process that they see faltering perhaps, in a number of respects. And they assume that it should be the role of the United Nations to help keep that process on track.

And we find ourselves having to explain to them, through you, that our role has essentially been asked to focus on arms monitoring, extremely important to sustaining the peace process but nonetheless only one aspect of it; electoral support, but it’s not the technical preparations for the election that has meant this further postponement; assistance in monitoring, but there what we have been able to do is being limited by the absence of an effective national monitoring of peace process commitments, such as was always intended. And, naturally, I think, many ordinary Nepalis who don’t understand the limitations of the mandate that was given to UNMIN expect that we should in some way be able to support the process more broadly.

Now I have stressed again that this will always remain a Nepalese process and any assistance the United Nations offers can only be at the request of the Government and the parties to the process. But we do think, without in any way envisaging a larger mission, that perhaps there are ways in which we could be more active in support to the process if that is desired.

Devendra Bhattarai, Kantipur: You have mentioned one thing here, “this would not mean a bigger UNMIN presence, we are already reducing our electoral staff”. But according to some of the sources most of the district electoral officers are being reinstated despite the fact that everybody is talking about downsizing UNMIN. Can I get the numbers of those electoral officers?

Ian Martin: We can give you the numbers afterwards. I can’t give them to you off the top of my head. But it is indeed true that, not wanting to cut back people’s quite limited contracts, many of which expire in December, we have temporarily re-deployed some of the staff who were here as District Electoral Advisers. So, the downsizing is in process. But it is not their re-deployment as District Electoral Advisers, that would be something to consider whatever the appropriate period was ahead of a new election date.

Sirish Pradhan, Press Trust of India: As you know the election has been postponed twice and it seems that the political parties are not serious in holding election in near future. How can you pressurize them to come to the electoral process? And there are reports that as the peace process becomes longer, the Maoist combatants in the camps are reducing. If it goes longer, there won’t be any Maoists in camp. How can you resolve this issue?

Ian Martin: First, I don’t think it’s the matter of the United Nations pressurizing the parties in relation to the election. I think it is the matter of the parties themselves, as I have suggested, frankly analysing what have been the reasons why the postponement took place, not just in terms of the new demands that produced the deadlock in the Parliament but also underlying reasons for the growing mistrust between the parties, and then to decide how those can be addressed in a way that allows the electoral process to go forward and addresses issues like public security which are critical for a successful electoral process.

So far as the cantonments are concerned, I don’t think you should exaggerate departures from the cantonments. It is true that our verification has shown that some of those who were there at the time of first registration are no longer in the cantonments, but the majority are. And I think it is extremely important that discharge from the cantonments is a managed process, with consideration of the future of those who leave the cantonments. That’s what we are working on so far as those who have been excluded by our process of verification. And then of course, as I have highlighted, there’s a longer-term question of the future of those who are verified and will remain in cantonments.

But what I have been stressing, and why it is so important to discuss the future of the security sector, is that cantonment was supposed to be a relatively short-term process while an early election was held. It has now gone on for 11 months. Similarly, the Nepal Army has been basically restricted to barracks for those 11 months. That is not a viable long term situation. And therefore there needs to be discussion, which so far has hardly begun, about the long term. And that’s a very central issue for UNMIN, because as I have said we don’t know how long the arms monitoring role at cantonments and barracks will need to continue unless we know that there is a plan for the long term solutions.

Sudeshna Sarkar, Indo Asian News Service: Mr Martin, would you care to name the armed group and leaders met by UN humanitarian officers, and are these UN humanitarian officials from UNMIN or from other UN offices?

Ian Martin: The statement was intended to make it very clear that they were not UNMIN personnel. We don’t have humanitarian personnel as such. But precisely because this was not an UNMIN responsibility I am not going to say anything more about the nature of the meeting. I have made it clear its general nature.

Sashi Pokharel, Ujayalo Radio: You have said that the UN has been suggested to be more active including in security sector as well. Does it mean you will give support to security forces? Supporting security forces?

Ian Martin: It is not so much a question of supporting security forces, as assisting a discussion as to what is the long-term future in the security sector. Now, if one goes back to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it didn’t settle the future of the Maoist combatants or indeed all issues relating to the future of the Nepal Army. It said, on one hand, that there should be a special committee established by the Interim Government to consider the future of the Maoist combatants. That special committee was eventually established in May, it held a single meeting in July, and now with the Maoists out of the Interim Government, it is not continuing to work. So, essentially no progress has been made on that issue.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement also talked about the Interim Government drawing up an action plan for the Nepal Army for its democratisation, for considering its appropriate size, for considering its future inclusive character. And again, I am not aware that that discussion has been taken forward. Of course, these are difficult issues on which there are very different perspectives, but it’s not an issue that can be avoided because the future of those in the cantonments must be addressed.

Jane Rankin Reid, Tehelka: I am just wondering about the actual time frame for the extended mandate. I understand it is suppose to be mid-December. How much longer will UNMIN be looking for?

Ian Martin: The present mandate actually expires on 22 January. It is an initial 12 month mandate, voted by the Security Council on 23 January 2007. The question of the duration of any extension is a matter first for the Government, in the request it makes, and then for the Security Council. It’s not for UNMIN itself to determine. So, in that respect we will wait the request from the Government, which as I have said, the Prime Minister indicated is the subject of active consultation amongst the political parties at the moment.

Jane Rankin Reid, Tehelka: Assuming that Government requests your mandate, and it does not look like they are not going to, what is a ballpark timeframe?

Ian Martin: A Security Council mandate can be very different in different circumstances. Twelve months, which was our initial mandate, is normally the maximum that is decided. There was some suggestion when the initial mandate of UNMIN was discussed that six months would have been more appropriate initially and then a review, and that’s not uncommon in terms of United Nations operations, especially where the situation on the ground is uncertain and the Security Council wants to review it. But I would stress these are in a sense technical issues. The decision as to how long the mandate is extended doesn’t preclude further extension if that is requested.

Manesh Shrestha, CNN: You mention “where it has been suggested more UN involvement”: where does this suggestion come from? And, second, “there is no exit strategy for the UN without security sector reform”. What does that mean, exactly? Without security sector reform the UN will not be able to get out of Nepal?

Ian Martin: So far as the question of where suggestions come from, there have been a wide range of suggestions: from Nepalis, from people in political parties, people in civil society, as well as from those in the international community who wish the process well, who have made a significant investment, both by paying through the United Nations for UNMIN but also in many other ways, providing support to the election and so on. And naturally the international community wants to see that the investment in international support is actually effective and successful in furthering the process.

So far as the question of exit strategy is concerned, if you take the two core roles of UNMIN, so far as the electoral support is concerned, the exit strategy is clear: the holding of a successful election means there is no longer a continuing need for electoral support. Even now the amount that has already been accomplished, that will still be of value when a new date is set for the election, means that we wouldn’t necessarily expect to be asked for the same degree of support in future as we initially provided to the Election Commission. It’s much more complicated when you come to the arms monitoring role. Because that is linked to the arms monitoring agreement and to the fundamental commitment that began from the 12-Point Understanding that the Nepal Army would remain in barracks and the Maoist army would be in cantonments until the Constituent Assembly election had taken place. And even then there may be some further need for discussion and implementation of decisions about the future. So that’s why I link the question of discussions about the future of the security sector to UNMIN’s exit strategy.

There could be a decision that UNMIN was no longer to play the arms monitoring role, but then one would have to ask the question what does that mean in terms of respect for the commitments in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the arms monitoring agreement that have been implemented and are expected to continue until the Constituent Assembly election has taken place.

Mahesh, Kantipur Radio: You have mentioned in the statement there is a need for an “agreement on a road-map which will ensure that there is not yet another failure to hold the election on whatever new date is agreed.” Can you suggest what type of roadmap it could be?

Ian Martin: Again, I regard that as something that should be a subject of reflection amongst Nepalese actors, in which we will be delighted to contribute to. It is not for UNMIN to set out exclusively an UNMIN roadmap. But it clearly requires a sufficient degree of consensus around the electoral system, not only amongst the political parties but an understanding from the marginalised groups that they are to be adequately represented in the Constituent Assembly, and therefore that nobody has a motivation to continue to seek to disrupt the process. It requires, as I have already suggested, addressing the issues of public security which are particularly serious in parts of the Terai as we all know, but not only in the Terai. We don’t know exactly what would have happened if the political parties had gone forward to a 22 November election and had begun campaigning actively at the local level. But certainly up until the time the election was postponed, a climate had not yet been created in many parts of the country where all political parties could campaign freely, without any fear of intervention, of violence or threats of violence from others. And that’s fundamental, of course, to having a successful election.

But then beyond that, as I have suggested, the Constituent Assembly election is a key part of the peace process and there needs to be an understanding on all sides that that peace process is on track, and that’s where I come back to the suggestion and the very welcome reflection of that suggestion, on the part of the Prime Minister and others in the political parties, that a review of implementation of the Agreements is an important matter.

Ram Humagain, Gorkhapatra: I don’t see anything information about the second round of verification in the statement. Has it become sidelined due to other issues? What is the latest progress on the verification process?

Ian Martin: I primarily wanted to focus on the mandate issues that we have been discussing. But indeed I am happy to tell you that verification is proceeding with cooperation at Nawalparasi, the penultimate cantonment site where we are undertaking verification. And that once that is completed, we move on to the seventh and last site. Cooperation regarding the verification process itself is proceeding smoothly.

The big issue that remains, however, is arranging the discharge of those who have been excluded by verification and that, as many of you have heard me say before, requires the Government to take decisions on the payments that are to be made to those who are discharged. Because although three months of payments was released on the eve of Dasain, as it were, that was not regarded as the final fulfilment of commitments to make payments. Again, not a negotiation that UNMIN is involved in directly, but one that has to be successfully resolved by the Government and with the Maoists for us to be able to proceed with the discharge arrangements.

Ishwar Khanal, The Himalayan Times: You have said that UNMIN has met and will continue to meet the wide range of representatives from the traditionally marginalised groups. Does this mean that your discussions are purely confined to humanitarian issues or, like, political issues as well?

Ian Martin: These are discussions to inform how UNMIN carries out all of its work. Obviously a lot of the concerns that marginalized groups have expressed to us relate to their position within the electoral system and eventually in the Constituent Assembly. Humanitarian issues are dealt with by the UN humanitarian system, the Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Kahane and others. Human rights issues are of course primarily within the mandate of OHCHR, which similarly has an active engagement with representatives of these groups. But we regularly discuss, sometimes at our initiative, sometimes at theirs, with representatives of women’s groups about the inclusion of women in the peace process and the electoral system, and then of course with Madhesi, Janajati, Dalit and other groups. And I think that it is extremely important that UNMIN and the United Nations system as a whole should be open to and aware of their concerns, even if some of them are not matters that are for UNMIN to address directly.

Surendra Phuyal, BBC: We’ve been hearing and reading reports that UNMIN is giving too much concession to the Maoists, which was evident while doing the revision of those disqualified during the verification process. We also hear, at the same time, from the Maoists that UNMIN is conspiring against them. What is the reality? How do you see these reports?

Ian Martin: The reality from my perspective is that UNMIN is trying as hard as it can to be objective in a situation where there are accusations and counter-accusations, and naturally nobody is going to be fully satisfied that we are reflecting exclusively their point of view.

Let me deal specifically with the question about verification and whether there are concessions within verification. Because this, I think, mainly stems from the disagreements we had with the Maoists after verification at the first cantonment site in Ilam, when we did agree to review a small number of cases. We reviewed a small number of cases chosen by General Wilhelmsen, the Chief Arms Monitor, because he was not satisfied that the reports from the teams could be fully relied on. They were reviewed according to exactly the same criteria. Some of the decisions were maintained, some were reversed, and we then built in a process whereby cases could be taken up to a higher level. We are carrying out a very difficult process, because we are trying to confirm through interview issues of age and recruitment dates that can’t be confirmed with absolute certainty by any documentation. But I assure you and everyone again that we have not compromised in any way the criteria that were set out in the arms monitoring agreement.

Now you will continue to find that sometimes things we say will coincide with the perspective of the Nepali Congress, sometimes with the perspective of the UML, sometimes with the perspective of the Maoists. And our criticisms will sometimes be directed in one direction and sometimes in the other, and I would ask you to look overall in the manner in which we are trying to fulfil the role of an objective third party. Because frankly it is only with objectivity and trust from all parties that support to a peace process can be effective. It can’t be effective by the third party becoming purely a critic of one party or another.

Biswomani Pokharel, Samay: Mr Martin, I think you are aware of the fact that Prime Minister Koirala, the Maoists and China and India are not willing to give you the extended role. In this context, why are you coming with all these agendas demanding the extension. Are you trying to put pressure on the government and all these parties?

Ian Martin: I’m not really aware of anyone’s position unless it is communicated to me. I read a lot of things in the media, some of which I think may be correct, some of which I’m not sure are correct. But until I’ve had official discussions with those involved I don’t know formally what the position is.

I am responding to the view that the United Nations ought to be able to play a more fully effective and supportive role in this peace process without in any way compromising national sovereignty and the fact that it is a Nepalese process. At the end of the day, what UNMIN will do will be determined by the requests of the Government and the parties, and the willingness, of course of the Security Council to mandate us according to their request.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: In your statement it says “the need for reviewing the CPA” and you have blamed both the parties for violating the CPA. Can you please tell me who is more violating the CPA? Do you see any defect in the CPA itself?

Ian Martin: I don’t think it is helpful to try to ask the question who is violating the CPA most. Because certainly failures to implement the CPA are very different in their nature and some of them frankly are a matter of shared responsibility, especially when implementation was the responsibility of an Interim Government that included the Maoists, both sides to the peace agreement. So I think what’s needed is for everybody to look at what the limitations have been in the implementation of the peace agreements. And it would be more helpful is if each side focused on their own limitations rather than on accusations against the other. The further part of your question?

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: Do you see any defects in the CPA?

Ian Martin: Many of the issues that concern us are questions of implementation, but some are issues where the CPA itself did not fully map out the future. For example, if we return to the question of the future of the Maoist combatants, as I already said the CPA described a process in general terms but it certainly did not settle the issue. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was not a final resolution of all the issues of the peace process. It was a very major achievement in taking the peace process forward but there is still a need to take forward further aspects of the peace process. And the CPA was also negotiated at a time when issues of inclusion were not as prominent as they have become. So again, although there are general commitments to questions of inclusion, those too I think need further consideration in the current situation.

Gopal Sharma, Reuters: Some Indian channels have quoted you as saying “significant numbers in the Maoist soldiers in the camps are children”. What is the latest numbers? Can you give us some figures?

Ian Martin: There is nothing new, I have said in these press conferences that we have confirmed through our verification that there are a significant number of minors, that’s not new. And that continues to be something that we are determining through our verification, what exactly the numbers are. As you know, I am not in the habit of giving you those numbers, but I have always been clear that we have found significant numbers who are under 18 on the qualifying date. And we are concerned to move ahead to their discharge, which under the agreement ought to have been immediate but which has been delayed by the failure to reach an agreement on the issue of payments in particular.

Ghanashyam Ojha, The Kathmandu Post: As regional forces have an influence on the peace process, do you think Nepal has to discuss with India to extend the tenure of UNMIN?

Ian Martin: That’s a matter for the Government of Nepal to decide,

Ghanashyam Ojha, The Kathmandu Post: What to you feel?

Ian Martin: It’s not a question of what I feel. What the Security Council expects is a request from an independent sovereign government. What views the Government takes into account in making its requests, are a matter for the Government.

Kumar Lamichhane, Nepal 1 TV: Fully effective role of UNMIN. Does that mean in your role, you are looking for expansion of the mandate that was earlier given to you? My second question is, are you in favour of merging Maoists combatants in the Nepal Army prior to the election?

Ian Martin: Well again, let me do the last question first: it’s not for me to be for or against the merger of Maoist combatants before or after the election. That is a matter that has to be decided by the parties. It is for me to insist that is a crucial issue - the future of the Maoists combatants is a crucial issue for the reasons that I have already said. Because there is no other way in which our arms monitoring responsibilities are going to transition to longer term solutions. What those longer term solutions are not for the UN to prescribe. They are indeed to be negotiated. Of course there is international experience that can be made available to those considering the issues that may be helpful, but not in the spirit of saying what should be done in Nepal should be done the same way as has been done in any other particular country.
As so often, when you ask two questions, I forget the other one.

Kumar Lamichhane, Nepal 1 TV: The fully effective role of UNMIN?

Ian Martin: Does it mean a formal expansion of the mandate? The three examples that I gave, of where we think we could be more helpful, I don’t think would necessarily require a formal expansion of the mandate of UNMIN. We are a United Nations political mission; I am the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who has what in United Nations terms is normally called a “Good Offices” role, an ability to offer assistance where that is requested. Those are areas in which I think we could very well assist largely within our existing mandate and resources if there is a clear wish for us to do so.

Sirish Pradhan, Press Trust of India: Last question. When you say extended mandate does it mean peacekeeping forces as the political situation becomes more fragile due to the postponement of the election.

Ian Martin: Nobody, nobody, nobody is talking about peacekeeping forces coming to Nepal. And I should point out to you some ambiguity in the words we are using. When I use the word “extended”, I am talking about extended in time. Others have been using the word “expanded” in relation to the scope of the mandate. But please be clear, I have just been in New York, there is no discussion in New York of peacekeeping in relation to Nepal. This is a special political mission and what is under discussion is the future term and role of this political mission.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: When you were in New York, the newspaper reported that someone telephoned you and asked some money, threatened you. Is it true?

Ian Martin: It’s true that there were telephone threats made here to this office, not received by me personally. And that an arrest was carried out as a result of that. A lot of the details in the report were not correct, including the report that someone had spoken directly to me. But it is correct that there were threats made.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: What is happening to the case? Is that case in the police?

Ian Martin: The police – it is now in the hands of the police. Yes. It is obviously not for UNMIN, it is a matter for the police.

Sudeshna Sarkar, Indo Asian News Service: Just wondering Mr. Martin, when this mandate is extended, from Special Representative, are you going to become and Extra-Special Representative?

Ian Martin: I think, I can, without any doubt deny that. Let me just wrap up by emphasizing, if I may, a few of the points that I wanted to make. The first, I wanted to emphasize my main message from New York that there is still very strong commitment on the part of United Nations, both the Secretary-General and the Security Council, to supporting Nepal’s peace process. So, that’s true at the highest level.

Secondly, the challenges to the process really must not be under estimated. There is a need for a frank assessment of why the two dates for the Constituent Assembly election have come and gone, and what now is a realistic roadmap. Thirdly, we have had a lot of discussion about in areas in which UNMIN is ready and could be of assistance to the process, but again I emphasize that that is not in any way to take away from the fact that this is a Nepali process, and that it is for the Nepalis to decide what role it wants the United Nations and the international community as a whole to play in support of it. Thank you very much indeed.

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PRESS STATEMENT of Ian Martin (6 November 2007)
My main purpose in inviting you to this press briefing is to answer any questions you may have about the future of UNMIN’s mandate, about which there have been many media reports and comments during my trip to New York. But first I want to refer to the negotiations of recent weeks which culminated in the votes in the Interim Legislature-Parliament on Sunday. The future of the monarchy is obviously not a matter on which the United Nations has taken or should take a position; nor is the electoral system, except for the desirability of respecting international good practice which is compatible with different electoral systems. These are matters for Nepalis to decide. Although these two issues have not been fully resolved, there have been positive aspects of recent discussions among the parties: the seriousness of the efforts to reach compromise within the Seven-Party Alliance; the repeatedly-expressed commitments to sustaining the Alliance and the peace process; and the respectful spirit in which the final parliamentary proceedings were conducted, despite continuing substantive disagreements.
I am dismayed however to have returned to an increased number of reports of unresolved abductions and killings, whether attributed to armed Madhesi groups, Maoist cadres, or local disputes. Nepal has lived for too long with violence and intimidation, and I appeal again at this season for a commitment to tolerance and non-violence, but also for an end to impunity. It is the responsibility of all to support efforts to bring murderers to justice, as the CPN(M) has committed to do in the tragic case of Birendra Sah, and as I have repeatedly said should be the case with the killers of Maoist cadres in the Terai. The rule of law across all of Nepal is fundamental to a conducive atmosphere for free and fair elections as well as to broader public confidence in the peace process as a whole.
When I briefed the Security Council in New York, I said that the crisis facing the peace process was not just the consequence of new demands regarding the issues of monarchy and the electoral system, but that it also stemmed from growing distrust amongst the parties to the peace agreement, with accusations in both directions that commitments had not been implemented. I believe that the parties need to take stock of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and other agreements reached, and their implementation. This should include the implementation of commitments made to Janajati, Madhesi and other groups. I was encouraged to be told in my meeting with the Prime Minister just before leaving Kathmandu that he intended that there should indeed be a review of the implementation of agreements, and to find on my return a wide appreciation of this need.
I also said to the Security Council that the parties need to collectively reaffirm to the public their commitment to a successful Constituent Assembly election, in order to reassure the people of Nepal that the process remains on track. The Constituent Assembly election is an integral element of the peace process: a credible election cannot take place unless the peace process is on a solid footing, and a credible election is critical to the success of the peace process. This requires not just the setting of a date, but agreement on a road-map which will ensure that there is not yet another failure to hold the election on whatever new date is agreed. Despite the best efforts of the Election Commission, with which UNMIN has worked closely, two dates set for the election have come and gone. It is now time for a frank analysis by Nepali politicians and civil society of why this has been the case, and what are the requirements for a successful electoral process to go forward.
I also informed the Security Council that the Prime Minister had told me of his intention to consult other parties with a view to requesting an extension of the mandate of UNMIN. The mood of the Security Council appeared to be unanimously sympathetic to such a request. As well as extending the time period of the mandate of UNMIN, there has also been discussion regarding the scope of our support to the peace process.
Let me first put to rest the suggestion that UNMIN has already exceeded its mandate. This is not the case. I want in particular to put on record that UNMIN has not met or sought to meet with the leadership of armed Madhesi groups. This misunderstanding appears to have arisen because there was one meeting in India between United Nations humanitarian officials and the leadership of one armed group. Their purpose was to try to ensure that emergency food relief and other assistance could be delivered in the wake of flooding in the Terai earlier this year without attacks by armed groups against humanitarian workers. These UN officials involved were not under the authority of UNMIN, and their discussion was confined to humanitarian, not political issues. Of course UNMIN has met and will continue to meet with a wide range of representatives of traditionally marginalized groups.
I was frank with the Security Council, as was the Secretary-General in his report, that expectations among Nepalis are high as to what UNMIN can do. Our focused mandate is not well understood. To expect UNMIN to safeguard or advance the peace process in ways that it has not been mandated or requested to assist is not realistic. I have always emphasized that this is a Nepalese process, whose success depends on Nepalis: the international community can only assist in the manner in which its support is requested. There are a number of areas where it has been suggested that more active United Nations support to the peace process would be of value, if desired by the government and the parties. I mention three. First, support to the implementation of the peace process and agreements reached, which as I have already said Nepali political leaders and civil society are increasingly acknowledging needs to be addressed. Second, assisting a discussion on the future of the country’s security sector, including a managed transition from the current temporary Maoist army cantonments and restriction to barracks of the Nepal Army to long-term solutions: without this, there is no exit strategy from UNMIN’s arms monitoring. And third, greater advisory support to promoting public security – the greatest concern of so many Nepalis and a critical requirement for a credible Constituent Assembly election. These would not mean a bigger UNMIN presence: we are already reducing our electoral staff, although we will be ready to increase our district presence again if requested ahead of a firm election date. But it could mean providing the broader support to the success of the peace process that many Nepalis expect of the United Nations. is for Nepalis to decide what is asked of the United Nations: you have the assurance of the Secretary-General and, I believe, the openness of the Security Council to extend the assistance requested.

UN Support For Polls

The United Nations has given full support to the process of holding the polls for a constituent assembly in Nepal. The UN has established its full presence in Nepal and is backstopping and overseeing the peace building and democratisation process in the country. The UN general secretary Ban Ki Moon, like his predecessor Kofi Anan, has evinced keen interest in the peace and democratisation process in Nepal. At one end, the UN is involved in the verification of the Maoist combatants to pave the way for their demobilisation. The global organisation is putting its weight behind making the polls to the constituent assembly a success. It needs to be mentioned that the UN has been consistently helping the country to ensure that the election to the constituent assembly is held during November and a democratic and peaceful Nepal is constructed. The UN voter education specialists are at work to assist the Election Commission to design and implement a strategy for empowering the Nepali electors to make informed choices in the polls.

Moreover, the UN has set up an advisory unit to provide technical and intellectual resources in the process of framing a new democratic constitution in the country. High level UN officials have been visiting Nepal to oversee and encourage the process for conducting elections to the constituent assembly. The visit by B. Lynn Pascoe, UN undersecretary general for political affairs recently, has been crucial in boosting the prospects for the constituent assembly polls in Nepal. At a time when pessimism and frustration have been heightened due to feuds and fissures among the political actors, posing serious questions on the prospects and possibilities of the polls for a constituent assembly, the positive remarks given by the high level UN official with regard to the polls should be commended. The UN official remarked that the political process for holding the constituent assembly elections in Nepal is moving on the right track and spoke with certainty that there was no room for despondency and pessimism. These observations have contributed to giving the political situation a positive direction. The political actors are expected to work in concert to make the scheme of the constituent assembly a success.

Source: The Rising Nepal, August 23, 2007

UN role in Nepal dubious

Sandhya Jain

Throughout 1945 and 1946, Britain, the Netherlands and Australia, as occupational forces in Indonesia, sought to reverse Indonesian independence and revert it to Netherlands’ colonial control.

It is strange that all Indian discourse on Nepal avoids scrutiny of the role the West is playing through the auspices of the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), established vide Security Council resolution 1740 (2007). Recent visitors to the country speak of the Terai disturbances, the growing extortion and lawlessness of Maoist cadres, the rising hills-plains divide, and the danger that elections scheduled for November 22 may be cancelled on some pretext. Some have taken note of the mushrooming growth of dance bars as the only means of income in a stagnant economy. Yet they seem unaware of the growing hatred of UN Mission staff as local citizens witness their flamboyant life styles, suffer their arrogance, and see no beneficial result of their presence in the country. The UNMIN was set up for one year at the request of the Nepalese Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) to help implement the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, monitor the ceasefire, and assist in the election of a new Constituent Assembly.

What most Indian analysts fail to realise, however, is that UNMIN is not an ordinary peace-keeping force, but a Political Mission. Only an absolute abdication of responsibility could have let the Sonia Gandhi-dominated UPA regime acquiesce in the arrival of the Mission to determine events in a country that lies in India’s natural sphere of influence. It is well known that India’s sad experience with UN officials in Kashmir compelled her to seek friendly ties with the Soviet Union so as to procure the Soviet veto against Western unilateralism in the Security Council. A more telling example of what the UN can do to non-Western nations can be seen in the case of Indonesia, one of its worst victims. The UN was set up in 1945 ostensibly to save the globe from future world wars; uphold fundamental human rights and the equal rights of nations regardless of size, among others. Yet its founding members, Britain, Australia and the Netherlands, were the principal wreckers of Indonesian independence. Throughout 1945 and 1946, Britain, the Netherlands and Australia, as occupational forces in Indonesia, sought to reverse Indonesian independence and revert it to Netherlands’ colonial control. The UN ignored this brazen violation of its Charter. In 1947, after two years of atrocities by the occupation forces against the Indonesian people, the Security Council merely called for a cease-fire on August 1, 1947. In an unpublished paper, public opinions activist Ms. Radha Rajan points out, the UN failed to declare the continuing presence of the Dutch in Indonesia or of the British in the Malay province (British Malaya) as illegal and violative of the Charter. The call for cease-fire suggested that Indonesia was a party to the hostilities, rather than an victim of continued western and colonial aggression. UN did not direct the Netherlands to withdraw from Indonesia, or UK to quit British Malaya. Instead, UN set up a “Good Offices Commission” in October 1947 to work out a ‘settlement’ in Indonesia. This naturally made the Netherlands a legitimate party in the negotiations, thereby legitimising colonialism and the refusal of European powers to withdraw unconditionally from their colonies.

In the context of Nepal, it bears mentioning that India can ignore the political activities of the UN Political Mission only at its own peril. The grim reality of Nepal today is that violence and lawlessness are increasing daily and Maoist cadres are flush with funds. Some of the funds can be explained in terms of government grants under the ceasefire, and extravagant extractions from businessmen and traders. It is my understanding, however, that these sources are being used as a ‘cover’ to shield the fact that the Maoists are being funded by external forces with a view to secure an anti-India and anti-China foothold in the region. Nothing else can explain the truth that under UNMIN auspices, Nepal is daily moving further away from the possibility of elections for a new Constituent Assembly. Instead, Maoists are trying to force the unelected coalition government to declare a Republic and dethrone the monarchy. Reports from hitherto reliable sources suggest certain Madhesi leaders of the Terai are being wooed and offered representation in the current makeshift Parliament. Should they agree, this would be unilaterally converted into a Constituent Assembly (again unelected), and this will proceed to declare a Republic, despite the growing public sentiment that the King represents the nation’s continuity with its Hindu civilisation and culture. Observers to the mountain country also say that the Maoists appear to have access to weaponry which has not been accounted for (there are districts that neither the government nor the UNMIN can enter). It is feared that if the scheduled elections are actually held, they may be violent and of doubtful fairness. UNMIN appears blissfully unaware of this reality, which is very suspicious.

New Delhi would do well to take a fresh shock of events in the Himalayan kingdom, rather than accept the prevailing rhetoric as truth. For instance, it is said that a ‘people’s movement’ brought about the brief period of ‘democratic’ rule in Nepal in April 1990. Yet with hindsight, this seems to have been an orchestrated preamble to a more violent movement by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), which launched an insurgency in 1996 because the various political parties simply failed to unite and give the country stable governance. The Maoists launched a decade of armed conflict during which thousands of persons ‘disappeared’ and many more were displaced. King Gyanendra’s intervention in October 2002 must be placed in this context. Various prime ministers appointed by him up to February 2005 could not control the violence, failing which he assumed executive powers on February 1, 2005. It is now well-known that the April 2006 agitation that led to restoration of Parliament was based on rented crowds. As such funding is normally associated with the West, India would do well to wake up to developments in its neighbourhood.

Source: The Organiser, Issue, August 12, 2007

The Growing Foreign Concern for Nepal

With the development of peace building process foreign concern in Nepal has increased in massive Level. Each and every country directly or indirectly related to Nepal is concerning about Nepal and its peace building process according to their global and regional influence. But the critics say that it is foreign intervention upon internal politics of Nepal. China, which often remains silent in Nepalese politics, has also been showing its concern since April movement of 2006. Especially it has seen in massive scale when Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Zheng Xianglin said any foreign intervention in Nepal "will not be tolerable for China," in an interview published in Nepal magazine, last month. Though China has not faced any charge from critic about intervention. But it is said that America and India have been playing vital role in Nepalese politics. Among the many Countries America, India and china are mainly have seen on the scene in Nepalese diplomacy. It is not new of American and Indian concern but in the latest day's Chinese concern has created a new wave.

Nepal is surrounded by India in east, west and south and by China in north. So she has geopolitical relationship with India and China. And, located between two large Asian countries China and India, America wants to gain the benefit of geopolitical and strategic significant from Nepal-U.S. relationship.Directly or indirectly these three country want to keep continue their relationship with Nepal in high level to maintain their political and economical impulse. America always wants to look through Indian eyes to Nepal; and India also does not make any different idea to look Nepal rather than American interests. Now, going on federalism and abolishing the monarchy are main political issues of Nepalese political ground. On the issue of abolishing the monarchy has disputes in the country. And it is charged that America and India want to keep continue the monarchy in Nepal, so, before a month some cadres of Young communist league, a sister organization of Nepal communist Party (Maoist) had hurled stone to James F. Moriarty, the American ambassador to Nepal.

India and Nepal have a geographical nearness and open boarder. There is monopoly of India in Nepalese commercial market too. So India wants to secure her dominant role in Nepalese market. And a few decades ago India was battled and defeated with china and it has remained a bit fear to India of China. This is why Nepal is important "northern frontiers" of India. Though, China and India have improved their relationship into fair competitive commercial partner from traditional enemy.China doesn't tolerate the activities about free Tibet in Nepal which happened sometimes. And, some analyst especially leftist says that the America is trying to encircle China through Nepali territory. So, it is said that china's relationship with Nepal is also a bit more strategic on the prospective of security. Even though Chinese ambassador to Nepal has said that it is not the time of cold war and china-America relations witness a smooth and healthy development. Nowadays China also wants to buildup the formal relationship with CPN (Maoist) which is said by Chinese ambassador in a press interaction, last week, organized by Reporters club. But America and India still doubtfully look to Maoist. And it is said that the Maoist's president Prachanda will visit to China after few months.

Besides located between India and China, America has another issue in Nepal of their interest. That is doctrine issue. America always hates communist. So, the entering of Maoist into government and their open politics has been challenging to America. America has still tagged to Maoist as terrorist. The out going ambassador Moriarty often talk about Nepalese politics in different programme and scold Maoist and her sister organization YCL. India has begun to invite to Nepalese party to visit India. Nepali congress and CPN UML has already visited India. Likewise many political mission and team of different western country come to Nepal to observe and talk about politics in Nepal. And they directly talk to Nepalese prime minister too. Last time American Former President had come to Nepal and met with prime minister and leaders of political parties including Maoist president Prachanda. These influential countries envoy frequently meet to the Nepalese prime minister directly and talk about Nepalese politics.

But critics say that it is not the right system to meet prime minister directly. Professor and political analyst Dr. Lokraj Baral said, "They must go through joint secretary of foreign ministry." Critics accuse that the foreign diplomats are being over smart in Nepalese politics out of their ethics. Some critics believe that our leader themselves give the environment of such type. Bhim Bhurtel, A political analyst says that if the political leadership believes on people rather than power center the foreign concern automatically reduce. He said, "in this situation Nepal should adopt the dynamic foreign policy in spite of accusing to foreign diplomats."

Source: Ohmy News International, June 30, 2007

Plea For CA polls

Chief of the United Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), Ian Martin pointed out the fact that the election to the constituent assembly should be held to establish political stability in the country. Speaking at an interaction with media persons held at Kathmandu ,the other day, the chief of the UN Mission in Nepal maintained that the conducive environment for polls will have to be created to conduct polls in a free and fair manner. Referring to the activities of the Young Communist League (YCL) , the head of the UN mission in Nepal asserted that the League's actions should not exceed the limits prescribed by law. The League should cooperate with the law enforcing agencies as a group of law abiding citizens. This alone would contribute in keeping law and order in the country.

Informing the media about the second phase verification of the PLA combatants lodged in different cantonments , he made it clear that the verification would be carried out to undertake examination and scrutiny strictly, and those who did not meet the criteria should be sent out of the camps. As the international community is all for stable and consistent peace building efforts, the support extended from all quarters including the UN to the cause of democracy and peace in Nepal is very instrumental. This has been one of the causative factors , among others, to accrue positive results for democratization and peace building in the country.

What should not go unmentioned is the establishment of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human rights in Nepal for the last two years. This has been at the frontline to monitor the abuses of civil and political rights in the country . Moreover, the initiative for commencing the second phase arms and combatants verification has been relevant and important. This goes in line with the concurrent efforts and preparation carried out for the election to the constituent assembly. As the present political dispensation has been working to arrive at settlement of the outstanding issues through dialogue, the commitment of the UN, as highlighted by Ian Martin, to extend cooperation to accelerate momentum for peace building is meaningful.

Source: The Rising Nepal, June 14, 2007

India to help UN on Nepal's transition to democracy

India has told the United Nations that it will strengthen its hands to help Nepal's transition to democracy, Indian diplomats said here Thursday.At a meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the two sides discussed the situation in Nepal in terms of the ensuing elections in the Himalayan country, arms management and the UN resolution 1740.

'Both the prime minister and the secretary general said that they looked forward to helping Nepal to achieve her democratic transition in a peaceful and orderly manner,' Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon said after the meeting. 'UN has an active role in Nepal,' he said and added that India will also extend all the help it can in helping its South Asian neighbour that is slated to elect its constituent assembly in November. After being criticised by the international community for delaying the crucial election, regarded as the key to peace and stability in Nepal, the ruling eight-party coalition had announced last week that the polls would be held in November.

Manmohan Singh and Ban also discussed other issues like climate change and felt that the right forum to raise the issue should be under the UN's Framework Convention on Climate Change. The secretary general, who has served in India in the past, proposed a meeting of world leaders, ahead of the General Assembly in September, to discuss climate change.

Source: Malaysia Sun, June 7, 2007

IDP still facing threat

Integrated Regional Information Networks

May 23, 2007

Hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their homes during the decade-long war between Maoist rebels and the government are having difficulty returning to their homes, despite the conflict ending in November 2006, aid workers say. Last year, the Nepalese government estimated that there were more than 200,000 internally displaced people (I.D.P.'s) in the country but there is no accurate information on whether that number has reduced after peace was achieved five months ago. The lack of an I.D.P. registration system has made it difficult to determine who has actually returned home, aid groups say. Most of the displaced are scattered in major towns and cities or have migrated to India.

But we can easily gauge that very few have returned because the Maoists still rule the villages and are selective about who can return to their homes safely," said Dilliram Dhakal from the Community Study and Welfare Center (C.S.W.C.), a local N.G.O. that has been advocating for the rights of the displaced. Dhakal added that despite commitments pledged by Maoist leaders in the capital to ensure the safe return of displaced families, their local Maoist cadres in the villages have not been fully cooperative. "There are issues of local Maoists not adhering to commitments made in the peace agreement," Paul Handley, humanitarian affairs officer with the United Nation's Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Nepal, told IRIN in the capital, Kathmandu.

So far, only those I.D.P.'s who support or have close affiliation with the Communist Party of Nepal, Maoists (C.P.N.M.) have been able to return to their properties, said Dhakal. But a large number of other I.D.P.'s are still unable to retrieve their farms, livestock and houses that were seized by the Maoists, he added. "What's the use of returning home when they have no property and land to live on for their livelihood?" asked rights activist Bhola Mahat from N.G.O. Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), which has been actively helping the displaced return home.

Land Issue Is Major Problem for I.D.P.'s

It is no longer the threat of physical security but more of food and land security that has been impeding returns, said aid workers. "I have nothing to eat or survive on. So how can I return home? Just to starve myself?" asked Ramesh Biswakarma in Kathmandu, where he is living in poverty after he fled from his remote village in the northwestern Jajarkot district. A large group of displaced people from Jajarkot is still living at an I.D.P. camp in the Rajhena area of Nepalgunj city, 600 kilometers west of the capital. Camp residents are desperately seeking help from aid agencies to ensure their protection, safety, and the return of their properties. "Land continues to be a problem in rural areas with I.D.P.'s not being able to access their lands," Aidan Goldsmith, director of International Rescue Committee (I.R.C.) in Nepal, told IRIN.

He said that major challenges for resolving the displaced persons issue were the return of their farmlands and generating livelihoods from whatever remains of their resources in their villages.
I.R.C. has been working in the country for the past two years with a focus on I.D.P.'s, other conflict-resolution issues, and health projects. "There is a prime need for assisting the I.D.P.'s to restart their lives and help them to become functioning members of the community," said Goldsmith.

New I.D.P. Policy and Legal Assistance

A new policy for assisting the displaced, formulated and passed by the Nepalese parliament three weeks ago, is seen as key to resolving the displaced persons issue. "It's a good policy and critical toward assisting the I.D.P.'s," Alexander Jones, Nepal's country director of the Norwegian Refugee Council (N.R.C.), said. In addition to OCHA, other key U.N. agencies and I.R.C., the N.R.C. was also part of the task force to help the government develop the new I.D.P. policy. Jones said that according to the new policy, citizens forced to leave their homes will have the right to protection from the state. The policy also helps to clearly define the status of an I.D.P., which was not the case before.

N.R.C., which provides legal assistance to the displaced in more than 10 countries, also launched an Information Counseling and legal Assistance project a month ago in Nepal. Since then, many displaced families have been able to get advice on their legal rights and access to justice as well as guidance on legal documents which would give them access to their properties. However, Jones said that many I.D.P. families lost their land and property legal documents after they were forced to leave their homes. At present, many of them lack enough documentation to even get any compensation from the government for their lost properties. © IRIN

Source: Worldpress.org, May 24, 2007

Nepal's Government Agrees to Pay Maoist Fighters in Camps

Liam Cochrane

Nepal's government has agreed to begin making monthly payments to Maoist former rebels now living in U.N.-supervised camps. In return, the Maoists will allow the United Nations to resume efforts to verify the former fighters' identities, and check for child soldiers in the camps. Liam Cochrane reports from Kathmandu.

For seven months the former fighters of Nepal's Maoist party have stayed at 28 camps across the country, as part of a peace deal made last year.
Under the deal the Maoists agreed to abandon their armed rebellion and join an interim government and parliament.
The United Nations has registered more than 31,000 Maoist fighters, but has yet to verify that all troops are over 18 years old. It also wants to check to be sure new fighters were not recruited after the peace process began.
Last month, the Maoists blocked U.N. verification until conditions were improved in the camps and salaries were paid to their fighters.

Nepal's Cabinet decided Monday to give a monthly allowance, equal to $46, for each Maoist fighter in the camps, which are also known as cantonments.
"I think we have solved a major problem with cantonments," said Krishna Bahadur Mahara, the spokesman for the government and also a senior Maoist leader.
Mahara said the monthly payments would be given to all 31,000 Maoists currently in the camps, not just those verified by the U.N. to be legitimate soldiers.
The Cabinet decision on allowances could mean a breakthrough for the U.N. verification process - a key part of last November's peace deal.

"UNMIN has been ready to do this process now for the last couple of months, so this would be very good news and we would seek to meet with the Maoist leadership very soon so that we can iron out the details and commence that process," said Kieran Dwyer, the spokesman for the U.N. Mission in Nepal.
The United Nations says it can begin verification within days. Final arrangements must first be cleared by the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, a body made up of representatives from the U.N., Nepal government and Maoist army.

Source: Global Security.Org, May 21, 2007

Hope And Optimism

Ian Martin, head of the UN Mission in Nepal, has expressed his optimism over the peace process in the country. Speaking with reporters at the UN Headquarters in New York Saturday, chief of the UN Mission in Nepal who has been involved in supporting the peace building process in the country, shared his unrelenting hope and maintained that the people of Nepal had taken their future in their hands, with strong determination not to allow Nepal slip into conflict. Referring to the deferral of the polls to the constituent assembly, he affirmed that the timetable for the election had been delayed because regulations governing the process had not been readied. The postponement of the constituent assembly polls, according to Ian Martin, would allow more time for the political stakeholders in the country to prepare a better and constructive environment for the polls. As has been consistently articulated by the chief of the UN mission, Nepal's peace process is fairly on track because following the success of the people's movement in April last year, the country has navigated along the way for building peace and democracy in the country.

The comprehensive peace accord has been signed, and essentially very meaningful has been the formation of the interim parliament and the government in which the Maoists have appropriated a lion's share. The Interim Parliament has seen completely new faces of a progressive political genre with women, Dalits and janjatis occupying a relatively fair share of seats in the total composition of the national legislature. The Maoists should be credited for conceding more seats to the subordinated sections of the society, which should be emulated by others especially when allowing more room for the marginalised in legislating the destiny of the nation. The Election Commission has worked enthusiastically to ensure that the polls to the constituent assembly are held in a fair and free manner. This indicates that Nepal's peace building process, as said by Ian Martin, has moved ahead in a smooth and constructive manner. Though political differences surface time and again, these are managed and handled in a deft manner. Thanks to the Nepalese political leadership, the country has been able to demonstrate a very appreciable model of peace building. The political leadership should work in this spirit to hold the polls to the constituent assembly and accomplish the unfinished task of peace building and democratisation.

Source: The Rising Nepal, May 7, 2007

Complex Questions Remain in Nepal: Ban Ki-Moon

The UN Secretary-General BAN KI-MOON notes “remarkable progress” in the peace process but also acknowledges the complexity of the Nepali problem.

In what looks like the longest statement ever on Nepal by a UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon provides a broad picture of the peace process in Nepal. The following is the full report of Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace process. [Note: Thanks to UN officials for heeding Nepal Monitor's request and making this document accessible. The Security Council's documentation site remained inaccessible for some days since the release of this document on April 26, 2007.]

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1740 (2007) of 23 January 2007, which established the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). The resolution welcomed the continued progress of the peace process in Nepal, and as requested by the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), mandated a special political mission to monitor the management of the arms and armed personnel of CPN(M) and the Nepal Army, assist in monitoring ceasefire arrangements, provide technical support for the conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere and provide a small team of electoral monitors. On 8 February 2007, I appointed Ian artin, who had been serving as my Personal Representative in Nepal, as my Special Representative and Head of Mission.
2. The present report reviews the progress of the peace process since my report to the Council of 9 January 2007 (S/2007/7) and the activities of UNMIN since its establishment on 23 January 2007, and assesses the continuing challenges and opportunities for sustainable peace in Nepal.

II. Progress of the peace process

3. Since the establishment of the Mission, the peace process in Nepal has made remarkable progress within a very short time frame, while experiencing a number of difficulties and understandable delays; however, consolidating those gains remains essential. Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed by the Seven-Party Alliance Government and CPN(M) on 21 November 2006, has advanced. The parties agreed upon an interim Constitution, which was promulgated on 15 January 2007; the Parliament, which had been reinstated in April 2006, was dissolved and replaced by an interim legislature-parliament. The new body includes Maoist members in addition to those of political parties elected to the House of Representatives in 1999 and some nominated members of civil society. On 1 April 2007 the Seven-Party Alliance Government and CPN(M) (“the eight parties”) formed an interim Government under Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, in which CPN(M) ministers hold 5 out of 22 Cabinet positions. [page 1 ends here]

4. The Seven-Party Alliance had linked the inclusion of CPN(M) in the interim legislature-parliament and interim Government to progress regarding the management of arms and armed personnel. In all, 31,152 Maoist personnel have been assembled in 7 main and 21 satellite sites around the country, and 3,475 weapons have been registered. The weapons are now stored in containers with around-the-clock monitoring by UNMIN, with the exception of weapons retained for perimeter security at the cantonments in accordance with the 8 December 2006 agreement on monitoring of the management of arms and armies or for the personal security of CPN(M) leaders. The Nepal Army has stored the number and types of weapons equivalent to those stored by the Maoist army, under the same procedures for registration and monitoring by UNMIN. As of mid-April, UNMIN was ready to begin the second stage of registration and verification of Maoist combatants.
5. However, those important achievements have occurred against a backdrop of escalating social unrest and long-standing issues of exclusion, aggravated by the determination of traditionally marginalized groups to take advantage of the opportunity to press for adequate representation in the Constituent Assembly and by their dissatisfaction with the interim Constitution. Groups representing the Madhesi, the people of the Terai plains along Nepal’s southern border, engaged in widening protests throughout the period from January to March 2007, demanding amendments to the interim Constitution and changes in electoral arrangements to guarantee representation in accordance with their proportion of the population in the Constituent Assembly and official bodies, together with a commitment to a federal State.

6. Some demonstrations turned violent, and in a number of cases the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force responded with excessive use of force. At least 18 out of 24 deaths documented by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal between 22 January and 7 February were the result of police action; many others were injured, and there was extensive damage to property, including government offices. In the Terai, tensions and violence increased between protesters representing the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF), two armed factions of the Jantantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) and CPN(M). Concerns were high that potential spoilers were seeking to take advantage of the unrest to derail the peace process, and some clashes took on a communal character between the Madhesi (those not of hill origin) and the Pahadis (those originating in the hills). Groups representing the Janajatis (indigenous people), including the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities, supported the Madhesi protests or asserted parallel demands for inclusion. At times, the demands from traditionally marginalized groups threatened to overtake the Government-Maoist peace process as laid out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the interim Constitution.
7. The Seven-Party Alliance and CPN(M) struggled to respond to the crisis effectively through steps to restore law and order and through a substantive response to grievances recognized as legitimate. In a major speech to the nation on 7 February 2007, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, supported by leaders of all eight parties, announced significant concessions in an effort to calm the widespread Madhesi protests. The eight parties undertook to allocate 49 per cent of the Constituent Assembly seats to the Terai region, in proportion to its share of the population according to Nepal’s most recent census, and to amend the interim Constitution to incorporate a commitment to a future federal State. The Government [page 2 ends here] established a ministerial team to engage in dialogue with Madhesi groups and with representatives of other traditionally marginalized groups. Although the Terai protests abated, formal talks between the government team, MPRF and JTMM did not get under way before the establishment of the interim Government, which immediately appointed a new team to continue efforts towards dialogue. Other traditionally marginalized groups have continued to protest in support of their respective demands, with Janajati representatives expressing their preference for a round table with all protesting groups rather than separate negotiations focusing on individual communities.

8. On 21 March 2007 at least 27 people, mostly linked to CPN(M), were killed in the Terai town of Gaur, close to the Nepal border with India, after violence broke out at simultaneous rallies of CPN(M) and MPRF. The Maoists remained restrained after the deaths of their members, although Maoist combatants did briefly leave cantonment sites to peacefully protest the Gaur killings, in violation of the agreement on monitoring the management of arms and armies. The situation in the Terai has remained turbulent, with a number of militant factions continuing to operate, including the two factions of JTMM, the Terai Tigers, the Terai Cobra and the Nepal Defense Army (NDA), a fundamentalist group committed to a Hindu kingdom in Nepal, which has claimed responsibility for planting explosive devices at various locations, including at the homes of civil society activists in Kathmandu.
The Gaur killings underscored the serious deficiencies of law enforcement in the country and the dangers of increased criminality along the border with India, which the Governments of Nepal and India are cooperating to address.
9. The participation of women in the peace process has shown little if any progress. As part of the effort to ensure the inclusiveness of the process, it is hoped that the interim Government and all concerned will make a renewed attempt to ensure a wider and deeper involvement of Nepalese women in the search for lasting peace.

10. Public security has been a matter of concern not only in the Terai but throughout much of the country. There have been widespread complaints that CPN(M) has continued to engage in a persistent pattern of low-level intimidation and threats against various sectors, particularly businesses in urban areas, leading toprotests from the business community. The Young Communist League (YCL) established by CPN(M) at the beginning of February 2007 has taken individuals into its custody and engaged in other quasi-policing activities, raising concerns that the Maoists have failed to fully abandon parallel security mechanisms. The formation of the interim Government offers the opportunity for CPN(M) to participate within the Government in establishing public security, ensuring the full cooperation of its cadres with State law enforcement authorities.
11. As part of their negotiations leading to the formation of the interim Government on 1 April 2007, the eight parties adopted a common minimum programme, by which they renewed their commitment to past agreements, including building a conducive environment for a peaceful election. The parties agreed among themselves on 20 June 2007 as the date for the Constituent Assembly election, although the election date requires a formal decision by the interim Government and further amendment of the interim Constitution, which stipulates that the election should take place by 14 June. They agreed to establish a joint coordination committee of the eight parties to assist the interim Government, solve problems and [page 3 ends here] monitor the implementation of the common minimum programme, and local monitoring committees in each district, comprising locally active political parties and others, to monitor implementation of the peace agreement. The eight parties decided upon, and the interim Government sent to the interim legislatureparliament, amendments to the interim Constitution providing for a two-thirds majority no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister, and a two-thirds majority vote to abolish the monarchy if the King is found to pose grave obstacles to the holding of the Constituent Assembly election. The interim Constitution otherwise provides for the decision to retain or abolish the monarchy to be decided by a simple majority of the first session of the Constituent Assembly.

12. The Seven-Party Alliance and CPN(M) originally decided in their agreement of 8 November 2006 that the Constituent Assembly election should be held by mid-June as the culmination of a timetable that had envisaged the formation of the interim Government on 1 December 2006. Since the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner on 30 October 2006 and of four other members in November and January, Nepal’s Election Commission, with the support of UNMIN electoral advisers, has worked hard to make the necessary preparations to meet this already ambitious timetable. This has proved increasingly difficult owing to three key factors: the late passage of essential electoral legislation, making it impossible to meet the timetable for logistical and other reasons; the need to address the concerns of traditionally marginalized groups, including through the addition of constituencies and the consideration of quotas within the electoral system; and the time needed to create sufficient public security. On 12 April 2007 the Election Commission informed the interim Government that an election by the mid-June deadline established in the interim Constitution had become impossible and that a minimum of 110 days from the passage of the necessary legislation would be required. The interim Government has yet to act on the advice of the Commission.
13. The reluctance of the parties to postpone the date of the election reflected real concerns that the peace process might stall and encounter further difficulties from spoilers if its momentum were not maintained. Averting such dangers requires determined cooperation among the parties represented in the interim Government and the legislature-parliament, as well as civil society and all democratic forces in Nepal to create the conditions necessary for a credible Constituent Assembly election.

III. Establishment of the United Nations Mission in Nepal

14. The decision by the Security Council of 1 December 2006 (S/PRST/2006/49) to endorse the proposal of my predecessor in his letter of 22 November 2006 (S/2006/920) for the advance deployment of up to 35 arms monitors and up to 25 electoral personnel enabled the then Office of the Personal Representative and subsequently UNMIN to respond to the urgent request of the parties to the peace agreement to proceed rapidly with monitoring the management of arms and armed personnel and with assisting the electoral process.
15. On 26 March 2007 the General Assembly, in its resolution 61/259, approved a budget of $88,822,000 for the Mission for the year 2007. Prior to that date, UNMIN operated on the basis of a commitment authority of $9,363,000 authorized on 20 December 2006 by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary [page 4 ends here] Questions, pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 60/249.
16. While arms monitoring and electoral assistance were able to move forward expeditiously, the Mission faced considerable operational constraints in terms of human and logistical resources as its budget allocation was being deliberated. Arms monitors in particular faced major challenges in terms of communications equipment and transport, in large part due to competing mission deployment demands elsewhere. UNMIN was not able to recruit beyond posts approved under the pre-mandate commitment authority until its budget and staffing table were approved. Partial temporary solutions to the need to have staff on the ground as soon as possible included sending staff on temporary duty from other missions to UNMIN. I thank other missions for their understanding, and express appreciation to the Governments of Denmark, India, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for assistance regarding urgent logistical requirements.

17. With the approval of the budget, staff recruitment is proceeding as rapidly as possible. UNMIN is projected to have a short lifespan, and normal processes for recruitment and deployment of logistical support make rapid deployment of such a mission with limited duration an extremely difficult undertaking.
18. A draft status of mission agreement was submitted to the Permanent Mission of Nepal on 23 February 2007. On 13 April the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by proposing a number of modifications, which are under discussion. The Government of Nepal has extended excellent support during the arrival and clearance of UNMIN equipment. The Government has provided facilities at Kathmandu and regional airports and has agreed to make available part of the Birendra International Convention Centre in Kathmandu for the Mission’s headquarters and to provide buildings for the Mission’s regional offices in Biratnagar, Pokhara, Nepalgunj and Dhangadhi.

IV. Activities of the United Nations Mission in Nepal

19. My Special Representative and his team have continued to engage a wide range of national and international actors in the effort to help create an atmosphere conducive to the Constituent Assembly election and the success of Nepal’s political transition. The core elements of the Mission, gradually built around the initial team of my then Personal Representative, have been carrying out their tasks while awaiting the approval of the Mission’s budget and the deployment of its full complement of personnel.

A. Arms monitoring

20. The advance deployment of 35 arms monitors authorized on 1 December 2006, together with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) registration experts and the Interim Task Force, a national mechanism composed of Nepalese ex-servicemen from the Indian Army, allowed the registration of Maoist army combatants and their weapons to begin in mid-January and the first stage of registration, including weapons storage, to be completed at cantonment sites in [page 5 ends here] mid-February. Registration and storage of Nepal Army weapons was completed on 12 April 2007.
21. Planning for the monitoring of arms and armed personnel began with a senior military adviser and three military advisers deployed to the Office of the then Personal Representative from October until the end of December 2006. From 1 January 2007, the total number of monitors deployed at each subsequent monthend has been as follows: January, 34; February, 64; March, 91. The total as of 15 April was 112, and deployment is expected to be completed, taking into account logistical requirements, during May. Arms monitors are maintaining an around-theclock presence at the seven main Maoist army cantonment sites and the Nepal Army weapons storage site. As of 15 April three sector headquarters are operational: the Western Sector in Nepalgunj; the Central Sector in Kathmandu; and the Eastern Sector in Biratnagar. The final two sector headquarters are being established for the Far Western Sector in Dhangadhi and for the Mid-Western Sector in Pokhara.

22. United Nations Development Programme registration teams, representatives of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and members of the Interim Task Force supported United Nations arms monitors in the registration process. It was reported to the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee that 31,152 personnel and 3,475 weapons had been registered. Nineteen per cent of the personnel registered are women. The Committee issued its findings on the process on 8 March 2007.
23. The weapons registered included those retained for perimeter security at the cantonment sites in accordance with the agreement on monitoring the management of arms and armies and 96 weapons retained outside the cantonments for the security of CPN(M) leaders. The Mission has repeatedly pressed the Government and CPN(M) to reach final agreement on the modalities for CPN(M) leadership security, which has complicated the arms monitoring regime. Although UNMIN was informed that agreement had been reached in principle, as of 15 April it had not been formalized. All parties have, however, agreed that any other weapons discovered should be treated as a violation of law, subject to seizure and prosecution.
24. In accordance with the agreement, 2,855 Nepal Army weapons were registered and stored from 10 to 13 April 2007 at the Chhauni Barracks in Kathmandu. That number corresponds to the number stored by the Maoist army, excluding those retained for perimeter and leadership security, and the weapons are composed of equivalent types.

25. All seven Maoist army weapon storage areas and the one Nepal Army weapon storage area are monitored under the arrangements laid down in the agreement on monitoring the management of arms and armies, including the around-the-clock presence of United Nations arms monitors and electronic surveillance. Arms monitors carry out visits to satellite cantonment sites and Nepal Army barracks and investigate incidents as appropriate. UNMIN has been ready to commence the second phase of registration and verification of Maoist army combatants, which will require those remaining in cantonments to have been born before 25 May 1988 and not to have been recruited after 25 May 2006. As of mid-April, the modalities for verification and for the discharge of children under 18 had not been agreed by the CPN(M), which publicly denied their presence. In addition, the CPN(M) leadership wanted the interim Government to initiate discussions on the future of Maoist [page 6 ends here] combatants and on further measures to improve conditions at cantonment sites before verification could proceed.
26. Conditions at cantonment sites have been of great concern to UNMIN. Although these are not in any way a responsibility of the United Nations, UNMIN and the agencies of the United Nations system have made repeated efforts to promote cooperation between the Government and CPN(M) to improve conditions and have expressed their willingness to respond to requests for assistance. The interim Government has established a new committee for cantonment management headed by the Minister for Peace and Rehabilitation and including the senior CPN(M) minister, and is committed to making urgent improvements. The task is, however, made more difficult by the fact that the number of personnel in the cantonments is greatly in excess of expectations, which in turn requires UNMIN to undertake verification as soon as possible. The onset of the monsoon rains expected in mid-June makes rapid improvements imperative.

27. As of 15 April, the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee had held 24 meetings. The spirit of cooperation in the group, comprising UNMIN, Nepal Army and Maoist army representatives, has been excellent. The formation of the interim Government should make progress on a range of issues facing the Committee easier.
28. Improvised explosive devices, used in large numbers by the Maoist army during the conflict, have been collected at designated areas a safe distance from each of the seven main cantonment sites. The disposal of such devices, as well as the clearing of Nepal Army minefields, is the responsibility of the parties. However, in view of the security risks the devices represent and in the interest of minimizing factors that could adversely affect the cantonment and arms monitoring process, the UNMIN Mine Action Unit has been conducting assessments of storage facilities for such devices all at main sites to estimate the quantity and ascertain the condition of stored explosives. An estimated total of 10 tons of explosives are currently stored at the seven sites, consisting of bulk explosives, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance. The Mine Action Unit has been monitoring the storage process and has made recommendations for the improvement of the storage facilities. Maoist commanders have been given advice on mitigating the risk of accidental detonation and have been requested to identify a location for the establishment of a demolition range at each cantonment site. Currently, instructions have been given not to approach the storage areas, and the Unit assesses that the risk to United Nations staff on cantonments is acceptable as long as the arms monitors follow those safety instructions.

29. The Mine Action Unit has urged the early destruction of all items stored, in view of the dangers resulting from the combination of an accumulation of explosives on storage sites, increasing temperatures and the age and condition of some of the explosives. A demolition plan has been approved by the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, giving priority to the disposal of items classified as unsafe to store. With the financial support of donors, a company based in the United Kingdom, the Armor Group, has been contracted to monitor the storage on a continuing basis and initiate destruction of the highest priority items.
The Maoist army and the Nepal Army have agreed to appoint liaison officers to the Unit, which is expected to greatly facilitate coordination and communication between the parties. The Mine Action Unit is also liaising with the Nepal Army to render support, within the Unit’s capabilities, in the clearing of its mine fields. [page 7 ends here]

B. Electoral support

30. The Mission’s electoral advisers have been providing technical assistance and advice to the Election Commission in the following areas: the legal framework and laws; voter education; training; logistics; political party, domestic and international observation accreditation; media; information technology; website development; and field support. UNMIN advisers have provided extensive advice on the planning and preparation of an election that is in line with international standards and have recommended amendments to draft election laws, in particular to ensure inclusion in accordance with the commitments of the interim Constitution. Decisions regarding the content of law and practice are made by the authorities of Nepal.
31. The total number of staff of the Electoral Assistance Office as of 15 April was 24. Nine are based at the headquarters of the Election Commission in Kathmandu and three in each of the five regions, in Biratnagar, Pokhara, Kathmandu, Nepalgunj and Dhangadhi. Four more positions that are in the process of being filled will all be at Kathmandu headquarters. Preparations, including a district-by-district security assessment, are under way for the deployment of 124 international and 43 national United Nations Volunteers who will serve as associate electoral officers in the 75 districts in Nepal. The scheduling of deployment will depend on final decisions regarding the election timetable. The team of electoral expert monitors, who will review all technical aspects of the electoral process and report on the conduct of the election, has been selected. They will be formally appointed by the Secretary-General in the near future.
32. The Election Commission’s notification to the interim Government that a mid-June election had become impossible cited, in addition to legislative and logistical requirements, the security environment. This highlights the importance of early deployment of the UNMIN small police advisory team.

C. Civil affairs

33. The Civil Affairs Office is responsible for implementing the Mission’s mandate to assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire arrangements beyond the management of arms and armed personnel. The parties have made repeated commitments, which are essential to creating the conditions in the countryside for a credible Constituent Assembly election. Those commitments were first detailed in the ceasefire code of conduct in May 2006, and they were reiterated and extended in subsequent agreements, including in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and most recently in the common minimum programme of the interim Government. The commitments, in addition to those regarding arms and armed personnel, include assuring freedom for political activists and members of social organizations to move throughout the country, express their views and engage in campaigning and other activities; allowing government and other essential services and facilities to operate without disruption; and ensuring the return of property seized or locked up during the conflict. Ensuring adequate political space and a level playing field for all in the rural areas, where there has been a prolonged absence of the State, will be crucial for the credibility of the election.
34. A national monitoring committee established by the parties in May 2006 to monitor the ceasefire code of conduct was dissolved after the Comprehensive Peace [page 8 ends here] Agreement was signed in November 2006, with the parties expressing their intention to establish a new monitoring body. My Special Representative has consistently emphasized the importance of a credible independent national monitoring mechanism for the peace process, but the establishment of such a mechanism has been delayed pending the formation of the interim Government. As of mid-April, the new Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction was developing plans for a high-level monitoring body as well as for local committees in each district to monitor implementation of the peace agreement.
35. The Civil Affairs Office, which did not benefit from any substantial advance deployment and as of 15 April had only two officers, has engaged in recruitment and planning the training and deployment of its future staff. This has included coordination with OHCHR, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other agencies of the United Nations system with a local presence that can contribute to monitoring and with sections of civil society to explain the future role of the civil affairs officers.

D. Political affairs

36. The Political Affairs Section, which as of 15 April comprised only one international and one national officer, supported my Special Representative in intensive dialogue with all the major stakeholders in the peace process, including the Government, political parties, civil society and other concerned citizens, and the diplomatic community. The prominence that the grievances and demands of traditionally marginalized communities have assumed during the period has complicated an already complex political landscape. The Mission has encouraged an inclusive dialogue within Nepalese society that can lead to a consensus on election arrangements and contribute to longer-term solutions. The Political Affairs Section also provided support to the Arms Monitoring Office in negotiations regarding the management of arms and armed personnel and, pending the establishment of the coordination unit, ensured coordination with the United Nations country team. Full staffing of the Section is expected in May.

E. Public information and outreach

37. The focus of the Communications and Public Information Section during the reporting period was primarily on the media, seeking to ensure that the mandate and activities of the Mission in support of the peace process were well understood. Planning for outreach activities has included identification of target audiences, especially in the regions and districts, at cantonment sites and among traditionally marginalized communities, and preparation for the production of public information materials. Implementation will take place as soon as the necessary staff have been recruited.
38. My Special Representative conducted five press conferences during the period, while UNMIN issued press statements and engaged in frequent encounters and briefings with the press. Statements were disseminated widely to regional and district media and at the national level, and achieved generally accurate reporting of the Mission’s work and concerns. To ensure that marginalized groups remained informed of the Mission’s work, statements were disseminated directly to targeted [page 9 ends here] civil society networks, including organizations representing women, Dalits and indigenous and Madhesi communities, and to community radio networks so that they could be broadcast in local languages in rural areas.
39. The Communications and Public Information Section has operated during the period with minimal staffing: the spokesperson was recruited in mid-February and joined by a national media officer in mid-March. Two United Nations Volunteers, a photographer and a press officer, joined in early April. Most staff are expected to be in place by mid-May.

F. Safety and security

40. Overall, security in Nepal has improved since the end of conflict in May 2006. The law-and-order situation has, however, deteriorated in many respects. United Nations staff are not assessed to be under direct threat from any group, although protest activities have affected Mission operations. The Madhesi People’s Rights Forum, which is active primarily in the Eastern, Central and Western Terai areas, has mobilized large numbers to participate in general strikes, establish road blocks to disrupt movement and block activities such as the work of customs posts along the border. The leaders of the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum and of some other organizations have publicly stated that the United Nations has free passage during strikes, but on the ground the demonstrators have sometimes challenged United Nations movement. UNMIN continues to enjoy relative freedom of movement, but exercises caution during the many civil disturbances as violence can occur without warning. Strong emphasis is laid upon security assessment and upon following minimum operating security standards.
41. Recruitment is in process for the full UNMIN Safety and Security Section, together with planning for its integration into the Department of Safety and Security operations in Nepal.

G. Administration and logistics

42. The establishment of the necessary administrative and logistics support infrastructure lagged somewhat behind the arrival of the advance contingents of arms monitors and electoral advisers and their deployment to the regions and cantonments, since UNMIN was constrained by the limits of the pre-mandate commitment authority as well as by the competing material and personnel needs of other deploying peacekeeping missions. During this critical build-up phase, UNMIN received significant assistance from agencies of the United Nations system in Nepal, in the form of office space and furniture, loans of vehicles with drivers and provision of supplies, as well as procurement and financial services. Initial communications and information technology equipment needs were met to the extent possible from strategic deployments stocks, airlifted to Kathmandu from the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. The Government of India donated 82 4x4 vehicles, buses and pick-up trucks and 20 generators to the Government of Nepal for loan to UNMIN, out of which 50 4x4 vehicles and 10 buses have been delivered so far. With the approval of the Mission’s budget by the General Assembly on 26 March 2007, it will be possible to achieve the full administrative and logistics infrastructure, including the establishment of the UNMIN headquarters in the [page 10 ends here] Birendra International Convention Centre, Kathmandu, and the five regional offices in Biratnagar, Pokhara, Kathmandu, Nepalgunj and Dhangadhi, to support the deployment of the remaining arms monitors, electoral advisers, civil affairs officers and other substantive staff. To that end, more than 300 tons of equipment from the strategic deployment stocks in Brindisi had been flown out to Nepal by the third week of April.

V. Human rights

43. In line with the request of the Nepalese parties for continued human rights monitoring by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office continued its monitoring, capacity-building and outreach activities, in cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Nepal as appropriate.
Activities focused on human rights issues related to the peace process, with priority given to monitoring events in the Terai. Human rights concerns related to law enforcement, both by police and by CPN(M), with its parallel “law enforcement” activities, dominated the period. Police responses to demonstrations and other incidents in the Central and Eastern regions of the Terai ranged from excessive use of force (at least 18 out of 24 deaths documented by OHCHR between 22 January and 7 February 2007 were the result of police action) and almost total inaction. The main conclusion of the Office’s investigations into the 27 killings in Gaur on 21 March 2007 was that the local authorities and police failed to prevent and stop the violence and the killings. Allegations of rape and sexual mutilation during that incident were not confirmed by medical or testimonial evidence.
44. The Office intervened in a number of cases of abductions by CPN(M), including by its Young Communist League. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) continued to maintain small groups of individuals in captivity who were serving “sentences” passed by “people’s courts”. The Office also investigated a number of clashes or violent incidents involving CPN(M) and MPRF, or CPN(M) and other political parties.

45. In order to promote dialogue and tolerance, OHCHR began a series of activities bringing together different stakeholders to discuss human rights and the peace process, with the participation of UNMIN. The Office gave briefings to representatives of the Government, civil society and others to raise awareness about the need for broad consultation prior to the setting up of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It also continued to press for the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations. It provided a forensic expert to support the exhumation of remains thought to be those of Maina Sunuwar, a 15-year-old girl who died after torture in the custody of the Nepal Army in 2004; the exhumation finally took place in March 2007, but investigations have so far made little progress. The need to set up a credible independent commission of inquiry to look into disappearances committed on both sides during the conflict remains a pressing outstanding issue, despite repeated commitments in agreements and elsewhere to do so. In relation to the above, further efforts will be required by the authorities to ensure an end to impunity, including through investigations into past crimes, and the entrenchment of the rule of law for the future. [page 11 ends here]
46. The Office has continued to work with and provide training for national actors, particularly the National Human Rights Commission, in building national capacity to address the human rights situation in the future. The Commission, though referred to in the interim Constitution, remains impeded in its work as the Government has not yet appointed commissioners.

47. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Nepal from 19 to 24 January 2007 to support the work of her Office and to hold meetings with key stakeholders. The visit focused primarily on the issues of social inclusion and representation, accountability and the need to strengthen law enforcement to develop a professional police service fully respecting human rights. In a welcome development, the agreement between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Government of Nepal was extended for a further two years in April 2007.

VI. United Nations country team coordination

48. UNMIN and the United Nations country team have established an excellent working relationship, enabling my Special Representative to fulfill his responsibility to coordinate the United Nations effort in Nepal in support of the peace process. In early April a joint strategic framework for supporting the peace process was agreed.
The strategic framework also forms the basis of one of the four priority areas defined by the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008-2010, which is currently being finalized in consultation with the Government and development partners. For the coming 18 months, the strategic framework will serve as the basis for the reorientation of existing programmes and the formulation of new priority programmes to support the peace process. Cooperation between UNMIN, UNDP, UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has been firmly established regarding the registration of Maoist combatants and the encouragement and support of improvement of cantonment conditions.
49. To complement the Peace Trust Fund of the Government of Nepal launched in February 2007, a United Nations peace fund for Nepal (United Nations fund) was established on 13 March 2007. Under the same overall governance structure as the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, which is overseen by a government steering committee with United Nations and donor participation, the United Nations fund will enhance the United Nations and donor coordination efforts under the leadership of UNMIN.

50. The United Nations fund will enable support in five main priority clusters, as follows: (a) cantonments and reintegration; (b) elections and governance; (c) quick impact (for vulnerable communities); (d) security sector; and (e) rights and reconciliation. It is envisaged that the United Nations fund will be phased out two years from the date of its establishment, and in that period it will have the capacity to facilitate rapid support from the agencies of the United Nations system for the peace process. The fund has received contributions of $1 million from the United Kingdom and of $1.2 million from Denmark, and other donors have indicated their interest in contributing. The first project approved by the United Nations fund was the funding of the contract in support of the mine action and improvised explosive devices disposal activities described in paragraph 29 above. [page 12 ends here]

VII. Observations

51. The peace process in Nepal has advanced considerably in a very short period of time. Few could have imagined at the beginning of 2006 that an end to the armed conflict would have been declared, that agreement on the management of arms and armed personnel would be in the process of implementation under United Nations monitoring with broadly cooperative relationships between the Nepal Army and the Maoist army, that CPN(M) would have entered an interim legislature and Government, and there would be almost universal agreement on the need to move forward to a new constitutional settlement through a Constituent Assembly election. These are historic achievements, and I congratulate all the parties to the peace process for their hard work to achieve consensus on difficult issues.
52. While much has been achieved, much also remains to be done. The task of monitoring the management of arms and armed personnel, which has been entrusted to the United Nations, is a first step in a process. It has brought into sharp relief the complexity of the process, including the unsatisfactory conditions of the Maoist army cantonments, which must be addressed through early decisions on the future of former combatants, in the context of longer-term reform of the security sector.

53. The election of a Constituent Assembly, which is the core objective of the Mission’s role, must be conducted in an environment conducive to a genuine expression of the will of the Nepalese people. This will require support for and cooperation with the Election Commission as it organizes Nepal’s first election involving partial proportional representation and ensures voter education for a unique Constituent Assembly poll. It will also require a cooperative effort to establish public security through effective law enforcement that respects human rights, in a country previously divided between State and non-State actors and where the police have yet to be deployed nationwide.
54. The government’s commitment to dialogue must be successful in ensuring that civil society in Nepal, in particular its many traditionally marginalized communities, feel ownership of the Constituent Assembly process. The Constituent Assembly is seen as the opportunity to create a “new Nepal”, and both the election that determines representation in this body and the constitution-making process that follows must be fashioned in such a way that those Nepalese who have too often been without a voice will be heard.
55. The peace process in Nepal is ultimately about resolving long-term underlying causes of the conflict. The challenge this represents and its potential impact on the short- and medium-term transitional peace efforts now in progress cannot be underestimated.

56. The process is Nepali-owned. The parties have demonstrated that they are capable of overcoming difficulties when they reach consensus agreements and act with unity of purpose. Maintaining unity of purpose will be essential in the months ahead as the country grapples with the immense challenges of reshaping itself as a peaceful, democratic and inclusive state. UNMIN, with the support of all relevant entities of the United Nations system and the wider international community, will play its part in supporting this endeavour in accordance with its mandate. [page 13 ends here]
To read the original report, click here (pfd format)
United Nations S/2007/235Security CouncilDistr.: General26 April 2007Original: English07-31323 (E) 260407

Source; The Nepal Monitor, May 1, 2006