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Thursday, 3 May 2007
Delayed Election To Constituent Assembly
Madhavji Shrestha
Blame game
Source: The Rising Nepal, May 3, 2007
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Wednesday, 2 May 2007
Maoist rebels infiltrate Indian cabinet meetings
Bruce Loudon, South Asia correspondent
"An explosive part of its contents relates to the outfit's precise and detailed knowledge about what was discussed in the two closed-door and high-profile meetings," the magazine said.
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Drifting aimlessly: Loktantra in doldrums
SHASHI P.B.B. MALLA & CHANDRA BAHADUR PARBATE
Under the present 8-party government, the country is not moving forward as expected by the people, and promised by those in power. It is day by day showing its weaknesses in all sectors. The Maoist minister for Information and Communications, Krishna Bahadur Mahara has already accused the non-Maoist led ministries of non-cooperation, and even of disruption of their regular work by the political appointees.
In an exemplary report, the UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal has now held the state apparatus, the Maoists and the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) all responsible for the blood-bath sometime back in Gaur. In a most damaging manner, the report highlighted the weaknesses of the law enforcement agencies (the Chief District Officer, Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force) which were "grossly ill-prepared" in spite of being aware of the grave possible developments. In any other normal country, this would be reason enough for the home minister to resign. However, all the accused parties have shielded themselves behind a wall of silence.
The situation is even worse for law-abiding citizens. They cannot hope for justice from interior minister and Maoist sympathizer Sitaula. The Maoist strategy of weakening the state structure (previously from outside, now from within) continues unabated. The victims of the Maoists’ 11-year People’s War have not received any succor. Thousands are waiting still for the return of their looted land, property, jewellery and cash. In the meantime the interim (now probably permanent) government and the constituent political parties leave no stone unturned to honour the "martyrs" of last year’s April agitation, while the families of the 14,000 dead in the Maoists’ killing terraces remain totally forgotten. With the grievances of so many not being addressed, civic sense is rapidly dwindling away.
All of these antics show that the presence of a parliament is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democracy. Where the parliament should be promoting due democratic process, it promotes anarchy. If it fails to set an example for behaviour along democratic rules and due process of law, how can the people be expected to refrain from anarchy?, dwindling away.
He has "abolished" the role of the monarchy through the back door, without the people’s mandate and without waiting for the results of a referendum or the decision of the Constituent Assembly (CA). His foreign policy lies in tatters, and his administration has not yet been able to appoint envoys to the still vacant embassies. Not surprisingly, our image has sunk to a new low in the international arena. All in all, Koirala is a consummate wheeler-dealer. Perhaps this is skill required in politics, but this makes him neither a statesman nor a Nepalese patriot.
For the sake of argument, even if we were to accept the violent agitation of last April with massive Maoist inputs as a so-called people’s movement (and serious and independent observers very much doubt this theory), then why are the eight governing parties keeping quiet about their inability to hold the CA-elections on time ? Were the monarchists and reactionaries so powerful, all things considered? After all, this was supposed to be a major aspect of the people’s aspirations and a principal demand of the much vaunted Jan Andolan II.
Concerned and enlightened citizens must now urgently ask themselves as to how long they are willing to accept the fundamental flaws in the present political system. The time is long past where we can tolerate the grave deviations from democratic norms. It can be safely assumed that unless Nepal gets rid of "Koiralaism", and the present government/parliament is replaced by those truly committed to democratic norms and the supremacy of the people, there will be no progress in the country. A genuine people’s movement with the nation’s interests at the heart is the need of the hour.
Source: American Chronicle, April 28, 2007
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NEPAL: CRACK IN THE MAOISTS’ CAMP?
Niraj Aryal
The Maoist party suddenly feeling the excessive pressure from India, which they had agreed to obey before the agreement with the SPA in New-Delhi, is now feeling uneasy with the growing Indian influence coming through Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, analyst claim. The issue remains the same and that is in the name of preserving the national unity crack is building up in the Maoists camp. Ram Bahadur Thapa Badal not for nothing urges from his eastern-hill sojourn that preserving national interest and establishing a republic should be a major agenda.
Source: Telegraph Nepal, May 2, 2007
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MAOIST ATTACK POLICE POST IN BANKE
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Maoists still a terrorist organisation: US Report
This group was responsible for the assassination of a Member of Parliament from Rastriya Prajatantra Party in September last year. The report states that 'imperialist' US and 'expansionist' India were the targets of considerable Maoists, especially in the period leading up to the April uprising but a trip by Maoist Chairman Prachanda to New Delhi on November 18 seemed to mark the culmination of a shift in the Maoist view of Nepal's large neighbour to the south. The United States provided substantial antiterrorism assistance and training to Nepal's security forces, including courses on crisis management and critical incident management, the report said.
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Prachanda threatens to launch fresh pro-republican movement
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International Community : Vital Role In Peace Process
Yuba Nath Lamsal
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An Important Step
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Tuesday, 1 May 2007
NEPAL: NGOs concerned at lack of action to release child soldiers
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Complex Questions Remain in Nepal: Ban Ki-Moon
2. The present report reviews the progress of the peace process since my report to the Council of 9 January 2007 (S/2007/7) and the activities of UNMIN since its establishment on 23 January 2007, and assesses the continuing challenges and opportunities for sustainable peace in Nepal.
5. However, those important achievements have occurred against a backdrop of escalating social unrest and long-standing issues of exclusion, aggravated by the determination of traditionally marginalized groups to take advantage of the opportunity to press for adequate representation in the Constituent Assembly and by their dissatisfaction with the interim Constitution. Groups representing the Madhesi, the people of the Terai plains along Nepal’s southern border, engaged in widening protests throughout the period from January to March 2007, demanding amendments to the interim Constitution and changes in electoral arrangements to guarantee representation in accordance with their proportion of the population in the Constituent Assembly and official bodies, together with a commitment to a federal State.
7. The Seven-Party Alliance and CPN(M) struggled to respond to the crisis effectively through steps to restore law and order and through a substantive response to grievances recognized as legitimate. In a major speech to the nation on 7 February 2007, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, supported by leaders of all eight parties, announced significant concessions in an effort to calm the widespread Madhesi protests. The eight parties undertook to allocate 49 per cent of the Constituent Assembly seats to the Terai region, in proportion to its share of the population according to Nepal’s most recent census, and to amend the interim Constitution to incorporate a commitment to a future federal State. The Government [page 2 ends here] established a ministerial team to engage in dialogue with Madhesi groups and with representatives of other traditionally marginalized groups. Although the Terai protests abated, formal talks between the government team, MPRF and JTMM did not get under way before the establishment of the interim Government, which immediately appointed a new team to continue efforts towards dialogue. Other traditionally marginalized groups have continued to protest in support of their respective demands, with Janajati representatives expressing their preference for a round table with all protesting groups rather than separate negotiations focusing on individual communities.
The Gaur killings underscored the serious deficiencies of law enforcement in the country and the dangers of increased criminality along the border with India, which the Governments of Nepal and India are cooperating to address.
9. The participation of women in the peace process has shown little if any progress. As part of the effort to ensure the inclusiveness of the process, it is hoped that the interim Government and all concerned will make a renewed attempt to ensure a wider and deeper involvement of Nepalese women in the search for lasting peace.
11. As part of their negotiations leading to the formation of the interim Government on 1 April 2007, the eight parties adopted a common minimum programme, by which they renewed their commitment to past agreements, including building a conducive environment for a peaceful election. The parties agreed among themselves on 20 June 2007 as the date for the Constituent Assembly election, although the election date requires a formal decision by the interim Government and further amendment of the interim Constitution, which stipulates that the election should take place by 14 June. They agreed to establish a joint coordination committee of the eight parties to assist the interim Government, solve problems and [page 3 ends here] monitor the implementation of the common minimum programme, and local monitoring committees in each district, comprising locally active political parties and others, to monitor implementation of the peace agreement. The eight parties decided upon, and the interim Government sent to the interim legislatureparliament, amendments to the interim Constitution providing for a two-thirds majority no-confidence vote against the Prime Minister, and a two-thirds majority vote to abolish the monarchy if the King is found to pose grave obstacles to the holding of the Constituent Assembly election. The interim Constitution otherwise provides for the decision to retain or abolish the monarchy to be decided by a simple majority of the first session of the Constituent Assembly.
13. The reluctance of the parties to postpone the date of the election reflected real concerns that the peace process might stall and encounter further difficulties from spoilers if its momentum were not maintained. Averting such dangers requires determined cooperation among the parties represented in the interim Government and the legislature-parliament, as well as civil society and all democratic forces in Nepal to create the conditions necessary for a credible Constituent Assembly election.
15. On 26 March 2007 the General Assembly, in its resolution 61/259, approved a budget of $88,822,000 for the Mission for the year 2007. Prior to that date, UNMIN operated on the basis of a commitment authority of $9,363,000 authorized on 20 December 2006 by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary [page 4 ends here] Questions, pursuant to the provisions contained in paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 60/249.
16. While arms monitoring and electoral assistance were able to move forward expeditiously, the Mission faced considerable operational constraints in terms of human and logistical resources as its budget allocation was being deliberated. Arms monitors in particular faced major challenges in terms of communications equipment and transport, in large part due to competing mission deployment demands elsewhere. UNMIN was not able to recruit beyond posts approved under the pre-mandate commitment authority until its budget and staffing table were approved. Partial temporary solutions to the need to have staff on the ground as soon as possible included sending staff on temporary duty from other missions to UNMIN. I thank other missions for their understanding, and express appreciation to the Governments of Denmark, India, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for assistance regarding urgent logistical requirements.
18. A draft status of mission agreement was submitted to the Permanent Mission of Nepal on 23 February 2007. On 13 April the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by proposing a number of modifications, which are under discussion. The Government of Nepal has extended excellent support during the arrival and clearance of UNMIN equipment. The Government has provided facilities at Kathmandu and regional airports and has agreed to make available part of the Birendra International Convention Centre in Kathmandu for the Mission’s headquarters and to provide buildings for the Mission’s regional offices in Biratnagar, Pokhara, Nepalgunj and Dhangadhi.
21. Planning for the monitoring of arms and armed personnel began with a senior military adviser and three military advisers deployed to the Office of the then Personal Representative from October until the end of December 2006. From 1 January 2007, the total number of monitors deployed at each subsequent monthend has been as follows: January, 34; February, 64; March, 91. The total as of 15 April was 112, and deployment is expected to be completed, taking into account logistical requirements, during May. Arms monitors are maintaining an around-theclock presence at the seven main Maoist army cantonment sites and the Nepal Army weapons storage site. As of 15 April three sector headquarters are operational: the Western Sector in Nepalgunj; the Central Sector in Kathmandu; and the Eastern Sector in Biratnagar. The final two sector headquarters are being established for the Far Western Sector in Dhangadhi and for the Mid-Western Sector in Pokhara.
23. The weapons registered included those retained for perimeter security at the cantonment sites in accordance with the agreement on monitoring the management of arms and armies and 96 weapons retained outside the cantonments for the security of CPN(M) leaders. The Mission has repeatedly pressed the Government and CPN(M) to reach final agreement on the modalities for CPN(M) leadership security, which has complicated the arms monitoring regime. Although UNMIN was informed that agreement had been reached in principle, as of 15 April it had not been formalized. All parties have, however, agreed that any other weapons discovered should be treated as a violation of law, subject to seizure and prosecution.
24. In accordance with the agreement, 2,855 Nepal Army weapons were registered and stored from 10 to 13 April 2007 at the Chhauni Barracks in Kathmandu. That number corresponds to the number stored by the Maoist army, excluding those retained for perimeter and leadership security, and the weapons are composed of equivalent types.
26. Conditions at cantonment sites have been of great concern to UNMIN. Although these are not in any way a responsibility of the United Nations, UNMIN and the agencies of the United Nations system have made repeated efforts to promote cooperation between the Government and CPN(M) to improve conditions and have expressed their willingness to respond to requests for assistance. The interim Government has established a new committee for cantonment management headed by the Minister for Peace and Rehabilitation and including the senior CPN(M) minister, and is committed to making urgent improvements. The task is, however, made more difficult by the fact that the number of personnel in the cantonments is greatly in excess of expectations, which in turn requires UNMIN to undertake verification as soon as possible. The onset of the monsoon rains expected in mid-June makes rapid improvements imperative.
28. Improvised explosive devices, used in large numbers by the Maoist army during the conflict, have been collected at designated areas a safe distance from each of the seven main cantonment sites. The disposal of such devices, as well as the clearing of Nepal Army minefields, is the responsibility of the parties. However, in view of the security risks the devices represent and in the interest of minimizing factors that could adversely affect the cantonment and arms monitoring process, the UNMIN Mine Action Unit has been conducting assessments of storage facilities for such devices all at main sites to estimate the quantity and ascertain the condition of stored explosives. An estimated total of 10 tons of explosives are currently stored at the seven sites, consisting of bulk explosives, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance. The Mine Action Unit has been monitoring the storage process and has made recommendations for the improvement of the storage facilities. Maoist commanders have been given advice on mitigating the risk of accidental detonation and have been requested to identify a location for the establishment of a demolition range at each cantonment site. Currently, instructions have been given not to approach the storage areas, and the Unit assesses that the risk to United Nations staff on cantonments is acceptable as long as the arms monitors follow those safety instructions.
The Maoist army and the Nepal Army have agreed to appoint liaison officers to the Unit, which is expected to greatly facilitate coordination and communication between the parties. The Mine Action Unit is also liaising with the Nepal Army to render support, within the Unit’s capabilities, in the clearing of its mine fields. [page 7 ends here]
31. The total number of staff of the Electoral Assistance Office as of 15 April was 24. Nine are based at the headquarters of the Election Commission in Kathmandu and three in each of the five regions, in Biratnagar, Pokhara, Kathmandu, Nepalgunj and Dhangadhi. Four more positions that are in the process of being filled will all be at Kathmandu headquarters. Preparations, including a district-by-district security assessment, are under way for the deployment of 124 international and 43 national United Nations Volunteers who will serve as associate electoral officers in the 75 districts in Nepal. The scheduling of deployment will depend on final decisions regarding the election timetable. The team of electoral expert monitors, who will review all technical aspects of the electoral process and report on the conduct of the election, has been selected. They will be formally appointed by the Secretary-General in the near future.
32. The Election Commission’s notification to the interim Government that a mid-June election had become impossible cited, in addition to legislative and logistical requirements, the security environment. This highlights the importance of early deployment of the UNMIN small police advisory team.
34. A national monitoring committee established by the parties in May 2006 to monitor the ceasefire code of conduct was dissolved after the Comprehensive Peace [page 8 ends here] Agreement was signed in November 2006, with the parties expressing their intention to establish a new monitoring body. My Special Representative has consistently emphasized the importance of a credible independent national monitoring mechanism for the peace process, but the establishment of such a mechanism has been delayed pending the formation of the interim Government. As of mid-April, the new Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction was developing plans for a high-level monitoring body as well as for local committees in each district to monitor implementation of the peace agreement.
35. The Civil Affairs Office, which did not benefit from any substantial advance deployment and as of 15 April had only two officers, has engaged in recruitment and planning the training and deployment of its future staff. This has included coordination with OHCHR, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other agencies of the United Nations system with a local presence that can contribute to monitoring and with sections of civil society to explain the future role of the civil affairs officers.
38. My Special Representative conducted five press conferences during the period, while UNMIN issued press statements and engaged in frequent encounters and briefings with the press. Statements were disseminated widely to regional and district media and at the national level, and achieved generally accurate reporting of the Mission’s work and concerns. To ensure that marginalized groups remained informed of the Mission’s work, statements were disseminated directly to targeted [page 9 ends here] civil society networks, including organizations representing women, Dalits and indigenous and Madhesi communities, and to community radio networks so that they could be broadcast in local languages in rural areas.
39. The Communications and Public Information Section has operated during the period with minimal staffing: the spokesperson was recruited in mid-February and joined by a national media officer in mid-March. Two United Nations Volunteers, a photographer and a press officer, joined in early April. Most staff are expected to be in place by mid-May.
41. Recruitment is in process for the full UNMIN Safety and Security Section, together with planning for its integration into the Department of Safety and Security operations in Nepal.
Activities focused on human rights issues related to the peace process, with priority given to monitoring events in the Terai. Human rights concerns related to law enforcement, both by police and by CPN(M), with its parallel “law enforcement” activities, dominated the period. Police responses to demonstrations and other incidents in the Central and Eastern regions of the Terai ranged from excessive use of force (at least 18 out of 24 deaths documented by OHCHR between 22 January and 7 February 2007 were the result of police action) and almost total inaction. The main conclusion of the Office’s investigations into the 27 killings in Gaur on 21 March 2007 was that the local authorities and police failed to prevent and stop the violence and the killings. Allegations of rape and sexual mutilation during that incident were not confirmed by medical or testimonial evidence.
44. The Office intervened in a number of cases of abductions by CPN(M), including by its Young Communist League. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) continued to maintain small groups of individuals in captivity who were serving “sentences” passed by “people’s courts”. The Office also investigated a number of clashes or violent incidents involving CPN(M) and MPRF, or CPN(M) and other political parties.
46. The Office has continued to work with and provide training for national actors, particularly the National Human Rights Commission, in building national capacity to address the human rights situation in the future. The Commission, though referred to in the interim Constitution, remains impeded in its work as the Government has not yet appointed commissioners.
The strategic framework also forms the basis of one of the four priority areas defined by the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2008-2010, which is currently being finalized in consultation with the Government and development partners. For the coming 18 months, the strategic framework will serve as the basis for the reorientation of existing programmes and the formulation of new priority programmes to support the peace process. Cooperation between UNMIN, UNDP, UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has been firmly established regarding the registration of Maoist combatants and the encouragement and support of improvement of cantonment conditions.
49. To complement the Peace Trust Fund of the Government of Nepal launched in February 2007, a United Nations peace fund for Nepal (United Nations fund) was established on 13 March 2007. Under the same overall governance structure as the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, which is overseen by a government steering committee with United Nations and donor participation, the United Nations fund will enhance the United Nations and donor coordination efforts under the leadership of UNMIN.
52. While much has been achieved, much also remains to be done. The task of monitoring the management of arms and armed personnel, which has been entrusted to the United Nations, is a first step in a process. It has brought into sharp relief the complexity of the process, including the unsatisfactory conditions of the Maoist army cantonments, which must be addressed through early decisions on the future of former combatants, in the context of longer-term reform of the security sector.
54. The government’s commitment to dialogue must be successful in ensuring that civil society in Nepal, in particular its many traditionally marginalized communities, feel ownership of the Constituent Assembly process. The Constituent Assembly is seen as the opportunity to create a “new Nepal”, and both the election that determines representation in this body and the constitution-making process that follows must be fashioned in such a way that those Nepalese who have too often been without a voice will be heard.
55. The peace process in Nepal is ultimately about resolving long-term underlying causes of the conflict. The challenge this represents and its potential impact on the short- and medium-term transitional peace efforts now in progress cannot be underestimated.
To read the original report, click here (pfd format)
United Nations S/2007/235Security CouncilDistr.: General26 April 2007Original: English07-31323 (E) 260407
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United States Issues Country Report on Terrorism
Daya Gamage – US Bureau Asian Tribune
“Despite considerable progress in Afghanistan, the Taliban-led insurgency remained strong and resilient, particularly in the Pashtun south and east. Although the insurgency absorbed heavy combat losses, its ability to recruit foot soldiers from its core base of rural Pashtuns remains undiminished.
“Terrorists staged numerous attacks in India, including a series of commuter train bomb attacks in Mumbai which killed over 200 people and injured more than 700. Despite challenges associated with its law enforcement and judicial systems, India achieved major successes this year, including numerous arrests and the confiscation of explosives and firearms. Neighboring Bangladesh continued to arrest extremists, but the deteriorating political situation in Bangladesh may increase the opportunity for terrorists to find refuge or transit.
“In Nepal and Sri Lanka, terrorism carried out by the Maoists and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) posed a severe challenge to those governments. On an encouraging note, in November, the Maoists signed a peace agreement with the Government of Nepal that provided, under certain disarmament conditions, that the Maoists could be admitted into an interim government. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE continued attacks including targeted assassinations against political and military opponents.
“A sustained commitment to counterterrorism by Central Asian states resulted in relatively few terrorist attacks. Yet terrorism and the underlying conditions and porous borders it exploits still pose a significant threat to the region. In May, terrorists attacked border posts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan but were subsequently killed and captured by joint operations in the Ferghana Valley. With U.S. support, Central Asian states have undertaken to improve the capabilities of their border forces and build new border posts to impede terrorist movements and interdict drug smuggling, some of which financed terrorism in the region. The sheer length of the border and local corruption remained obstacles in Central Asia's efforts to control its borders. More widely, popular grievances over governance and poor economic growth enhance conditions terrorists and other extremists could exploit to recruit and operate in the region.
“Central Asia's most notorious terrorists are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and a splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU ). However, radical extremist groups such as Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) may also present a danger to the region. HT, an extremist political movement advocating the establishment of a borderless, theocratic Islamic state throughout the entire Muslim world, has followers in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the Middle East. The United States has no evidence that HT has committed any acts of international terrorism, but the group's radical anti-American and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts of violence against the United States and its allies. HT has publicly called on Muslims to travel to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight Coalition Forces.”
Through April 2006, Nepal's primary counterterrorism focus remained the Maoist insurgency but the focus shifted dramatically after Nepal's political parties, the Maoists, and civil society led a popular uprising against the King. King Gyanendra was compelled to restore parliament and cede his authoritarian powers to a government run by an alliance of the seven main political parties. The Maoists declared a unilateral cease-fire on April 27. The government followed suit on May 3, formally lifting its designation of the Maoists as a terrorist organization. Months of negotiations resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement on November 21 that formally ended the insurgency.
The agreement also provided that the Maoists would be admitted into an interim government once Maoist combatants were in camps and relinquished their weapons under UN monitoring.
From January to November, Maoist rebels were responsible for the deaths of 165 security personnel and 46 civilians. During the same time period, the government killed 182 suspected Maoist militants. Nepal's National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) reported that murders by Maoists lessened after the cease-fire in April, but still totaled 28 from May until November. Security force killings of Maoist insurgents were also significantly lower after the cease-fire, totaling nine during the same period.
Despite the cease-fire, Maoist rebels continued to conduct abductions, extortion, and violence. In the Kathmandu Valley, Maoists took advantage of their dramatically increased presence and the government's reluctance to upset the peace process to expand their use of extortion and efforts to undermine trade unions and student groups affiliated with the political parties. They also continued forced recruitment of schoolchildren, with thousands targeted after the signing of the initial November 8 peace accord. On September 20, and again on December 19, the Maoists declared nationwide transportation strikes. Both events were accompanied by the stoning of vehicles, and each lasted only for the declared period, demonstrating Maoist command and control.
This year also saw the beginning of a disturbing new trend with the activation of the separatist Maoist-splinter terrorist group called the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), which aimed to bring about the secession of the southern Terai plains from the rest of Nepal. This group was responsible for the assassination of a Nepali Member of Parliament in September.
"Imperialist" United States and "expansionist" India were the targets of considerable Maoist venom, especially in the period leading up to the April uprising. A trip by Maoist Supremo Prachanda to New Delhi on November 18, however, seemed to mark the culmination of a shift in the Maoist view of Nepal's large neighbor to the south. At the end of the year, the United States was the only country to maintain its designation of the Maoist insurgency as a terrorist organization. Several countries, including India, were waiting for the Maoist entry into government to authorize open contacts at all levels. The United States provided substantial antiterrorism assistance and training to Nepal's security forces, including courses on crisis management and critical incident management.
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