Extending UN Role in Nepal

The following is the Transcript of Question and Answer session with Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Nepal in Kathmandu, 6 November 2007. At the end is Martin's press statement.

Sam Taylor, AFP: Mr Martin, it’s a bit difficult, I am still digesting your statement. When you talk about expanding of the mandate, first you talk about support to the implementation to the peace process. Can you explain in concrete terms what you mean about that support, what would that, could that be?

Ian Martin: There are a number of peace processes where there is implementation machinery defined which the United Nations participates in or supports. Indeed here in Nepal we were asked to be members of a broader advisory committee around the Peace Ministry. But many of the elements of agreements that have been reached, for example, the establishment of a high level monitoring committee, which we have always regarded as of great importance and were indeed asked in principle to assist; the establishment of a credible commission to investigate disappearances, which again has been repeatedly agreed but yet to be implemented in practice: these are among the kind of measures where I believe we could be of greater assistance to the parties in the follow-through on agreements that have been reached, sometimes more than once.

Sam Taylor, AFP: But how Mr. Martin – what form will that assistance take? Experts, UN people going in to assist or set up these things? What concrete things?

Ian Martin: Well, it could mean a continuing relationship with whatever body, the Peace Ministry or other implementation machinery that’s agreed, as well as indeed bringing in international experience where it is helpful to defining how to implement particular commitments.

Kumar Lamichhane Nepal 1 TV: Your statement mentions that “The expectation among Nepalese are high as to what UNMIN can do”. Are you indicating that Nepalese people are expecting much more of a role and mandate to be given to UNMIN, and are you indicating this thing in case the Terai rebel group which has also asked UNMIN to play role while negotiating with the Government?

Ian Martin: That reference wasn’t intended to be a reference to the Terai situation. It was rather a general reference to the fact that Nepalis see here what looks like a rather large United Nations presence and one that has increasingly reached the regions and, through our District Electoral Advisers and Arms Monitors, the districts of Nepal. They are very concerned about a peace process that they see faltering perhaps, in a number of respects. And they assume that it should be the role of the United Nations to help keep that process on track.

And we find ourselves having to explain to them, through you, that our role has essentially been asked to focus on arms monitoring, extremely important to sustaining the peace process but nonetheless only one aspect of it; electoral support, but it’s not the technical preparations for the election that has meant this further postponement; assistance in monitoring, but there what we have been able to do is being limited by the absence of an effective national monitoring of peace process commitments, such as was always intended. And, naturally, I think, many ordinary Nepalis who don’t understand the limitations of the mandate that was given to UNMIN expect that we should in some way be able to support the process more broadly.

Now I have stressed again that this will always remain a Nepalese process and any assistance the United Nations offers can only be at the request of the Government and the parties to the process. But we do think, without in any way envisaging a larger mission, that perhaps there are ways in which we could be more active in support to the process if that is desired.

Devendra Bhattarai, Kantipur: You have mentioned one thing here, “this would not mean a bigger UNMIN presence, we are already reducing our electoral staff”. But according to some of the sources most of the district electoral officers are being reinstated despite the fact that everybody is talking about downsizing UNMIN. Can I get the numbers of those electoral officers?

Ian Martin: We can give you the numbers afterwards. I can’t give them to you off the top of my head. But it is indeed true that, not wanting to cut back people’s quite limited contracts, many of which expire in December, we have temporarily re-deployed some of the staff who were here as District Electoral Advisers. So, the downsizing is in process. But it is not their re-deployment as District Electoral Advisers, that would be something to consider whatever the appropriate period was ahead of a new election date.

Sirish Pradhan, Press Trust of India: As you know the election has been postponed twice and it seems that the political parties are not serious in holding election in near future. How can you pressurize them to come to the electoral process? And there are reports that as the peace process becomes longer, the Maoist combatants in the camps are reducing. If it goes longer, there won’t be any Maoists in camp. How can you resolve this issue?

Ian Martin: First, I don’t think it’s the matter of the United Nations pressurizing the parties in relation to the election. I think it is the matter of the parties themselves, as I have suggested, frankly analysing what have been the reasons why the postponement took place, not just in terms of the new demands that produced the deadlock in the Parliament but also underlying reasons for the growing mistrust between the parties, and then to decide how those can be addressed in a way that allows the electoral process to go forward and addresses issues like public security which are critical for a successful electoral process.

So far as the cantonments are concerned, I don’t think you should exaggerate departures from the cantonments. It is true that our verification has shown that some of those who were there at the time of first registration are no longer in the cantonments, but the majority are. And I think it is extremely important that discharge from the cantonments is a managed process, with consideration of the future of those who leave the cantonments. That’s what we are working on so far as those who have been excluded by our process of verification. And then of course, as I have highlighted, there’s a longer-term question of the future of those who are verified and will remain in cantonments.

But what I have been stressing, and why it is so important to discuss the future of the security sector, is that cantonment was supposed to be a relatively short-term process while an early election was held. It has now gone on for 11 months. Similarly, the Nepal Army has been basically restricted to barracks for those 11 months. That is not a viable long term situation. And therefore there needs to be discussion, which so far has hardly begun, about the long term. And that’s a very central issue for UNMIN, because as I have said we don’t know how long the arms monitoring role at cantonments and barracks will need to continue unless we know that there is a plan for the long term solutions.

Sudeshna Sarkar, Indo Asian News Service: Mr Martin, would you care to name the armed group and leaders met by UN humanitarian officers, and are these UN humanitarian officials from UNMIN or from other UN offices?

Ian Martin: The statement was intended to make it very clear that they were not UNMIN personnel. We don’t have humanitarian personnel as such. But precisely because this was not an UNMIN responsibility I am not going to say anything more about the nature of the meeting. I have made it clear its general nature.

Sashi Pokharel, Ujayalo Radio: You have said that the UN has been suggested to be more active including in security sector as well. Does it mean you will give support to security forces? Supporting security forces?

Ian Martin: It is not so much a question of supporting security forces, as assisting a discussion as to what is the long-term future in the security sector. Now, if one goes back to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it didn’t settle the future of the Maoist combatants or indeed all issues relating to the future of the Nepal Army. It said, on one hand, that there should be a special committee established by the Interim Government to consider the future of the Maoist combatants. That special committee was eventually established in May, it held a single meeting in July, and now with the Maoists out of the Interim Government, it is not continuing to work. So, essentially no progress has been made on that issue.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement also talked about the Interim Government drawing up an action plan for the Nepal Army for its democratisation, for considering its appropriate size, for considering its future inclusive character. And again, I am not aware that that discussion has been taken forward. Of course, these are difficult issues on which there are very different perspectives, but it’s not an issue that can be avoided because the future of those in the cantonments must be addressed.

Jane Rankin Reid, Tehelka: I am just wondering about the actual time frame for the extended mandate. I understand it is suppose to be mid-December. How much longer will UNMIN be looking for?

Ian Martin: The present mandate actually expires on 22 January. It is an initial 12 month mandate, voted by the Security Council on 23 January 2007. The question of the duration of any extension is a matter first for the Government, in the request it makes, and then for the Security Council. It’s not for UNMIN itself to determine. So, in that respect we will wait the request from the Government, which as I have said, the Prime Minister indicated is the subject of active consultation amongst the political parties at the moment.

Jane Rankin Reid, Tehelka: Assuming that Government requests your mandate, and it does not look like they are not going to, what is a ballpark timeframe?

Ian Martin: A Security Council mandate can be very different in different circumstances. Twelve months, which was our initial mandate, is normally the maximum that is decided. There was some suggestion when the initial mandate of UNMIN was discussed that six months would have been more appropriate initially and then a review, and that’s not uncommon in terms of United Nations operations, especially where the situation on the ground is uncertain and the Security Council wants to review it. But I would stress these are in a sense technical issues. The decision as to how long the mandate is extended doesn’t preclude further extension if that is requested.

Manesh Shrestha, CNN: You mention “where it has been suggested more UN involvement”: where does this suggestion come from? And, second, “there is no exit strategy for the UN without security sector reform”. What does that mean, exactly? Without security sector reform the UN will not be able to get out of Nepal?

Ian Martin: So far as the question of where suggestions come from, there have been a wide range of suggestions: from Nepalis, from people in political parties, people in civil society, as well as from those in the international community who wish the process well, who have made a significant investment, both by paying through the United Nations for UNMIN but also in many other ways, providing support to the election and so on. And naturally the international community wants to see that the investment in international support is actually effective and successful in furthering the process.

So far as the question of exit strategy is concerned, if you take the two core roles of UNMIN, so far as the electoral support is concerned, the exit strategy is clear: the holding of a successful election means there is no longer a continuing need for electoral support. Even now the amount that has already been accomplished, that will still be of value when a new date is set for the election, means that we wouldn’t necessarily expect to be asked for the same degree of support in future as we initially provided to the Election Commission. It’s much more complicated when you come to the arms monitoring role. Because that is linked to the arms monitoring agreement and to the fundamental commitment that began from the 12-Point Understanding that the Nepal Army would remain in barracks and the Maoist army would be in cantonments until the Constituent Assembly election had taken place. And even then there may be some further need for discussion and implementation of decisions about the future. So that’s why I link the question of discussions about the future of the security sector to UNMIN’s exit strategy.

There could be a decision that UNMIN was no longer to play the arms monitoring role, but then one would have to ask the question what does that mean in terms of respect for the commitments in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the arms monitoring agreement that have been implemented and are expected to continue until the Constituent Assembly election has taken place.

Mahesh, Kantipur Radio: You have mentioned in the statement there is a need for an “agreement on a road-map which will ensure that there is not yet another failure to hold the election on whatever new date is agreed.” Can you suggest what type of roadmap it could be?

Ian Martin: Again, I regard that as something that should be a subject of reflection amongst Nepalese actors, in which we will be delighted to contribute to. It is not for UNMIN to set out exclusively an UNMIN roadmap. But it clearly requires a sufficient degree of consensus around the electoral system, not only amongst the political parties but an understanding from the marginalised groups that they are to be adequately represented in the Constituent Assembly, and therefore that nobody has a motivation to continue to seek to disrupt the process. It requires, as I have already suggested, addressing the issues of public security which are particularly serious in parts of the Terai as we all know, but not only in the Terai. We don’t know exactly what would have happened if the political parties had gone forward to a 22 November election and had begun campaigning actively at the local level. But certainly up until the time the election was postponed, a climate had not yet been created in many parts of the country where all political parties could campaign freely, without any fear of intervention, of violence or threats of violence from others. And that’s fundamental, of course, to having a successful election.

But then beyond that, as I have suggested, the Constituent Assembly election is a key part of the peace process and there needs to be an understanding on all sides that that peace process is on track, and that’s where I come back to the suggestion and the very welcome reflection of that suggestion, on the part of the Prime Minister and others in the political parties, that a review of implementation of the Agreements is an important matter.

Ram Humagain, Gorkhapatra: I don’t see anything information about the second round of verification in the statement. Has it become sidelined due to other issues? What is the latest progress on the verification process?

Ian Martin: I primarily wanted to focus on the mandate issues that we have been discussing. But indeed I am happy to tell you that verification is proceeding with cooperation at Nawalparasi, the penultimate cantonment site where we are undertaking verification. And that once that is completed, we move on to the seventh and last site. Cooperation regarding the verification process itself is proceeding smoothly.

The big issue that remains, however, is arranging the discharge of those who have been excluded by verification and that, as many of you have heard me say before, requires the Government to take decisions on the payments that are to be made to those who are discharged. Because although three months of payments was released on the eve of Dasain, as it were, that was not regarded as the final fulfilment of commitments to make payments. Again, not a negotiation that UNMIN is involved in directly, but one that has to be successfully resolved by the Government and with the Maoists for us to be able to proceed with the discharge arrangements.

Ishwar Khanal, The Himalayan Times: You have said that UNMIN has met and will continue to meet the wide range of representatives from the traditionally marginalised groups. Does this mean that your discussions are purely confined to humanitarian issues or, like, political issues as well?

Ian Martin: These are discussions to inform how UNMIN carries out all of its work. Obviously a lot of the concerns that marginalized groups have expressed to us relate to their position within the electoral system and eventually in the Constituent Assembly. Humanitarian issues are dealt with by the UN humanitarian system, the Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Kahane and others. Human rights issues are of course primarily within the mandate of OHCHR, which similarly has an active engagement with representatives of these groups. But we regularly discuss, sometimes at our initiative, sometimes at theirs, with representatives of women’s groups about the inclusion of women in the peace process and the electoral system, and then of course with Madhesi, Janajati, Dalit and other groups. And I think that it is extremely important that UNMIN and the United Nations system as a whole should be open to and aware of their concerns, even if some of them are not matters that are for UNMIN to address directly.

Surendra Phuyal, BBC: We’ve been hearing and reading reports that UNMIN is giving too much concession to the Maoists, which was evident while doing the revision of those disqualified during the verification process. We also hear, at the same time, from the Maoists that UNMIN is conspiring against them. What is the reality? How do you see these reports?

Ian Martin: The reality from my perspective is that UNMIN is trying as hard as it can to be objective in a situation where there are accusations and counter-accusations, and naturally nobody is going to be fully satisfied that we are reflecting exclusively their point of view.

Let me deal specifically with the question about verification and whether there are concessions within verification. Because this, I think, mainly stems from the disagreements we had with the Maoists after verification at the first cantonment site in Ilam, when we did agree to review a small number of cases. We reviewed a small number of cases chosen by General Wilhelmsen, the Chief Arms Monitor, because he was not satisfied that the reports from the teams could be fully relied on. They were reviewed according to exactly the same criteria. Some of the decisions were maintained, some were reversed, and we then built in a process whereby cases could be taken up to a higher level. We are carrying out a very difficult process, because we are trying to confirm through interview issues of age and recruitment dates that can’t be confirmed with absolute certainty by any documentation. But I assure you and everyone again that we have not compromised in any way the criteria that were set out in the arms monitoring agreement.

Now you will continue to find that sometimes things we say will coincide with the perspective of the Nepali Congress, sometimes with the perspective of the UML, sometimes with the perspective of the Maoists. And our criticisms will sometimes be directed in one direction and sometimes in the other, and I would ask you to look overall in the manner in which we are trying to fulfil the role of an objective third party. Because frankly it is only with objectivity and trust from all parties that support to a peace process can be effective. It can’t be effective by the third party becoming purely a critic of one party or another.

Biswomani Pokharel, Samay: Mr Martin, I think you are aware of the fact that Prime Minister Koirala, the Maoists and China and India are not willing to give you the extended role. In this context, why are you coming with all these agendas demanding the extension. Are you trying to put pressure on the government and all these parties?

Ian Martin: I’m not really aware of anyone’s position unless it is communicated to me. I read a lot of things in the media, some of which I think may be correct, some of which I’m not sure are correct. But until I’ve had official discussions with those involved I don’t know formally what the position is.

I am responding to the view that the United Nations ought to be able to play a more fully effective and supportive role in this peace process without in any way compromising national sovereignty and the fact that it is a Nepalese process. At the end of the day, what UNMIN will do will be determined by the requests of the Government and the parties, and the willingness, of course of the Security Council to mandate us according to their request.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: In your statement it says “the need for reviewing the CPA” and you have blamed both the parties for violating the CPA. Can you please tell me who is more violating the CPA? Do you see any defect in the CPA itself?

Ian Martin: I don’t think it is helpful to try to ask the question who is violating the CPA most. Because certainly failures to implement the CPA are very different in their nature and some of them frankly are a matter of shared responsibility, especially when implementation was the responsibility of an Interim Government that included the Maoists, both sides to the peace agreement. So I think what’s needed is for everybody to look at what the limitations have been in the implementation of the peace agreements. And it would be more helpful is if each side focused on their own limitations rather than on accusations against the other. The further part of your question?

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: Do you see any defects in the CPA?

Ian Martin: Many of the issues that concern us are questions of implementation, but some are issues where the CPA itself did not fully map out the future. For example, if we return to the question of the future of the Maoist combatants, as I already said the CPA described a process in general terms but it certainly did not settle the issue. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was not a final resolution of all the issues of the peace process. It was a very major achievement in taking the peace process forward but there is still a need to take forward further aspects of the peace process. And the CPA was also negotiated at a time when issues of inclusion were not as prominent as they have become. So again, although there are general commitments to questions of inclusion, those too I think need further consideration in the current situation.

Gopal Sharma, Reuters: Some Indian channels have quoted you as saying “significant numbers in the Maoist soldiers in the camps are children”. What is the latest numbers? Can you give us some figures?

Ian Martin: There is nothing new, I have said in these press conferences that we have confirmed through our verification that there are a significant number of minors, that’s not new. And that continues to be something that we are determining through our verification, what exactly the numbers are. As you know, I am not in the habit of giving you those numbers, but I have always been clear that we have found significant numbers who are under 18 on the qualifying date. And we are concerned to move ahead to their discharge, which under the agreement ought to have been immediate but which has been delayed by the failure to reach an agreement on the issue of payments in particular.

Ghanashyam Ojha, The Kathmandu Post: As regional forces have an influence on the peace process, do you think Nepal has to discuss with India to extend the tenure of UNMIN?

Ian Martin: That’s a matter for the Government of Nepal to decide,

Ghanashyam Ojha, The Kathmandu Post: What to you feel?

Ian Martin: It’s not a question of what I feel. What the Security Council expects is a request from an independent sovereign government. What views the Government takes into account in making its requests, are a matter for the Government.

Kumar Lamichhane, Nepal 1 TV: Fully effective role of UNMIN. Does that mean in your role, you are looking for expansion of the mandate that was earlier given to you? My second question is, are you in favour of merging Maoists combatants in the Nepal Army prior to the election?

Ian Martin: Well again, let me do the last question first: it’s not for me to be for or against the merger of Maoist combatants before or after the election. That is a matter that has to be decided by the parties. It is for me to insist that is a crucial issue - the future of the Maoists combatants is a crucial issue for the reasons that I have already said. Because there is no other way in which our arms monitoring responsibilities are going to transition to longer term solutions. What those longer term solutions are not for the UN to prescribe. They are indeed to be negotiated. Of course there is international experience that can be made available to those considering the issues that may be helpful, but not in the spirit of saying what should be done in Nepal should be done the same way as has been done in any other particular country.
As so often, when you ask two questions, I forget the other one.

Kumar Lamichhane, Nepal 1 TV: The fully effective role of UNMIN?

Ian Martin: Does it mean a formal expansion of the mandate? The three examples that I gave, of where we think we could be more helpful, I don’t think would necessarily require a formal expansion of the mandate of UNMIN. We are a United Nations political mission; I am the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who has what in United Nations terms is normally called a “Good Offices” role, an ability to offer assistance where that is requested. Those are areas in which I think we could very well assist largely within our existing mandate and resources if there is a clear wish for us to do so.

Sirish Pradhan, Press Trust of India: Last question. When you say extended mandate does it mean peacekeeping forces as the political situation becomes more fragile due to the postponement of the election.

Ian Martin: Nobody, nobody, nobody is talking about peacekeeping forces coming to Nepal. And I should point out to you some ambiguity in the words we are using. When I use the word “extended”, I am talking about extended in time. Others have been using the word “expanded” in relation to the scope of the mandate. But please be clear, I have just been in New York, there is no discussion in New York of peacekeeping in relation to Nepal. This is a special political mission and what is under discussion is the future term and role of this political mission.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: When you were in New York, the newspaper reported that someone telephoned you and asked some money, threatened you. Is it true?

Ian Martin: It’s true that there were telephone threats made here to this office, not received by me personally. And that an arrest was carried out as a result of that. A lot of the details in the report were not correct, including the report that someone had spoken directly to me. But it is correct that there were threats made.

HH Upadhyay, Kantipur TV: What is happening to the case? Is that case in the police?

Ian Martin: The police – it is now in the hands of the police. Yes. It is obviously not for UNMIN, it is a matter for the police.

Sudeshna Sarkar, Indo Asian News Service: Just wondering Mr. Martin, when this mandate is extended, from Special Representative, are you going to become and Extra-Special Representative?

Ian Martin: I think, I can, without any doubt deny that. Let me just wrap up by emphasizing, if I may, a few of the points that I wanted to make. The first, I wanted to emphasize my main message from New York that there is still very strong commitment on the part of United Nations, both the Secretary-General and the Security Council, to supporting Nepal’s peace process. So, that’s true at the highest level.

Secondly, the challenges to the process really must not be under estimated. There is a need for a frank assessment of why the two dates for the Constituent Assembly election have come and gone, and what now is a realistic roadmap. Thirdly, we have had a lot of discussion about in areas in which UNMIN is ready and could be of assistance to the process, but again I emphasize that that is not in any way to take away from the fact that this is a Nepali process, and that it is for the Nepalis to decide what role it wants the United Nations and the international community as a whole to play in support of it. Thank you very much indeed.

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PRESS STATEMENT of Ian Martin (6 November 2007)
My main purpose in inviting you to this press briefing is to answer any questions you may have about the future of UNMIN’s mandate, about which there have been many media reports and comments during my trip to New York. But first I want to refer to the negotiations of recent weeks which culminated in the votes in the Interim Legislature-Parliament on Sunday. The future of the monarchy is obviously not a matter on which the United Nations has taken or should take a position; nor is the electoral system, except for the desirability of respecting international good practice which is compatible with different electoral systems. These are matters for Nepalis to decide. Although these two issues have not been fully resolved, there have been positive aspects of recent discussions among the parties: the seriousness of the efforts to reach compromise within the Seven-Party Alliance; the repeatedly-expressed commitments to sustaining the Alliance and the peace process; and the respectful spirit in which the final parliamentary proceedings were conducted, despite continuing substantive disagreements.
I am dismayed however to have returned to an increased number of reports of unresolved abductions and killings, whether attributed to armed Madhesi groups, Maoist cadres, or local disputes. Nepal has lived for too long with violence and intimidation, and I appeal again at this season for a commitment to tolerance and non-violence, but also for an end to impunity. It is the responsibility of all to support efforts to bring murderers to justice, as the CPN(M) has committed to do in the tragic case of Birendra Sah, and as I have repeatedly said should be the case with the killers of Maoist cadres in the Terai. The rule of law across all of Nepal is fundamental to a conducive atmosphere for free and fair elections as well as to broader public confidence in the peace process as a whole.
When I briefed the Security Council in New York, I said that the crisis facing the peace process was not just the consequence of new demands regarding the issues of monarchy and the electoral system, but that it also stemmed from growing distrust amongst the parties to the peace agreement, with accusations in both directions that commitments had not been implemented. I believe that the parties need to take stock of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and other agreements reached, and their implementation. This should include the implementation of commitments made to Janajati, Madhesi and other groups. I was encouraged to be told in my meeting with the Prime Minister just before leaving Kathmandu that he intended that there should indeed be a review of the implementation of agreements, and to find on my return a wide appreciation of this need.
I also said to the Security Council that the parties need to collectively reaffirm to the public their commitment to a successful Constituent Assembly election, in order to reassure the people of Nepal that the process remains on track. The Constituent Assembly election is an integral element of the peace process: a credible election cannot take place unless the peace process is on a solid footing, and a credible election is critical to the success of the peace process. This requires not just the setting of a date, but agreement on a road-map which will ensure that there is not yet another failure to hold the election on whatever new date is agreed. Despite the best efforts of the Election Commission, with which UNMIN has worked closely, two dates set for the election have come and gone. It is now time for a frank analysis by Nepali politicians and civil society of why this has been the case, and what are the requirements for a successful electoral process to go forward.
I also informed the Security Council that the Prime Minister had told me of his intention to consult other parties with a view to requesting an extension of the mandate of UNMIN. The mood of the Security Council appeared to be unanimously sympathetic to such a request. As well as extending the time period of the mandate of UNMIN, there has also been discussion regarding the scope of our support to the peace process.
Let me first put to rest the suggestion that UNMIN has already exceeded its mandate. This is not the case. I want in particular to put on record that UNMIN has not met or sought to meet with the leadership of armed Madhesi groups. This misunderstanding appears to have arisen because there was one meeting in India between United Nations humanitarian officials and the leadership of one armed group. Their purpose was to try to ensure that emergency food relief and other assistance could be delivered in the wake of flooding in the Terai earlier this year without attacks by armed groups against humanitarian workers. These UN officials involved were not under the authority of UNMIN, and their discussion was confined to humanitarian, not political issues. Of course UNMIN has met and will continue to meet with a wide range of representatives of traditionally marginalized groups.
I was frank with the Security Council, as was the Secretary-General in his report, that expectations among Nepalis are high as to what UNMIN can do. Our focused mandate is not well understood. To expect UNMIN to safeguard or advance the peace process in ways that it has not been mandated or requested to assist is not realistic. I have always emphasized that this is a Nepalese process, whose success depends on Nepalis: the international community can only assist in the manner in which its support is requested. There are a number of areas where it has been suggested that more active United Nations support to the peace process would be of value, if desired by the government and the parties. I mention three. First, support to the implementation of the peace process and agreements reached, which as I have already said Nepali political leaders and civil society are increasingly acknowledging needs to be addressed. Second, assisting a discussion on the future of the country’s security sector, including a managed transition from the current temporary Maoist army cantonments and restriction to barracks of the Nepal Army to long-term solutions: without this, there is no exit strategy from UNMIN’s arms monitoring. And third, greater advisory support to promoting public security – the greatest concern of so many Nepalis and a critical requirement for a credible Constituent Assembly election. These would not mean a bigger UNMIN presence: we are already reducing our electoral staff, although we will be ready to increase our district presence again if requested ahead of a firm election date. But it could mean providing the broader support to the success of the peace process that many Nepalis expect of the United Nations. is for Nepalis to decide what is asked of the United Nations: you have the assurance of the Secretary-General and, I believe, the openness of the Security Council to extend the assistance requested.

Maoists want cases dropped

KATHMANDU, Nov 6 - The Maoists have sought the judiciary's commitment that it will not proceed with cases filed during conflict time against its cadres as a precondition for releasing two court staffers of Rukum district.
President of Maoist-affiliated government employees' organization, Rukma Lamichhane, communicated the intention behind the abduction of Sashi Ram Bista and Khadga Bahadur Khadka, employees of Rukum District Court, to the Supreme Court administration and representative of apex court employees' organization on Tuesday.
"They sought the judiciary's commitment that it would not go ahead with cases against their cadres in return for the release of Bista and Khadka," Hemanta Rawal, co-spokesperson of the Supreme Court, told the Post.
Lamichhane met Rawal at the apex court to convey the Maoist condition for the release of abducted court employees Tuesday afternoon. Bista and Khadka were abducted in the weekend while they were on duty to serve a court subpoena in a murder case involving what Maoists called a "martyr family".
Similarly, Lamichhane also conveyed a similar message to Binod Adhikari, chairman of Nepal Judiciary Employees Concern Committee, in a telephonic conversation Tuesday when I questioned the abduction.
"If they want to get their cases withdrawn why don't they send Prachanda to meet the Chief Justice and continue to make helpless court employees suffer through abduction," Adhikari said.
A few hours after the Maoists revealed their intention, they released Bista and Khadka in Rukum district on the same condition that Lamichhane conveyed to the apex court in Kathmandu.
"They have been released this evening on the condition that initiatives will be taken at the center to withdraw cases against Maoist cadres, and that the court would not proceed with cases till the center decides on them," Ravi Raj Kafle, chief district officer of Rukum told the Post over phone from Rukum.
In Kathmandu, Lamichhane said he met the official of the Supreme Court administration to try to understand the root cause behind the abduction instead of disseminating news of the abduction unilaterally.
"The court sent them (the abducted staffs) with bad intention, violating the commitment in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement," Lamichhane said.
In the meantime, Nepal Judiciary Employees' Concern Committee in Kathmandu District Court did not work for two hours Wednesday to protest the abduction.

Source: The Kathmandu Post, November 6, 2007

Maoists to pressure govt on republic, poll system

KATHMANDU, Nov 6 - The CPN-Maoist has announced new programs to pressure the government to implement parliamentary directives on republic and proportional electoral system. An informal central committee meeting of the party, held at its central office at Budhanagar Tuesday, decided to initiate interactions with various ethnic groups, besides calling a mass meeting in Kathmandu on November 18 in this connection.
"We will talk to various political parties for an immediate meeting of the seven political parties," Maoist central leader Barsa Man Pun 'Ananta' said.
He said the Maoists would urge all political parties during the seven-party meeting to sincerely implement the parliamentary directives on republic and proportional electoral system.
"We will also initiate interaction with various ethnic groups, which are in favor of a republic and a proportional electoral system, to forge a strong voice in this regard," he said.
The Maoist central committee meeting also decided to launch nation-wide protests if the government fails to implement the parliamentary directives.
"The Nepali Congress must accept the majority verdict of parliament," said Maoist spokesperson Krishna Bahadur Mahara. He also said the NC would face moral pressure against continuing in the government if it ignored parliament's verdict. "The situation will come to a point when we will have to think of an alternative to the Nepali Congress in the government if the NC fails to implement parliament's verdict," he said.
The meeting has decided to organize a mass meeting in Kathmandu on November 18 to pressure the government to implement parliament's directives.
Maoist leader Ananta said the Maoists have achieved a victory over their issues through parliament. "The Nepali Congress now has no option but to accept parliament's verdict," he said.
Focus on unity, poll: UML to Maoists
KATHMANDU, Nov 6 (PR) - The CPN-UML has suggested to the Maoists to focus on seven-party unity and holding CA polls at the earliest and not get distracted by other issues.
Talking to Maoist Chairman Prachanda and his deputy Babu Ram Bhattarai at his residence, UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal urged the Maoist Chairman to focus on holding the constituent assembly (CA) polls at the earliest while keeping the seven-party alliance (SPA) intact, instead of raising other issues.
They (Maoists) raised the issue of fulfilling their 22-point demand (submitted to the government earlier) and the proposals passed by the interim parliament, but Nepal told the Maoist leaders that those issues could be discussed during the seven-party meeting, and urged them to focus on holding the CA poll. "Nepal emphasized CA polls at the earliest without creating any division within the SPA," said Raghuji Pant, UML leader.
Nepal told the Maoist leadership that even the proposals passed by the special session of the interim parliament need to be ratified by a two-third majority of the House.
"It is not possible without the consent of the Nepali Congress (NC)," Pant said, adding, "Therefore, unity among the seven parties is a must and that is also the spirit of the interim constitution."
Clarifying the UML stance over the latest political scenario, Pant further said, "We believe that neither the UML and the Maoists jointly nor the Nepali Congress acting alone can provide a way out of the current political stalemate." He also ruled out any change in the government leadership. "The party has not thought over the issue of changing the government leadership so far," Pant said, speaking at a program held in the capital on Tuesday.

Source: The Kathmandu Post, November 6, 2007

Maoists not likely to join govt: Vaidya

Kathmandu, Nov. 6: Senior leader of the CPN-Maoist Mohan Vaidya 'Kiran' has claimed that the leftist force has to lead the seven party alliance and move ahead accordingly in order to end the present political deadlock. Talking to The Rising Nepal, Maoist leader Vaidya said that the special session of interim parliament has brought the leftist forces closer and mounted moral pressure on the leadership of the present government. ?The special session of parliament has passed the motions on republic and proportionate representation system for the constituent assembly," he said adding that the onus now lies on the government to sincerely implement the decision of the House. He warned that the government would eventually collapse if it ignored the sentiment of the House and failed to implement the instructions on these vital national issues. The endorsement of the motions for declaring republic and adopting fully proportional electoral system is against the authoritarian tendency of the Nepali Congress and it clearly calls for genuine democratic practice in the functioning of the government, he said. ?The decision is of vital importance as it has underscored the urgency of institutionalising the republican setup and fully proportional election system by amending the interim constitution, which reflects the aspirations of the people," the senior Maoist leader claimed. According to him, the government is now under the obligation to present a bill in the parliament and act accordingly to ensure that the House decisions are implemented. ?For this, our activities should be focused to help the government carry out the House instructions and hold the CA election as early as possible."Asked how the Maoist party would move ahead to implement the House decision, Vaidya said that the government was already facing a moral question regarding the recent House decision. ?Our efforts would be to exert pressure on the government in a peaceful manner to act in line with the spirit of the House motions on the republican setup and proportional representation system."?It is up to the Nepali Congress whether or not to move ahead as per the democratic norms and practices. If the government does not follow the parliament's instructions, it will lose its credibility and will also lose the right to rule.Regarding the provision in the interim constitution for implementing the adopted proposals he said, ?the constitutional provision of the two third majority for adopting the motion on monarchy is a technical one. Moreover they are related with the CA election and the majority lawmakers have passed the motions. They are of political importance. Now we have to see whether the Congress wants the election or not. It depends on how the government responds to parliament's instructions. If the government ignores or makes unnecessary delay to implement them, we will start people's movement. Therefore, the government should act accordingly or else invite its eventual collapse."He clarified that the party would not join the government even after the government implements the instructions. ?The condition for us to join the government is the end of the authoritarian attitude of the Congress and creation of environment for the genuine practice of lokatantra in which the government operates on consensus," he said.Denying rift in the seven-party alliance because of the division in parliament during the voting, he claimed the voting in parliament has created a new basis for alliance among seven parties. This unity must be strengthened to institutionalise a republican set up in the country.?Maintaining the alliance is the need of the hour as it has not achieved its goal of holding CA election and thereby ensuring restructuring of the state. This mission was set when the seven parties and our party reached the 12-point understanding two years ago," he added.Vaidhya termed the leftist unity seen in the voting as the victory of the Nepali people and against the hegemonistic attitude of some partners in the alliance. ?The left unity should not undermine the SPA or alienate the Congress, but it should rather be used to strengthen the alliance to foil the conspiracy of reactionary and imperialist forces. As the leftist force is a progressive force, it has the responsibility to work for a free and fair CA election and the leftist have to reorient their activities towards the free and fair election."At the same time, the Maoist leader warned of fresh agitation if the government ignored the other demands of the Maoists. ?The issues concerning the whereabouts of the disappeared people, providing relief to the family of the martyrs, facilities and salary to the Maoist combatants are humanitarian issues, which must be addressed with priority. How can we go for polls without addressing these issues?" he said.

Source: The Rising Nepal, November 7, 2007

House Decision

THE special session of the parliament reached a majority decision in which it concurred on a federal democratic republic ahead of the Constituent Assembly elections and a fully proportional election system. The special session saw intense deliberations for a protracted period amongst the leaders of the political parties and the parliamentarians. That this decision was reached augurs well for the peace and democratic process of the country that at one time looked like floundering, much to the chagrin of the people at large who had made great sacrifices.

At one time, it was feared that the Seven Party Alliance was on the verge of breaking up as the negotiations were taking place, but finally reason prevailed, and the alliance remained intact. Unity amongst the political parties is crucial at this time, especially at a time when efforts are underway to hold the Constituent Assembly elections. This has now opened the way for declaring the date for the Constituent Assembly elections that would decide the future course the country would take. Due to adverse circumstances, the elections had to be postponed twice. This had drawn not only widespread anxiety in the country, but also of the international community that wanted to see the successful culmination of the peace and democratic process.

However, what is to be noted is that the parliament had failed to garner the required two-third majority to immediately declare the country a republic by changing the interim constitution. The decision reached by the House comes at a time when it is being questioned if the Constituent Assembly elections can be held in a free and fair manner without fear and intimidation of the voters. There are regressive elements that are bent on creating an environment that is not congenial for the holding of the elections. Such attempts should be thwarted and the disgruntled elements, some of whom have genuine grievances, should come to the negotiating table to sort out matters so that the important exercise of holding the Constituent Assembly elections can be brought to fruition.

In any case, the House decision should be hailed by all accounts as there was giving and taking on key issues in the proposals, whereby the Maoists withdrew its motion for the immediate declaration of a republic and the consequent UML support for a fully proportional electoral system. Now that various issues that served as impediments for the successful holding of the Constituent Assembly polls have been thrashed out, the country looks forward to the continuation of the democratic exercise with the hope that the peace achieved in the country will be lasting.

Source: The Rising Nepal, November 7, 2007

Interview with Maoist leader Ram Bahadur Thapa in Nepal

“I stand with the revolution”
28 October

MIN BAJRACHARYA

By raising demands on the eve of the constituent assembly elections, the Maoists are accused of being against polls. Why are you going against the very agenda you raised? On a superficial level, it looks like the CPN-M was behind the delay in elections. But if you take a closer look, you’ll see that the NC and other parties are the main culprits. Take a look at our demands, and see if they are legitimate or not. The parties are responsible for the election postponement because they refused to budge. Don’t you see that you are endangering the peace process and a return to war? We have seen that danger. If the government tries to suppress our peaceful revolution with weapons then it will be clear that they have no desire to hold elections or change to a republic. I don’t think they’ll make such a stupid move. But history has shown that in extreme cases, people do resort to stupidity. So we haven’t dismissed that possibility. In the span of one-and-a-half years, what have you accomplished and what have you lost? Our recently concluded fifth plenum answers this question. There were forces that tried to isolate us by labelling us terrorists. They have failed. The middle class no longer misunderstands us and we have established international relations. But there have also been losses. We have had trouble making the changes we wanted. We failed to make the people understand many of our agreements. Regressive forces have made use of that. Our weaknesses in madhesi, janjati and republican issues have been exposed.

Are you a hardliner? No. There are right-wingers, middle-of-the- roaders, and leftist factions in our own party and they are in constant conflict. So where do you stand among those factions? We are revolutionaries and I fall into that category. Our party follows the revolutionary code. I am on the side of revolution and if the party line goes against my beliefs, then I will stand with the revolution. It is said that you have tried to establish yourself against Chairman Prachanda. That is also part of a conspiracy. I do not surface in public much, and that is my weakness. This rumour has spread because certain factions wish it. You have said that you do not want a republic like that in Iraq or Sikkim. We want a Nepali republic, where Nepalis make the decisions. Foreign help will be required, but not foreign direction. If foreigners try to direct us instead of just helping us, it will be an attack on our national integrity. You have maintained that there is an Indian hand in everything, but we do not see you opposing it. Our line on India is clear. There are many treaties and agreements with Nepal that need to be changed. We don’t want to ruin our relationship with India, we want to make it better in the future. But our party will oppose India’s incorrect actions. Certain factions in India are hatching a conspiracy against the movement of the Nepali people. This is an attack on our independence. The madhesi incidents are also anti-national.

Source: People's March, November 1, 2007

Interview with Nepal’s Maoist Leader Dr. Bhattarai

When reporting on the Maoists in Nepal, Western journalists tend to focus on Chairman Prachanda, (nom de guerre of Pushpa Kamal Dahal), usually overlooking the major influence that Dr. Baburam Bhattarai has wielded within the Party—from the very beginning to the present time. Although it is Prachanda’s face that will greet you on the official Maoist website, it is fair to say that it is the combined efforts of Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai, together, that have so altered the course of Nepal’s history.

Dr. Bhattarai’s credentials are impressive. He seems to have thrived in the academic world. He garnered the highest score in the National School Leaving Certificate (SLC) in 1970. In 1972, he came first in the Intermediate Science exams. He received his Bachelors in Architecture (Honors) in 1977 from Chandigarh, India, and his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi) in 1986. His doctorate thesis on “The Nature of Underdevelopment and Regional Structure of Nepal- A Marxist Analysis” was later published by Adroit Publishers (Delhi 2003). He has a number of other books to his credit and is a regular contributor to both Nepali and English periodicals.

No less impressive is his reputation as a superlative chess player. Prior to his ascendancy in the political realm, when the World Chess Federation (FIDE) president Max Euwe gave a simultaneous exhibition in Kathmandu, Bhattarai played him: He beat Euwe, the ex-World Champion, in 23 moves with what is remembered as “a brilliant queen sacrifice.”
On February 4, 1996 Bhattarai gave the government, led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, a list of 40 demands, threatening civil war if they were not met. His demands included:
1) The end of the “domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance” 2) The abrogation of “discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty” 3) The confiscation of “land under the control of the feudal system”, to be “distributed to the landless and the homeless.”

The Maoists declared the People’s War.
Dr. Bhattarai went underground for almost eight years. In May 2002, the Nepal government announced a bounty on his head—dead or alive–of $64,000–a vast fortune in Nepal.
In February 2003, he was designated by the Maoists to head a five-member negotiation team in peace talks with the government to end the ongoing People’s War. He emerged from hiding one month later.
He is now Senior Standing Committee Member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Head of the International Department of the Party, and Convener of United Revolutionary People’s Council.
Dr. Bhattarai married Hisila Yemi, a Newar Buddhist girl met at university. Today she is known by the nom de guerre Parvati, a political leader in her own right. Together they have one daughter.
It is perhaps pertinent to note that Dr. Bhattarai hails from a village in the western district of Gorkha, ancestral home of the kings of Nepal. It is no accident that anti-feudal sentiments have long permeated this area. The western districts have the poorest record in child literacy, child labor, landless households and per capita food production. Out of necessity, a large percentage of western Nepalis migrate to India as laborers; the region is substantially sustained by remittances sent to the folks back home: Little wonder then that this became the initial support base of the Maoist movement.

I interviewed Dr. Bhattarai long after sunset at his compound. Although he had spent the day in back-to-back closed-door meetings, he was attentive, engaged, polite and seemingly oblivious to the fact that the hour approached midnight.
Interview with Dr. Baburam Bhattarai

DUNHAM: I’d like to begin with the monarchy–the monarchy as your foe. It seems to me that the Maoists couldn’t have wished for a better enemy than King Gyanendra, widely regarded as an arrogant, rigid, ruthless, foolish and out-of-touch king– unless you wished for the king’s son, Prince Paras. The monarchy has had its wings clipped but royalists still exist, many among them denying that they are royalists. Who do you most distrust: monarchists or “closet” monarchists?

DR. BHATTARAI: It’s not a matter of personal distrust. We keep these things in historical perspective. We are not interested in individuals. We are interested in institutions, which have hampered the development of Nepal. This illegal monarchist institution, which presides over a feudal economy, politics and culture, and that has been ruling Nepal society for the last 250 years—this has been the biggest obstacle for Nepal moving into the modern age. We want to abolish this feudal institution. In that sense, whosoever is in favor of abolishing this institution, we are ready to align ourselves with them. But those who don’t want to abolish the monarchy or want to keep the monarchy in one form or another—we distrust them.

DUNHAM: And do you think that there are still a substantial number of people who are secretly monarchists?

DR. BHATTARAI: Yes, there are secret monarchists. Being Marxists, we like to think in terms of class systems. Because of the monarchists’ class interests, and their landed interests, their economic collaboration and their cultural linkages with Hindu fundamental interests—these people would like to save the monarchy, whether secretly or openly. And they are substantial in number. But they are gradually decreasing in numbers and becoming isolated from the people. In that sense, their days are numbered. We don’t regard them as a big adversity. If they are not backed by big foreign powers, I think the days of the monarchy are numbered.

DUNHAM: What about members of the army? Are there still significant numbers of secret monarchists within their ranks?

DR. BHATTARAI: In the lower levels of army personnel, most of the members are against the monarchy– let us say below the rank of major. But above the rank of major– colonel and general– there are still people with a privileged background who are linked with the Shah and Rana families. These people are either secretly or openly for the monarchy. These people are also decreasing in number but still they are powerful. They occupy the senior-most positions in the army.

DUNHAM: You mentioned the fundamentalist Hindus. Do you regard that as a growing institution?

DR. BHATTARAI: When Prithvi Narayan Shah [the first king, 1722-1775] founded the centralized feudalist state of Nepal, he gave it a slogan that means a real Hindu State. The real cultural background of the state, in that sense, is Hindu fundamentalism. Hindu fundamentalism is still substantial in numbers. They are the real backbone of the monarchy.

DUNHAM: And how deep does the Hindu state run in Nepal?

DR. BHATTARAI: I think that it is quite strong. It isn’t as strong as it is in India. It’s more deeply rooted there. But in Nepal’s case, since it lies between India and China (or the Tibetan Autonomous region of China–Buddhism dominated) there has always been a mixture of Hinduism and Buddhism in Nepal, as well as various national religions indigenous to Nepal. In that way, Hinduism is more diluted in Nepal than the Hinduism of India.

DUNHAM: So the king has support in India?

DR. BHATTARAI: Yeh, some of the ruling classes in India– mainly the Hindu fundamentalist parties–they seem to be in favor of the monarchy. The majority of the political parties– Indian National Congress, which is the ruling party in India– they don’t seem to be overtly in favor of the monarchy. But, yes, a section of the ruling class in India is in favor of the monarchy.

DUNHAM: Here’s my impression of the average Nepali assessment of government officials: Corrupt; greedy; jealous of one another; promising the people anything they think the people want to hear but, in fact, focusing their attention on building private mansions, getting SUVs, sending their relatives on shopping sprees, etc. There is also the issue of age. When one thinks of members of Parliament, one thinks of very old men indeed– holding onto their power no matter what. If this impression meshes with the Maoist party’s impression, how can you be sincere when you say you want to work with the guys in government?

DR. BHATTARAI: Yeh, when you have to choose between the whale and the deep sea, the choice is very difficult. But since the monarchy has been the biggest obstacle for social development in Nepal, for the last 250 years, we must choose any ally who is ready to fight against the monarchy. That is the choice forced upon us. In that sense, you are right. The Parliamentary political parties cannot be trusted, they themselves are very corrupt, they don’t have any vision for a new Nepal. That is well known. Even so, to do away with the monarchy and to fight against feudalism, we thought is was more prudent to align ourselves with them– for the time being. If it is possible, we will try to reform them. We prefer it that way. But if they are not ready to reform, then the path will take its own course.

DUNHAM: The Madeshi problem. I’ve been coming back and forth to Nepal many times and I thought I knew a lot about Nepal. But I realized in December 2006 that I had never heard of a Madeshi problem. I didn’t know this. It was a completely new thing to me. Two or three weeks ago I went down to Birgunj and Janakpur and I talked to ten or twelve leaders–intellectuals–not leaders of the radical parties—but some I think, were radically inclined and preferred not to share with me everything they felt. Anyway, my impression was that the Terai has a legitimate gripe against the government of Nepal. They have been marginalized, parodied, belittled and ignored for decades and now, I think, they have taken a cue from the Maoists– how the Maoists have focused attention on issues in the last ten years—the Madeshi are sort of imitating the Maoists in getting their point across. The Madeshi I talked to, they themselves felt now marginalized by Yadav and Gwala Singh and these guys, and they felt like they no longer had a voice. Ironically, they had been marginalized within the issue of marginalization. Where is the Maoist focus on this situation and how important is it to address the discontent in the Terai?

DR. BHATTARAI: You have raised a very valid question. Nepal is a multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic country. Being of small size, there is a lot of diversity: national diversity, social diversity and regional diversity. Within these diversities, the Madeshi issue is an instance in which the people feel marginalized by the central state. Our party, the Supreme Maoists, during the People’s War, we raised the issue of the marginalized nationalities and regions, including the Madeshis. We were the ones who really empowered them, who really led them to fight for their cause. Then came the peace process. Then there was some confusion. Some people thought we had compromised with the state and some of the royalists and Hindu fundamentalists from India– who were against our movement– they tried to grab this genuine agreement with the Madeshi people and they instigated this Madeshi movement. The genuine movement of the Madeshi people was highjacked by the unscrupulous elements from India and Nepal. We support the general cause of the Madeshi people. We must support it because their cause is genuine. They need liberation from the oppressive state of Nepal. We have promised the Madeshi autonomy. But when the Nepali Congress government wasn’t prepared to declare autonomy right now, or declare a free state right now, then we made a sort of compromise that we would go for an election with the constituent assembly and after the election, we would go for a federal structure. Some people thought, if it was postponed in that way, the federal system might never be achieved. The general agreement was there. But there were some– the royalist people were never for a federal system in Nepal or autonomy for the Madeshi people–they instigated, created the problem.

DUNHAM: But there are also people in Terai who aren’t asking for autonomy but, rather, advocating for Secession from Nepal. How realistic is that?

DR. BHATTARAI: No, I think that is just a fringe group. The movement of the Madeshi people is just looking for autonomy within the federalist state of Nepal. The Maoists are for that. Our movement raised that question. We fully support that. Those who claim they want to separate from Nepal—they are an insignificant minority. They could be instigated by elements from India.

DUNHAM: Let’s talk about the youth of Nepal. 60% of the population in Nepal is under the age of 30. They are active in the streets but they emerge as political office-holders much more slowly than they do in the West. It frustrates them. How can the Maoists integrate the youth of Nepal into the political positions of power so that their frustrations are better addressed?

DR. BHATTARAI: In fact our movement mobilized the youth. You’ll see the majority of our cadres in our People’s Liberation Army or in the women’s movement or the Dalit movement or the so-called untouchable movement–most of them are youth. Our party is given full credit for mobilizing the youth. We join with the general aspirations of the youth. I think they are the biggest strength of our movement. You see, the PLA, more than 30,000 living in camp internments, most of them are youths between 22 and 25 years of age. We’ve been able to organize and mobilize the youth and represent their aspirations.

DUNHAM: I guess what I’m trying to say is, yes, in terms of numbers I see that. What I don’t see is in terms of leadership. I don’t see a younger group coming forward. Where is the representation under 40 or, let’s say, under 50 in the government? There’s a gap here.

BHATTARAI: If you look at it from our party’s viewpoint, all the five ministers that we have chose, all of them are under 50 and some are below 40. And if you see the 83 members of the interim legislature we have nominated, the majority of them are between the ages of 30 and 40.

DUNHAM: Are you addressing the education of the youth? And their ability to find a job, once they have received an education?

DR. BHATTARAI: Yeh, that’s a good question. The biggest problem of Nepal is unemployment. That’s why many youths migrate to India and other foreign countries in search of jobs. Most of them are uneducated. Even some who are educated but don’t get good employment in Nepal migrate to the West– the US, Canada, Australia and other places. We have to provide them with a good education, technical education, political education and create jobs within the country. This will be the focus of our development policy in the days to come. Our party has given due importance to spreading education and providing jobs within the country. If you see within the interim legislation, we fought hard to include employment as a fundamental right. It is the first time in Nepali history where we have included this as a right in the constitution.

DUNHAM: Are you developing specific job programs?

DR. BHATTARAI: Whatever can be done, we are pushing forward and our thrust has been to initiate developmental works so that jobs are created for the youth. Creating infrastructure—building road, dams—could be constructive in mobilizing the youth in large numbers. This is what we are proposing. Let’s see what happens.

DUNHAM: To what extend are the other parties dragging their feet?

DR. BHATTARAI: Other parties are dragging their feet. If you see the experience of the past 15 years, when the Parliamentary parties were in power, they followed such a wrong economic policy so that the employment wasn’t there. The so-called development growth was there—but growth without employment. So this lopsided, distorted development policy should be corrected and we want to follow an economic policy where there is growth and employment.

DUNHAM: Tying into the economics: The industrialists who I have talked to in Kathmandu are resistant to the Maoists coming into power. How do you approach them? How do you gain their trust? How do you work with businessmen who have so much to lose financially? Have you been in any kind of conversations with these men?

DR. BHATTARAI: Yes, we are in conversation with industrialists. In fact we are organizing some contracting programs with the educated members of the Chambers of Congress and industries. We have tried to remove some of the misconceptions they have about us. And now we think that whatever misconceptions they had about us is mostly clear. They know that we are for representing industry in this country. We are for a democratic revolution, not a socialistic revolution right now. In the democratic phase of the revolution, the private property will be there. The industries and trade will not be seized. It will remain in private hands. The state will play a guiding role, but the property will not be nationalized. Once this fact is clear to them, that we are the ones who can ensure real stability in the country– peace in the country– in that sense, they will absolutely come to our side.

DUNHAM: What about foreign investors? I’ve read that big investors have pulled out recently because they are giving up on political stability in Nepal. They have cold feet. How do you get them to come back and embrace the idea of investing in Nepal?

DR. BHATTARAI: If you look back in history– Nepal, because of its backwardness, lack of industrial development, lack of development climate– there has never been significant foreign investors in Nepal– even before our movement started ten years ago. The economic development of the last 40 or 50 years, the growth rate went very slowly—less than 2% per annum. It’s a very low growth rate. This can’t be blamed on us, you see. The reason why foreign investment is less is because there is less demand: there is poverty, when the people are poor—they don’t buy goods. Because of this, foreign investors are not attracted. But once this democratic change is complete, once we go for big infrastructure development projects, then foreign companies won’t oppose the idea of investment. We are not against foreign investment. The only thing is that the priority should be given for national self-reliant development. And the foreign investors play a secondary role, a supporting role. We should rely more on our indigenous resources: labor, capital and market.

DUNHAM: For many years NGOs have pumped money into the country and perhaps created the notion among the people of Nepal that foreign countries are always going to help them, bail them out. You speak of self-reliance. Do you believe that NGOs are a barrier to self-reliance?

DR. BHATTARAI: Yeh, NGOs and INGOs haven’t played a very positive role. Instead of creating productive employment they have been more of a parasite– bringing money from the outside and continuing the goods from the outside. Whatever money comes through the NGO agencies, it definitely won’t trickle down to the real masses of the people–only a few people, some elites in our nobility area– they have pocketed that money and created a separate class of elites. That has definitely alienated the masses. This is one of the reasons we were given the right to revolt in the countryside.DUNHAM: How do you curb the NGOs? There seems to be an inordinate number of NGOs in Nepal, compared to other countries. It’s almost a cottage industry here, where everyone can set up an NGO and put a picture in a Western newspaper of an undernourished child and say, “GIVE”.

DR. BHATTARAI: (laughing) Yes, exactly. You’re right, you’re right. This is a very disturbing development taking place. I think NGOs have to be regulated and controlled.

DUNHAM: You would suggest a central watchdog monitoring organization?

DR. BHATTARAI: Yes, it should be there, it should be there. We are in favor of that.

DUNHAM: Regulations for all NGOs?

DR. BHATTARAI: Not all. There are some NGOs who may be really dedicated to the quality of society and people, driven by UN motives, or something like that—but most of these NGOs are profit-oriented, commercialized. So in a real sense, they are not NGOs. They needed to be regulated and controlled.

DUNHAM: What is the relationship between the Maoists and the political powers in Delhi? What should India be doing to better support the Nepali situation?

DR. BHATTARAI: Historically, there have been some problems with our neighbors to the south. Because ours is a smaller country, sandwiched between two big countries, India and China. Historically, there has been an ongoing rivalry between India and China. There is an inherent insecurity in Nepal that someday one of our big neighbors could eat Nepal up. And since we are more dependent on India– we are landlocked on three sides from India, and almost all of our economic interaction takes place with India– that fear-cycle is always there. But in the changed context, we think we need to improve our relationship with India. Particularly since last year, the Indian establishment has been playing a more positive role for the democratic cause of the country. Definitely, we would like to improve our relations. But we would like to retain our independence and sovereignty vis-à-vis these big powers. There are some problems. But we think it can be resolved.

DUNHAM: You mentioned that you are landlocked.

DR. BHATTARAI: We are India-locked.

DUNHAM: And yet, in terms of water, you have the second-greatest potential for hydroelectricity in the entire world. This must be a great concern and interest for the Maoists. Certainly the Indians would like to have that energy. How are you addressing that? I know that you can’t do anything right at the moment, but how would you like to address the hydroelectric potential while ensuring that the Nepali people are actually getting the benefit? In the past, there have been water treaties with India that proved to have been lopsided in favor of India.
DR. BHATTARAI: The water issue: It is a major resource for Nepal. If we could correctly exploit this resource, then we could really benefit. In that sense we are not against collaborating with India to harness the waterpower. We are not against have agreements with India on the water issue. But in the past, the water projects that were undertaken by India were, as you say, quite lopsided. India could monopolize the benefits and the Nepali people thought they had been deceived. There are some residual problems connected to that. But we would like to correct that. If we could come up with equality and mutual benefits, we would like to conclude fresh agreements with India. We are for that.

DUNHAM: In talking with Nepali people about India, I often sense a cynical reaction. If you would like to work with the Indians, what do you say to the Nepalis who don’t trust India?

DR. BHATTARAI: We have to act on two levels. On the government level, our relationship can be quite strained at times. But on the people-to-people level, the relationships are quite smooth and warm. Once there is a real democratic change in Nepal, and the Indian people support the change in Nepal, the relationship between the two people will definitely improve. If our movement is successful—we are able to abolish the monarchy and establish a democratic republic in Nepal—we should have a better relationship with democratic India. I think the earlier frictions we have had with India will abate.

DUNHAM: What is the Maoist’s current relationship with China and how important is Beijing in terms of the future of Nepal?

BHATTARAI: Beijing is important because it is a big power. Not only are the Chinese our neighbors, but also is an emerging world power, so we should have a balanced and friendly relationship with China. But the Himalayas separate China from Nepal. We have very limited linkages with China, economically and physically. We are bound to have more interaction with India than China but, even then, a better relationship with China will be to our advantage. China’s economy is growing very fast. As we are sandwiched between two fast growing economies, we could benefit from both India and China.

DUNHAM: I’d like to address the amount of violence that has taken place in Nepal in the last ten years. Approximately 14,000 people have died because of the conflict. After the uprising last year, everyone took a deep breath, a sigh of relief, but since then there have been frequent bouts of violence—pockets of violence here, pockets of violence there. And many people who I’ve interviewed claim that the Maoists, knowing and willingly, are engaging in acts of violence and intimidation. How do you answer that accusation?

DR. BHATTARAI: That’s not true. If you see—in light of the facts—the party which was the Revolutionary People’s War for ten years—and has played a very resourceful role in the peace process, which has improved in one year’s time. Before starting the People’s War, we were in Parliament. We were in peaceful politics. Only when Parliamentary and peaceful politics failed to bring about the desired changes in the country—and there was a lot of repression unleashed on the agitating masses—we were forced to resist. Violence threatened us. Violence was not our choice. If you analyze it correctly, during the ten years of the People’s War, we proposed peace talks, time and again. Three times we entered into peace talks. We voluntarily and unilaterally declared ceasefires. That shows that we were for genuine peace with the monarchal state, which was violent, controlled the armed forces of the country, and which was by nature very undemocratic, and they thrust all of this violence on us. Our violence was not offensive violence, but defensive violence. Resistance violence. Given the historical record I think it is not true if somebody alleges that we are still into violence. That’s not true.

DUNHAM: Well, let me ask you this: In 1996, the Maoists lit a fire. And I can’t think of one instance in the history of Nepal where a fire has created such energy around it, and so quickly. My question is: Can the Maoists control the fire they created? What happens, for example, if some of the Maoist youth are disenfranchised and go off on their own? All of the cadre—all of the youth you have assembled—

DR. BHATTARAI: It isn’t true. It is a proven practice: More than 30,000 youths who fought, who participated in the war, members of the People’s Liberation Army—they have been living in camps for the last six months—very peacefully, not a single person has revolted, so that is the proof. This whole thing is under the control of the party leadership.

DUNHAM: How long can you keep these youths in cantonments before—they’re young guys—how long can you keep them there before they become restless and –

DR. BHATTARAI: They won’t be ready to stay idle in the camps, if the political process doesn’t move ahead.

DUNHAM: If you had one question to ask Americans, what would it be?

DR. BHATTARAI: Being the sole superpower of the world, I think Nepal should be too insignificant for them. They shouldn’t be interfering with the internal affairs of Nepal. Nepal is not a threat to you, United States of America. We would ask them, just let the Nepalese people decide their own future, and you will see that we are the most peaceful people in the world, and that we are no threat to the United States of America, we are no threat to the American people. There was not a single American harmed during the last ten years of the People’s War. There is no reason to harbor any prejudicial interest.

Source: Mikel Dungham Blogs, November 1, 2007

Politics stands still

Yubaraj Ghimire

As hopes fade of an early election that is free and fair, Nepal’s crisis shows no signs of abating. What can India do?

External recognition, it seems, is a much more important factor in Nepal’s politics than internal legitimacy. In October 2002, the international community including India, endorsed King Gyanendra when he sacked an elected prime minister for his failure to hold elections to Parliament on schedule. But in April 2006, the international community decisively rejected King Gyanendra’s complete takeover bid.

In fact, this turned into a major morale booster for the demoralised political parties that came together and mobilised people against the king. G.P. Koirala, who became prime minister after April 2006 following the success of that mass movement, is now fast losing crucial international support as he has missed two deadlines to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly (CA). Besides, the country’s law and order situation is in a shambles.

In the absence of an election in the near future, international support has become all the more crucial for Koirala’s survival. So long as key international players — India, US, China, European Union and United Nations — were agreed about assisting in charting out Nepal’s future political course (through the CA elections), things seemed to be moving in the right direction. But there are visible differences in the approach of international players towards Koirala’s failure to hold elections, though they are all clear that a fair and fearless election is urgent.

In the last few days, Koirala has intensified his meetings with diplomats, following Shyam Saran’s visit as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s special envoy, soon after the CA polls were postponed indefinitely. His advice was simple enough -- an early election, as early as December. But given Nepal’s poor law and order situation, it is hard to swallow. It also implies that the prime minister should be prepared to go for polls without the Maoists if they continued to insist on their ‘unreasonable demands’. Their new demand for abolition of the monarchy immediately and a complete switch to the proportional representation system of elections for the CA polls, barely a fortnight before the nomination process, was clearly intended to derail the entire election process.

Yet, going to the polls without the Maoists will minimise, to a large extent, the prospect of a foreseeable end to the 12-year old Maoist-led insurgency that has taken a toll of 13,000 lives. It’s equally challenging to hold them to their earlier pledge in Delhi, under a government initiative (in which Saran played the key role), that they would renounce the politics of violence and partake in competitive parliamentary politics. In the current context, however, it was as much a failure on the part of Indian government to not be able to assess that elections were not going to take place on November 22.

India’s Nepal policy seems to have failed. Similarly, there is a debate going on about whether the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), headed by the Secretary General’s Special Representative Ian Martin, should be allowed to stay (with an enlarged mandate) beyond January 22, when its current tenure ends. While the government of Nepal is likely to write to the security council to have its tenure extended by another year, it is unlikely this will happen. UNMIN has been involving itself in Terai problems, where apart from peacefully agitating groups, more than a dozen armed groups, most of them based across the border, are demanding more political rights and inclusion in the decision making process.

India has backed the demands of the Terai groups, but the lack of consensus among the political parties in Nepal has delayed any action by the government. At the same time, China has been warning Nepal that the threat to the country’s stability because of the failure of the peace process will be a matter of special concern in the northern neighbourhood.

A delicate imbalance in the approach of the key international players, coupled with total domestic failure, has the potential to point Nepal in a new direction. But its destination is more confused than ever before.

Source: The Indian Express, October 30, 2007

Republican State And Democracy

Lakshman Bahadur K.C.

Modern states or govern ments have been classified under various forms such as monarchy, republican, dictatorship, democracy, unitary federal and presidential, parliamentary. It does not mean that the various forms of governments which are practised presently in various countries of the world are of recent origin. In fact, forms of government with different names have been in existence since the days of Aristotle in ancient Greece 2,500 years ago.

Classification of governments

Aristotle's classification of government has been considered as authoritative among the early classifications. In modern times, several eminent western political writers have made attempts to classify governments. Among them, Dr. Stephen Leacock's classification of governments has been accepted as being more comprehensive and the best.At first, Leacock divides states into two classes - despotic and democratic. Despotism is another name for dictatorship. In a despotic state, the ruler enjoys absolute and supreme power totally disregarding the wishes of the people. In a democracy, the sovereign power is vested in the general people who exercise it through their elected representatives in the parliament.He further subdivides democracies into limited monarchies and republics. In a limited monarchy, the monarch doesn't enjoy real political power.

He or she is just a nominal or ceremonial head. It is the elected parliament responsible to the people which exercises the real authority. In a republic state, it is the elected representatives headed by an elected president that govern the state for a fixed term.Each of these types of states is again subdivided into unitary and federal forms of government on the basis of concentration on the distribution of powers. In a unitary state, power is concentrated in the central government whereas in a federal state, the government's powers are divided between the centre and the units. The federal system is based on the concept of a dual set of government.The unitary and federal states are further subdivided into parliamentary and presidential forms of government on the basis of relationship between the legislature and executive. In the parliamentary form of government, the executive headed by the prime minister is responsible to the legislature. The head of state (a monarch or president) has only a nominal authority in such a system. Whereas in the presidential form of government, which is based on the doctrine of the separation of power, the chief executive, i.e., the president is not responsible to the legislature and is independent of it though the president may be removed by the process of impeachment.

Thus, we can put the formal classification of governments into broad categories as monarchy, dictatorship and democracy and their subsidiary forms like constitutional monarchy, republics, unitary and federal, parliamentary and presidential governments or a mixture of them. Any form of government may be practised on the basis of the political requirement of the country. No form of government, therefore, can be described as pure or exclusive as well as static.The political system of a country represents harmonisation of the different forms of government. For example, the political system of Great Britain is based on the concept of constitutional monarchy, unitary and parliamentary democracy.

On the other hand, India is a republic and a federal state. It has an elected president with functioning parliamentary democracy under the leadership of an elected prime minister, whereas the USA is a federal republic and democratic state with a presidential form of government, which is based on the doctrine of separation of powers.Another form of government is monarchy. It is the oldest form of government and is prevalent in several states of the world. In fact, the monarchial system having hereditary succession symbolises autocracy, feudalism and exploitation. But with the growth of democracy, which is based on the universal concept of liberty, equality, fraternity and welfare state, the system of absolute monarchy declined in modern times and was replaced by the republican state. But some European countries like Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands have retained the monarchial system as ceremonial heads under a democratic set up.Thus, we find that several countries of the world have removed monarchical system and established a republican system through violent political change. The republican state is now the prevalent system around the world. But the establishment of republicanism does not automatically usher in plural democracy. Republicanism is practised with different forms of government with or without plural democracy.

There are several countries which have adopted the republican concept with different principles of state governance. Just take the example of Korea. The divided Korea - North and South - though they are republican states, the principle of governance for their respective countries is fundamentally different from one another. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North) is governed by a single party ideology of communism whereas the political system of the Republic of Korea (South) is based on the concept of plural democracy with presidential form of government. The president in South Korea is elected by the people in free and fair democratic competitive elections.There is also another form of republican state, which is related to religion and the army doctrine.

For example, Iran proclaims itself an Islamic republic, which means its whole system is guided by Islamic law. In the case of Iraq, it was ruled by military dictator Saddam Hussein for a long time though it was a republican state. Thus, several countries practise dictatorship under the banner of a republican state. The establishment of a republic state is, therefore, no guarantee that multiparty democracy would be established unless it is backed by full commitment to the functioning of constitutional democracy based on the rule of law, periodic competitive elections among the political parties, liberty, equality, fraternity and a welfare state.Nepal is now on the verge of great political change. The successful popular uprising of April 2006 in which millions of people had participated against the autocratic royal regime under the leadership of the seven party alliance and the CPN Maoist opened the door for a change of great magnitude in the political, social and economic fields.With the introduction of the interim constitution 2063 B.S., an interim government and an interim legislature, the Nepalese people have now started to experience a new wave of political change.

One of the basic features of this change is that Nepal is positively heading towards the achievement of new multiparty democracy based on the concept of federal republic with the aim of ending the centralised feudal monarchical system. But Nepal's march towards establishing a new Nepal through state restructuring and creating a new political set up based on political pluralism, rule of law, inclusiveness, fundamental rights, freedom of the judiciary and the press and the welfare state cannot be materialised unless and until we sincerely realise the imperative of framing and introducing a new and stable constitution by the elected Constitution Assembly.The constitution of the elected Constitution Assembly will certainly be a major and historical step towards institutionalising the achievements of the April movement and ending the political transition of Nepal, which will guide the new political set up based on democratic values.

But contrary to the arrangement as provided in the interim constitution 2063 for holding the Constitution Assembly elections, the postponement of the CA polls twice has raised doubts about the sincerity of the political stakeholders of the present political set up. The postponement of the CA polls due to the controversy raised by the CPN Maoist leaders on the methods of the CA polls at a time when the CA polls were scheduled to be held on November 22 is itself a breach of the provisions of the interim constitution, which is a common and legal document of the eight political parties.LegitimacyThus, inability to hold the Constitution Assembly elections means maintaining the status quo and prolonging the transition period, which is definitely not in the interest of Nepal and the Nepalese people. So without wasting time, the political parties and their leaders must come forward to create a conducive environment throughout the country for holding the CA polls successfully and peacefully within this year, otherwise the legitimacy of the present interim set up will be questioned.

Source: The Rising Nepal, October 31, 2007

Nepal needs a close look

Ashok K Mehta

In the case of Nepal, historically India's foreign policy has been driven by its security concerns, but the policy planning has been patchy. Cognisance is still taken of a British foreign policy document as old as 1919, which noted: "Nepal is in a position to exercise powerful influence over India's internal stability and if it were to become disaffected, the anarchy would spill over...."
The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship (TPF), together with the accompanying letter which is derived from the 1923 security treaty Nepal signed with Britain, has provisions impacting on mutual security concerns: "Neither country will tolerate threat to the other... devise effective countermeasures..."

In 1959, Jawaharlal Nehru equated aggression on Nepal or Bhutan with aggression on India. This resulted in a furore in Nepal for being bracketed with Bhutan. While BP Koirala welcomed Nehru's security commitment, he asserted Nepal's independence. Nepal takes pride in its independence, being the only country other than Bhutan and Thailand in the region not to be colonised, but it paid a different price for it.

India has been associated directly with all the major changes in Nepal starting with the overthrow of the Ranas in 1950, advent of multi-party democracy in 1959, restoration of democracy in 1990 and the virtual end of monarchy in 2006. Two companies of Indian Infantry were poised to land in Kathmandu in 1950 in case there was "anarchy", but the force was not needed. In 1959, during Nepal's first multi-party election, Indian Army Gorkha signallers were deployed for communications.

The military-to-military connection between the two Armies is also historic. In 1952, King Tribhuvan requested for an Indian military mission to train the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). In 1960, 21 border checkposts were established in the north with Indian security personnel. In 1965, King Mahendra requested India for reorganising and re-equipping the Army. In 1970, on Nepal's request both the checkposts and training teams were withdrawn but the military cooperation continued unabated without any physical presence of Indian Army trainers. The special military relationship was symbolised by the Army Chiefs of the two countries being made honorary Generals of each other's Armies.

The bulk of Army training is handled by India under the special aided programme of the MoD and maximum training vacancies on training courses go to Nepal and Sri Lanka. In 1990, after the restoration of democracy, yet another request was made to modernise the Nepal Army and that programme is still going on. At the height of Maoist insurgency, when the Army was under pressure and ill-prepared to meet the Maoist challenge, Indian Army's counter-insurgency experts trained and guided the Nepal Army to defeat the Maoists. Massive contingents of equipment were rushed to ensure military posts were defensible.

In 2003, for the first time after 1970, a Bilateral Security Consultative Group was established for channelling equipment and expertise to Nepal Army. The military assistance was provided on specific request from the Government of Nepal in the spirit of past agreements and understandings. In 2004, when the Maoists besieged the Kathmandu Valley for a week, the Directors General Military Operations consulted each other on possible help that India could provide. National Security Adviser JN Dixit held a special meeting with the Indian Army and Air Force Chiefs to evolve contingency plans in case of any adverse situation.

Contingency planning is at the core of national security; it includes humanitarian and military assistance requested by friendly countries. India is guided by treaty obligations and security commitments in the neighbourhood. It dispatched the IPKF to Sri Lanka following a request made by President JR Jayewardene after the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. Similarly, the Government of Maldives asked for -- and received -- military assistance to defeat a serious mercenary threat.

India has either planned or dispatched military succour to Seychelles, Mauritius and Fiji. It has repeatedly stated that it is committed to the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka", which is diplomatese for deterring the LTTE from a military takeover of the north-east or declaring the Eelam. The ISLA of 1987, like the 1950 TPF, is still in place, though both are dated.

Like the Southern Command in Pune is responsible for contingency planning and tasks in the island countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, Lucknow's Central Command has for long been involved in planning possible missions in the north, including Nepal. Military training institutions and think tanks are forever wargaming scenarios in the region so that, unlike their political masters, they are not caught napping. Exercise Tribhuvan was a study carried out in the late 1970s to assess the possibilities of a Communist takeover of Nepal. Shades of what is being currently played out by the Maoists and their associates in Kathmandu and the countryside were reflected in the exercise.

Over the years, India's security concerns were focussed on the activities of the ISI in Nepal, culminating in the hijack of IC-814 in Kandahar. The raid on the ISI stronghold by Nepal Police in Kathmandu's Hotel Karnali in 1994 revealed the scale of Pakistan's anti-India activities, but Kathmandu chose to deny most of it till the Kandahar episode. Nepal's sensitivity about its sovereignty and territorial integrity is manifest in the ladder-point security check of Indian Airlines flights at Tribhuvan Airport. Indian security staff frisk passengers on an elevated platform, avoiding use of Nepalese soil.

In the early 1990s, the first GP Koirala Government requested New Delhi for help to search for survivors of two major air crashes in the Valley. Nepali media ran banner headlines: "IAF helicopters invade Nepali airspace..." The Madhuri Dixit and Hrithik Roshan non-incidents created an avoidable anti-Indian stir in Nepal. Many Nepali friends say India is hypersensitive to anti-India sentiments which are dutifully shed by Nepalis before crossing the open border with India. They ask: "How can India become a regional -- leave alone an Asian -- power, if it loses sleep over such incidents?"

Leaders of the Seven-Party Alliance are privately, and some even publicly, saying that Maoists are afraid of facing an election; and, their hardliners could be preparing for a power grab. The Maoists have consistently accused royalists of conspiring against the "people's revolution" and the Army of planning a coup. These may not happen but are all part of future scenarios which warrant contingency plans.

The Maoists have the capability and the hardliners the intent to skirt the electoral process and seize power. India does not have to be apologetic about voicing its security concerns and priorities in Nepal and taking necessary action in shaping the environment. Moreover, being prepared for the unexpected, the political class would then no longer be equated with "headless chickens". National interest might prevail over political survival.

Source: The Pioneer, October 31, 2007

MUSLIMS of NEPAL: Becoming an assertive minority

R. Upadhyay


Hindu Monarchy with Hinduism as State religion ruled Nepal for centuries. The system of governance was also based on Hindu scriptures. As Buddhism was accepted as a part of Hindu society, the followers of this religion had no problem in the kingdom. But Muslims, the third religious group in the kingdom was allowed to practice their faith under certain restrictions. They were debarred from propagation of Islam or to follow the Islamic code Shariat in respect of dissolution of marriage by oral pronouncement of the word 'Talaq' thrice. In case of inheritance also they were to follow the Hindu-scriptures based code of Nepal. Any violation of Hindu scriptures based Nepal Code was a punishable offence. The situation therefore, was not congenial for the Islamic community to settle there. Even during Muslim rule in India Muslim migration to this country was insignificant. Perhaps strict implementation of Hindu scriptures based code was the main reason behind the indifference of the community towards settling in Nepal. In spite of such restrictions, it is unusual for the Muslims to become a significant third religious group in this Hindu kingdom.
The study of the religion-political sociology of the Muslims of South Asia has been the hot subject for historians for over last two decades but its scope in the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal is found to be proportionately minimal. Historically, it is difficult to come to any definite conclusion on the issue of migration but some reports suggest that Bakhtiyalr Khilji invaded Tibet in 13th century and some of its soldiers sneaked into Nepal. Another report says that first arrival of Muslims in Kathmandu valley was in late fifteenth and early sixteenth century during the reign of Ratna Malla, when Kashmiri traders from Tibet came here via Tibet for their trade in carpets, rugs and woolen garments. Soon after them some bangle sellers locally known as Churaute also arrived in the valley. It is also said that the rulers of Nepal invited a few dozens of Muslim army personnel from neighbouring Indian Territory to train the soldiers in fire arms. The Muslim rulers could not annex Nepal due to the fighting capability of Gurkhas. Shamsuddin Ilyas, Muslim ruler of Bengal had raided the Kathmandu valley in 1349 but returned without success.
Major penetration of Muslims in Nepal was in its Terai region during and after Sepoy mutiny of 1857. Jung Bahadur, the first Rana Prime Minister was the ally of the British but he gave protection and shelter to the Begum of Oudh . This was not possible without the consent of the British. It was a deliberate political move of the British to keep away the Muslim ruling family from its Indian Territory to avoid any mobilisation of Muslim masses around it. Knowing about the migration of the Begum, the Muslims from the border area also started migrating to the Terai region. They were mostly farm labour and small traders. British atrocities in the Ganges valley forced them to flee to the Terai region of Nepal to save their lives. The Hindu landlords were in need of the farm labour for cultivation and the rulers of the kingdom interested for more revenue from agricultural produce, placed no restriction for such migration of the Muslims. However, there was no relaxation in 1853 Code for the migrant Muslims. The descendants of the Muslims settled in the hills still constitute only 3 % of the total Muslim population of Nepal. Rest of 97 % is settled in Terai region mostly bordering India along Bihar and U.P.
Although Muslim conquest of northern India had undermined the centuries old rigid anti-Muslim policy in the kingdom to some extent, the sliding decline of Mogul Empire prompted successive rulers to maintain its Hindu character. Prithvi Narayan Shah during his regime (1743-1775) unified various independent hill kingdoms into modern Nepal. A few months before his death in 1775 he recorded the 'Divya Sandesh' (Divine message), which was a part of the guiding principles for state administration. In his divine message he "had envisaged his kingdom as a land of Hindus, contrasting with 'Mughlana' (India), the land polluted by the rule of the Mughals and their successors". (A History of Nepal by John Helpton, Cambridge, 2005, page 56). This contemptuous language about India because of Muslim-rule over it remained a permanent mental load of Nepali masses. India was known as Moghalan as a common language of Nepalese. It is said that the people of Nepal made it a custom not to drive out the cow, the national animal from their field in south direction to stop its entry in Moghlana, where there was no state restriction on cow-slaughter.
Jang Bahadur, the first Rana Prime Minister in the kingdom expanded the 'Divya Sandesh' and framed 'Mulki Ain' (Law of the Land) 1853 for strict implementation of the caste order based on Hindu social code, which listed the Muslims in the category of impure and untouchables. In fact the people of Nepal tolerated the Muslims known as 'Mlechchhas' (barbarians) with restrictions to the extent that only "raw and dry eatables" were acceptable from their hands. (Article of Marc Gaborieau 1972 in 'Muslim community of South Asia', Edited by T.N.Madan, Manohar, 2001, page 209.).
The Muslims of Nepal strictly followed the Nepal Code of 1853 and accepted their lower social status as loyal citizens and accordingly maintained a very low and profile under the Hindu Monarchy system of governance. It may be interesting to note that even after their long presence in Nepal during the monarchy there was hardly any significant communal problem in the kingdom. Living in Hindu scriptures-based cultural milieu and related social environment for centuries they accepted the situation as it was.
The end of Rana regime in 1951 and establishment of Monarchy-led multi-party coalition government hardly made any change in the social status of the Muslims. The situation more or less remained the same even after 1959 promulgation of constitution and the formation of democratically elected government with B.P. Koirala as Prime Minister. In 1960 King Mahendra dismissed this government and introduced Monarchy-led party less Panchayat system. He replaced the 1853 Code new Code in1963, which provided equal citizen status to the Muslims. Although, the new Code allowed the Muslims to practice their religion freely, the ban on conversion or dissolution of marriage etc remained as it was in 1853 Code. Any attempt to convert people remained a punishable offence with three-year imprisonment. The King however, nominated one Muslim in his National Panchayat and there was no restriction on opening of madrassas.
Even though the 1963 code did not alter the social status of the Muslims it opened a floodgate for the various Ismamist groups from across the boarder to expand their activities in Nepal. With the support of the ISI and financial support from Muslim world there was a speedy growth of madrassas and mosques in both sides of 1751 k.m. Indo-Nepal boarder particularly along the Indian states of U.P. and Bihar.
Some reports suggest that the ISI of Pakistan with a view to make Nepal its hide out for exporting terrorism to India also financed some NGOs to bring demographic imbalance in Terai region by infiltration of Bangladeshi Muslims. The report said, "The official figures show that the strength of the Muslim community in Nepal has grown from 2% of the population in 1981 to 3.5 in 1991. Data compiled by the Nepalese Election Commission in connection with the recent general elections indicates that this figure could now have crossed 5% and more even be close to 10%. Steady migration of Bangladesh Muslims to the Terai considerably contributed to this increase". (India Today, June 12, 2000). Today there are 300 madrassas and 343 mosques within 10 k.m. of the boarder in Indian side while 181 madrassas and 282 mosques are in Nepal side. (Dastider). It is said that the Islamist world is quite liberal in financing the NGOs to the insidious growth of the Islamist fundamentalist net work in Nepal.
As per 1991 Census Report Muslims constitutes 3.4 % of the total population of Nepal, though the figure claimed by the Muslim organisations of the country is between 8 to 10 %. (The figure is based on the source: HMG, CBS, Population monograph, Kathmandu, 1994 as quoted in Understanding Nepal by Mollica Dastider, Har-Anand Publication, 2007, page80).
Since the government of Nepal did not contest such claim of the Muslim organisations, the figure of 10% appears to be nearer to the factual position. The ethnic structure of Terai region as suggested by Dastider also corroborates it. Today four districts of Terai namely Banke, Kapilbastu, Parsa and Rautahat with over fifty percent of Muslim population are now Muslim-majority districts. In five districts namely, Bara, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Sirha and Sunsari Muslims are the second religious majority and in two districts namely Rupandehi and Sarlahi they constitute as a significantly third religious group.
Whatever may be the correct figure of Mislims in Nepal, it is something amazing to see how this significant followers of Islam compromised with anti-Shariat (Islamic laws) un-Islamic Hindu environment and lived there peacefully for centuries. Socio-political scientists might have their own analysis but it gives credence to some views that Shariat could be made flexible if it serves the interest of political Islamists.
By and large Muslims of Nepal had a feeling of better security of their life and properties under the Monarchy led party-less Panchayat system in comparison to their counterparts in secular and multi-party democratic India. They apprehended that Hindu-majority parliamentary rule would endanger even their present identity. Such feeling made them complacent and accordingly, their participation in the pro-democracy movement of early 1990 was minimal. However, taking advantage of the democratic movement some of the fundamentalist organisations like Millat-e-Islamia and Muslim Seva Samiti were found expressing concern over the state sponsored drive for Nepalisation of the people. The Muslim youths took this move as Hinduisation of Muslims.
Political transformation of Nepal from absolute Hindu monarchy to multi-party parliamentary democracy in 1990 was a landmark development in the history of the kingdom. The interim constitution declared Nepal as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign Hindu and constitutional monarchial kingdom. It also said, "The state shall not discriminate among citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe or ideological conviction or any of these".
The end of political discrimination among the citizens on the ground of religion prompted 31 Muslim leaders to contest in the first general election in 1991 after the promulgation of interim constitution from different parties and five of them got elected including three from Nepali Congress and one each from Communist Party of Nepal and Sadbhavana Party. Sheikh Idris of Nepali Congress was also included in the cabinet.
The sudden rise in political profile of the Muslims not only boosted the morale of this centuries old suppressed community but also provided them an opportunity to raise an assertive voice for sharing political and administrative power. Accordingly they raised demands like 10% reservation in constituent assemblies, reserved seats in Parliament and government holidays on Muslim festival. Similarly the radical Islamists also became active to spread their net work in the kingdom to assertively fight for their separate identity. Immediately after the promulgation of interim constitution, the Imam of the Jama Masjid of Kathmandu led a delegation and submitted a 14-points charter of demands to the then Prime Minister K.P.Bhattarai.
Although Muslims were not fully satisfied due to Hindu character of the interim constitution, they had no problem in their socio-political and religious activities. Muslim organisations like Islami Yuva Sangh, Millate Islamia and Ittehadul Muslimeen, which were operating as socio-religious organisations became aggressive in challenging their centuries old subordinate status. This led to communal conflict in some of the Terai regions, where Muslims are in competitive strength.
Spread of the network of Islamist terrorists in post-1990 Nepal became a security problem for India. The infamous hijacking of IC- 184 from the capital of the kingdom in early 2000 suggested that political transformation made this country a safe hide out for the Jehadis to export terrorism in India. ISI might have masterminded this operation but was it possible without the support of local Islamists? According to a report a Nepali national Nayeem Shah arrested in Kathmandu in 1998 for possession of fake Indian currency of 3.5 lakh disclosed that the notes were given to him by Nepalese politician Mirza Dilshad Beg before his assassination. On November 4, 2006, India's Union Home Minister of State Sriprakash Jaiswal said Pakistani Militants had found safe hide-outs In Nepal …"(Outlook.com, November 20, 2006).
The Interim Parliament declared Nepal as a secular state on May 18, 2006, which was incorporated in the interim constitution on May 2007. It says, "Nepal is an independent, invisible, sovereign, secular, inclusive and fully democratic state". Constituent Assembly is to approve this interim constitution after its election in November this year.
How far the Muslim masses of Nepal would integrate in the national mainstream and join the nation building programme under a new political environment only time will say but if the Islamists are not kept under check and political parties imitate the vote-seeking politics of their Indian counterparts, they will remain as backward as they were for centuries. The growth of madrassas in stead of schools for modern education and wide network of Islamist terrorists would only add to their misery. Mushroom growth of Islamic organizations having links with the Radical Islamists of the world has not only become the concern of the people of Nepal but it is also a security risk for India.
On September 1, 2004, thousands of demonstrators stormed the main mosque in Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, sets furniture and carpet on fire, tore up a copy of Quran and chanted "Down with Islam'. They were protesting against the killing of 12 Nepalese labourers in Iraq. Police had to open fire to control the crowd. The incident was a signal for the future relation between Hindu and Muslims of the country, who were living peacefully for centuries.


Source: Ocotber 4, 2007

China’s New Assertiveness in Nepal

Bhaskar Roy

In an interview (June 17) to the publication “Nepal” the new China Ambassador to Nepal, Zheng Xialing, said “China shall not tolerate any foreign intervention in Nepal”. Ambassador Zheng explained, “Whenever the Nepali people face any problem or difficulty, China shall treat them as our own especially when the problems pertain to sovereignty or territorial integrity (emphasis added).

A reading of the text of the interview leaves no doubt that it was carefully prepared in advance by the interviewer and the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu to convey certain messages to India and, also, apparently to the USA. For example, the interviewer recalled Chinese Vice Premier Marshall Chen Yi had said China would not tolerate foreign interference in Nepal, and asked whether that policy had changed.

Other important questions included China’s concerns on Free Tibet campaigners’ activities in Nepal, acceptance of Nepal as a republic and US views of Maoists as terrorists. This interview can be considered as glimpses into China’s readjusted foreign policy towards Nepal after the fall of King Gyanendra and the monarchy. Zheng Xialing’s observations are not idle statements of a senior diplomat, but highly significant and meaningful.

Nepal has been one of the important elements in China’s Indo-Himalayan strategy to ultimately push the de facto Sino-Indian border from Kashmir to Bhutan closer to India’s heartland. Nepal is one of the “five-fingers” strategy of late Mao Zedong. It spells Beijing’s influence and control over Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. To the “five fingers”, there are indications that a “toe” is being added. Some of the Tibetans who have been won over by the Chinese are locating along the Indo-Himalayan belt from Ladakh to Sikkim. Kathmandu is one of the very important centers for meetings between China operatives and their Tibetan contacts from India.

Returning to Ambassador Zheng Xialing’s assurance to protect Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity including from foreign intervention in Nepal, the hardline from Beijing is unmistakable. To this was the added reference to Marshall Chen Yi’s similar statement of assurance in 1962.

Reference to 1962 is of particular importance. The Chinese propaganda machinery frequently claims that India’s “illegal” incursion deeper into Chinese territory was dealt a humiliating blow by the Chinese army, the PLA. In the context of Nepal, Zheng’s statements, obviously cleared by Beijing, does border on not so camouflaged warning to India over Nepal’s affairs.

There is a territorial problem between India and Nepal over Kalapani, which is with India. The matter was thought to have been a settled issue, till Chinese President Jiang Zemin reportedly encouraged the Nepalese governement and Palace to reopen the issue during his official visit to Kathmandu in December, 1996. Almost immediately following President Jiang’s visit the Nepalese reopened the issue with India both officially and through public protests. According to reports, the Kalapani issue has not gone away and friendly Chinese delegations visiting Nepal allegedly remind the Nepalese periodically. The policy is to keep the fire burning slowly till the time comes to raise the intensity and get it raging.

Nepal had three main pillars, and a fourth one was growing. Beijing nurtured all the three i.e. the Palace, the Royal Nepalese Army (now Nepalese Army), and the Nepali Congress (NC). Given the historic importance of the monarchy, especially the belief among the common people that the king is the reincarnation of the God Vishnu on earth, the Palace was Beijing’s first choice for friendship. The army leadership was with the Palace and, hence, scripted for Chinese coalition. The NC was a different issue, with its traditional linkages with India, but NC leaders tried to maintain a balance between Beijing and New Delhi. The CPN (UML), among the left parties became particularly close to the Chinese. The CPN (Maoist) had a problem, having gone underground, fighting the monarchy from 1990. That, however, does not mean the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu did not have any contact with the Maoists. They did, but very carefully.
During the people’s uprising led by the Maoists from 2000, Beijing made a strategic policy mistake, something uncharacteristic for them. They believed the Palace with the army would prevail again, and remained openly pro-Palace. But unlike India, China had already set up some controlled institutions in the country through their old friends, but fully controlled by Beijing through their embassy in Kathmandu.

The Nepal – China Study Centers (NCSC) and fully funded by China and locally supervised by Madhav Nepal, CPN (UML) leader. While the head office of NCSC in located in Kathmandu, the branch offices numbering now more than seven are located close to the Indian border. These centers are involved in anti-India influence peddling, collection of information, promoting China etc. But the NCSC members can be much more damaging. Their potential to create mischief in the Terai region is enormous, and they can remain undetected. The Terai region is already restive, with no united stand even among the Madhesis.

Another Chinese institution is Nepal-China Mutual Co-operation Society (NCMCS). Again funded through the Chinese Embassy, the co-ordination has been entrusted to Prof. Ballab Mani Dahal. The main task of the NCMCS is to promote China and denigrate India and other US as colonialists and exploiters.

The perception in India that it has come up on top in Nepal is all very well. Maoist supremo Prachanda is on record to thank India for its support to the anti-monarchy movement. India is also mediating in the political crises in Nepal, which would be construed in China’s strategic calculations as “intervention”. This is exactly what Ambassador Zheng said in his interview that China would not allow in Nepal.

During the end months of turmoil and the initial stages of return of democracy, China decided to allow India to take the front position. China was in no position to put its foot in the swirling political waters in Nepal. It decided to nourish its constituencies, including firming a better relationship with the Maoists. This is expected to be a totally new relationship.

The China-Nepal railway in the making needs to be viewed in terms of a new strategic advantage for China. The railway project should be operational next year, providing greater connectivity both for passengers and goods between the two countries. It would be a handle for the anti-India Nepalese factions, and would erode to some extant Nepal’s total dependence on India for access to sea ports, notwithstanding the cost difference. It may also be kept in mind China is always capable of providing “friendship” prices to “friends”.

The new political crises in Nepal with the indefinite postponement of the Constituent Assembly (CA) polls for a second time on October 5 could create a fertile ground for Chinese covert intervention. China’s friends, the CPN (UML) and the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party (NMKP) opposed the postponement of the polls, thus dividing the original seven party coalition. The Maoists reneged on the earlier agreement, demanding the country be declared a republic before the CA elections. The reunited NC is sitting rather ineptly in the middle without taking a firm position. Under these conditions India’s leading role in Kathmandu to bring about a reconciliation and emerge as the chief arbitrator in Nepal’s politics goes against Chinese strategic interests.
Ambassador Zheng’s interview portends not only China’s hard-line policy in Nepal vis-à-vis India, but this is likely to extend in their policies to other countries in South Asia to further compress India in its immediate neighborhood. An inimical neighborhood would hamper India’s development and some of the countries of South Asia may be more than willing to play China’s game. It appears a major foreign policy challenge is coming up. It will not do to sweep things under the carpet. The issue will be too big to hide anywhere. The only answer can be a proactive foreign policy.

Source: South Asian Analysis Group, October 8, 2007